Showing posts with label the audience. Show all posts
Showing posts with label the audience. Show all posts

10 July 2023

Richard Maltby—Story as the Cheapest Form of Novelty



Richard Maltby
Harmless Entertainment:
Hollywood and the Ideology of Consensus

(1983)


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THE CANNING BUSINESS

"After all, pictures are shipped
out in cans. We're in the can-
ning business."
Sammy Glick



... "There is ever present the obligation to entertain those who pay the price for what they believe will be entertainment." [Joseph] Breen's job was to ensure that Hollywood produced "entertainment which tends to improve the race, or at least to recreate and rebuild human beings exhausted with the realities of life."

As well as this prescription, the movies were also expected to contain a number of known or anticipated ingredients, which can be characterized in several ways. In fulfilling its "obligation to entertain" the Hollywood movie had, like any other non-durable consumer product, to meet certain standards of quality. Predictable quality was indicated by the same criteria as might be employed by a manufacturer of canned food: the reputation of the producing company's brand name (MGM, Warner Brothers), and the quality of the product's ingredients (starring Cary Grant and Jean Arthur, [etc.]...) Commercially, film, like canned food, required that its customers could anticipate enjoying it by contemplating the mixture of known and reliable ingredients.

On the other hand, while one can's contents should taste exactly like another's, a film needed to present at least the illusion of being distinct from every other film. Even the most formularized B-film entailed a separate act of production and had to supply its spectator/consumers with an element of novelty to keep them engaged in its consumption, as well as the predictable ingredients which would initially lure them to the cinema. Advertising slogans often sought to make this joint appeal. ...

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... Campaigns mounted around a star... offered the audience a novel experience from a familiar, reliable source, an idea perhaps most concisely expressed in the advertisements for Ninotchka, which simply announced, "Garbo laughs."

According to legend, Brian Foy, "The Keeper of the Bs" at Warner Brothers, kept a large pile of scripts permanently on his desk. A completed film's script would go to the bottom of the pile, and after it had worked its way up to the top, it would be remade with a different cast, setting, period, or alteration of other details. Whether or not the story is apocryphal (and Foy did once boast that he had made the same film eleven times), it illustrates an important aspect of Hollywood production techniques: the development of archetypal structures through industrial pressures . The most common criticism of the American cinema, that it is repetitive and formulaic , is in a sense an acknowledgment of its effectiveness as a commodity , as well, of course, as being a tacit declaration in favor of a particular bourgeois individualist notion of art. The operation of such archetypal structures is most clearly visible in B-features because they operated under the most stringent economic restrictions. A typical Republic budget of 1951, for one of its cheapest "Jubilee" category of films with a total production cost of $50,000, shows an expenditure on story and script of $1,800, less than the cost of the unprocessed film to shoot the picture. Operating within such tight financial limits, the cost of developing new material was prohibitive. It was cheaper to keep a stable of contract writers to revamp familiar plotlines. The pressure of a fixed budget exerted similar influence at all stages of production, encouraging the employment of stock companies and stock shots, existing sets and pre-arranged lighting and camera set-ups.

While most acute in B-features, such economic pressures existed in all areas of Hollywood production. The system, as Harry Cohn explained to Robert Parrish, was geared to volume production.

Now, let me give you some facts of life. I release fifty-two pictures a year. I make about forty and buy the rest. Every Friday, the door of this studio opens and I spit a movie out onto Gower Street....  If that door opens and I spit

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and nothing comes out, it means that a lot of people are out of work--drivers, distributors, exhibitors, projectionists, ushers, and a lot of other pricks.

[Parrish, Growing Up In Hollywood]

Standardization was as much an economic necessity in film production as in any other industrial process , and it appeared in the form of conventional or formulaic structures. Warner Brothers, which prided itself on its cost efficiency, was the studio most inclined to remakes. It produced, for example, three versions of The Maltese Falcon in ten years. Throughout Hollywood a standardization of budgeting, scheduling and casting (two stars per A-feature) was the norm.*

This standardization was the means by which predictable quality could be guaranteed to the audience. Its effect was evident in the two most advertised mechanisms of its operation, the film genre and the star system. Both functioned as practical and prior operating indexical systems upon which the audience could base their consumption decisions. A knowledgeable audience would have expectations of a film starring Clark Gable or of a gangster movie, and would decide to go to it or not depending on their past response to identifiably similar products. Although much less considered either by audiences or, in the main, by subsequent criticism equivalent mechanisms operated within the film itself, to provide conventional patterns by which the audience decoded the representation of plot, character, movement, space and time. These various mechanisms, examined in more detail later, formed a matrix of conventional structures within which a fiction comprehensible to its audience could be constructed. Although not immutably fixed, such fictive conventions provided the predominant source of predictability in a Hollywood film, while the equally necessary element of novelty was supplied by the particular story the film narrated.

The audience's principal activity in the cinema is the construction/ consumption of the story the film is telling.

__________
*Jeanne Thomas Allen argues that "Standardisation is primarlly the outcome of the interchangeability of parts made possible by the development of precision tools to replicate identical component systems," and suggests that it might be possible to extend this notion beyond its application to technological development into "the standardisation of film products for marketing efficiency."

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That this is so can be empirically demonstrated by looking at the volume of film criticism that concerns itself only with examining story and theme, as easily as it can be done by asking an audience what the film they have just seen is "about." (Not many people will tell you that it's "about" the dialectical relationship between sound and image track, although every film is "about" that.) This is partly the result of the functional system of film production: the story is the simplest and cheapest ingredient to change and therefore the cheapest form of novelty . Partly, it is simply a matter of societal habit: the ritual consumption of particular, frequently repeated stories is an activity largely reserved for children. The elderly woman who went to The Sound of Music more than 200 times was regarded as such a freak phenomenon that the cinema she patronized took her out of the economic system by giving her a free pass! While the movies clearly do supply frequently repeated fictions describing the same social arenas and presenting the same moral/ideological conclusions, the details of their stories vary. The audience is always buying a new product. The primacy of the story as the object of consumption is also, however, guaranteed by the nature of the fictive conventions used to present it. The mechanisms of these conventions seek to efface themselves, allowing the audience to assume their operation without taking particular notice of them. Eyeline matching is one convention the audience is likely to take for granted, the iconography of a Western is another. The process by which conventions are assumed and disregarded concentrates the audience's attention on the story. It is, in the main, the superstructure of a film that we observe, while the continuity of its deep structures are taken for granted.

"I hope you realize that you're making a perfect
spectacle of yourself," Katharine Hepburn to Cary
Grant in Bringing Up Baby.

If a binary opposition between novelty and predictability, the familiar and the original, can be proposed in the Hollywood product, an overlapping opposition, between narrative and the spectacle of performance, can also be argued for.* While the primary object of consumption is a film's


__________
*In film and literary criticism, "narrative" tends to be used in two senses, corresponding to its adjectival and noun forms. Bordwell and Thompson define a narrative as "a  (cont.)

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story, a second, and sometimes competing, source of audience pleasure is in witnessing spectacular events or the performances of favorite stars. The star system not only provided its audience with commodities other than films to consume, it also provided them with an alternative way to consume the films. The "star vehicle," as Frank McConnell says, existed "primarily, if not solely, for displaying its leading players in as many of their postures as possible." Sneak preview questionnaires asked their audiences to comment on the principal performances separately from the story. The audience's consumption of film as spectacle was accepted by Hollywood's production and advertising alike, as an alternative to engaging the narrative.

...

This tension between narrative and performance is a constant, and perhaps determining, feature of the American cinema. In its largest terms a consensual Hollywood fiction is engaged in both activities at the same time. It


__________
chain of events in cause-effect relationship occurring in time," which is straightforward enough and overlaps considerably (as the dictionary definition of the noun permits) with story. As an adjective, however, narrative refers to the activity of telling a story, rather than that which is told. This ambiguity is inconvenient, and I shall try to keep my use of the term to its second, adjectival, meaning. It should then be clear that narrative refers to something distinct not only from "story," but also from "fiction," which is a larger entity which will encompass both narrative and performance structures .

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performs its conventional articulations--of genre, star persona, space--in the process of narrating its story. They are closely related by separable activities, and the audience can selectively direct its attention towards either or both. While consuming the story spectators may also admire and later imitate) the gestural codes of their favorite performers, or the other codes of spectacular performance that the film offers, such as dress codes in fashion. The codes of the film's performance, both internally (the conventions of the film's construction) and externally (the film's references outside itself to performance codes in the everyday world), operate as a framework in which the act of narration can take place. But the individual spectator may choose to concentrate his or her attention on the conventions themselves: there is an inevitable sense of ritual in watching The Oklahoma Kid's operation of Western conventions, which is inextricably bound up with their effect on the narrative. It is clear from very early on that the film will climax with Cagney shooting it out with Bogart; it is clear that Bogart will be killed, and it is also clear that either Cagney or his brother (Harvey Stephens), who are both in love with the Girl (Rosemary Lane), must die to leave the way free for a romantic resolution. It is not, however, clear which brother will be killed, since the various conventions at work conflict with each other. Cagney is quite used to giving up the Girl to someone more respectable and dying at the end of the picture (The Roaring Twenties, Angels with Dirty Faces), but an outlaw hero can get away with more reprehensible conduct than a gangster, since the frontier offers more possibility than the city for redemption by a good woman. The spectator can be interested in how the story turns out, or in how the film solves the problem of its conflicting conventions. Equally, he or she may view the individual image as a unit of the story, concentrating on the narrative relationships between objects in the frame, or as a spectacle in itself, looking at the objects within the image as separable elements. Neither of these modes of audience behavior is aberrant; both are sanctioned by the way the film is constructed, although different films will find different points of balance. Ultimately the choice of emphasis, for film, audience and critic, is political, since to stress the performance of a film is to signal its artificiality, while privileging its narrative affirms its continuity and holistic nature.

Some generic conventions allow performance to interrupt or fracture narrative more readily than others; musicals and comedies, for example, expect the disruption of

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their narrative progression by separable acts of performance where epics contain their spectacle within the larger narrative framework. A particularly schematic distinction between narrative and performance takes place in the Warner Bros. musicals of the early 1930s: 42nd Street (1933) and Gold Diggers of 1933 divide rigidly into straightforward backstage narratives interrupted by separate musical spectacles which, as Richard Dyer has pointed out, operate different conventions of spatial presentation. This explicit bifurcation of space into separate areas for narrative and performance, work and play, practiced as rigorously by Chaplin in Modern Times (1936) as by Busby Berkeley and his co-directors, is not necessary for performance to be disruptive. Gene Kelly's roller-skate dance in It's Always Fair Weather (M.G.M., 1955), for example, provides a transformation of space by performance, rather than by the perceptual conventions through which it is depicted. Instead of being passively integrated into a narrative space as he has been in the previous sequences, Kelly forcibly asserts himself against it, insisting, by his movements, that the audience's comprehension of the space and the object relations within it be revised. He glides along the street singing to himself, unaware either of the peculiarity of his movement or of his being an object of attention for passers-by. His performance of the song, essentially a private act shared with the film audience, creates a safe performing space free from narrative pressures (he is at the time being pursued by three thugs). Once Kelly becomes aware of his performance, he celebrates the safety it provides by dancing on the skates, drawing a crowd and even stopping the traffic, whereas his narrative identity would insist that he try to be as inconspicuous as possible. As long as he is dancing, in an arena made safe by his performance, he cannot be affected by narrative forces: the three thugs will not find him.

Within the consensus, tradition performance, although always available for consumption, is normally subordinated to and contained by narrative. M.G.M.'s 1936 production San Francisco provides a number of illustrations. Within the framework of a linear narrative built around a triangular relationship involving Clark Gable, Jeanette MacDonald and Jack Holt there are two kinds of suspending performances. McDonald sings a number of songs and arias, presented as events within the narrative (by devices such as intercutting between her singing, audience reaction, and one or both of the men), which propose a narrative development continuing at the same time as the performance, although

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such developments are never in themselves sufficient to justify the songs' duration in the fiction. They supply a separate kind of audience pleasure while remaining firmly placed within the narrative. The other performance is more disruptive of the narrative, since, like the Berkeley numbers, it operates a different set of spatial codings. The spectacle of the earthquake is introduced at a climactic moment of the plot: McDonald has just renounced Holt for Gable (establishing this by performing a song), and Gable has rejected her. At this level the earthquake has the conventional melodramatic function of the external, natural manifestation of the characters' tempestuous emotions (more frequently signaled by a thunderstorm). But the sequence of the earthquake itself is performed in a manner stylistically quite at odds with the rest of the film. The soft-focus quality of the narrative image is exchanged for a hard-edged, sharp-focus clarity, the previously exclusively eyeline-height camera level is replaced by extreme low and high angles and canted shots. Objects, rather than people, occupy the frame, with a concentration on selected details, such as the detached wheel of a crashed carriage, which is photographed spinning to the ground in three shots. The editing tempo is radically increased. It is not simply a montage sequence, nor a performance of special effects, although it is, obviously, both of those things. It is a sequence constructed along lines of expressive articulation quite different from the rest of the film, based on concepts of composition and rhythm, recognizable to the contemporary spectator as influenced by Eisenstein, and in fact the work of Slavko Vorkapich. In much the same way as the other sequences I have mentioned, this three-minute episode self-assertively marks itself off from the rest of the film, and claims a separate existence for itself within the fiction so long as it lasts. The end of the earthquake produces a reassertion of the narrative , which is then concerned with its own resolution as Gable searches for MacDonald. The fiction , however, has not been unaffected by this sequence, and the presentation of spectacle competes with the Gable-MacDonald narrative for fictive centrality during the remaining fifteen minutes of the film--to the extent that in occasional shots Gable, who is the narrative guide through the second earthquake and its aftermath, is abandoned both by the soundtrack suppressing his dialogue in favor of incidental figures (usually screaming), and by the camera's retreating from its usual distance of medium or full shots of him to a repeated placing of him as one among several figures in a long shot.

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There is, then, an inherent tension within Hollywood fictions between the activities of narrative and performance . Supplying a range of commodities from which the audience could, within limits, construct its own entertainment , the American cinema potentially allowed for a considerable diversity of political expression. That, in practice , it promulgated a consensual conservatism was the result not of its formal conventions so much as of its social function . But the containment of performance within narrative by most Hollywood film neither eliminated the possibilities for formal experimentation nor prevented the audience choosing the objects of its consumption within the fiction on offer. Those critics who argue that Hollywood film is essentially a realist narrative form conflate the dialectical relationship between narrative and performance into a unilateral emphasis on story, and restrict the polyvalent possibilities of the film-audience relationship. In terms of a political analysis, such a diagnosis assumes that ideology has a prior existence external to the film, whose operation of it can be seen as a hegemonic activity by the dominant bourgeoisie. If, against this, we see both film and audience as active,

if we see representational force as deriving from the process of becoming , being made, rather than from our contemplation of an object of accomplishment , then this has major implications for the relevance of a vocabulary of communication.

[Chaney, Fictions and Ceremonies]

If we see the film as an enactment , rather than a container , of ideology, then the process of inscription becomes central to the comprehension of ideology within any given film/text. For the critic to presume the existence of an ideologically preconditioned perceptual system--whether derived from a literary or a psychoanalytic aesthetic--is to drastically restrict the possibilities for the act of inscription.


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INTERLUDE

An American definition of a
first-class intelligence:
The ability to hold two opposed
ideas in the mind at the same
time, and still retain the ability
to function.
F. Scott Fitzgerald:
The Crack Up

"PRODUCTION FOR USE"--HOWARD HAWKS

You work your side of the
street, I'll work mine.
Steve McQueen in Bullitt

The imperatives of Hollywood production set strict limits on both the possibilities and the need for thematic sophistication in its individual films. These commercial restrictions are the first and largest hurdle confronting the auteur critic, desperately trying to convince himself and others that the apparently simple is secretly, subversively profound. Howard Hawks is a test case.

Hawks' films may be the models of thematic density that Robin Wood and others take them to be. But if they do reveal a consistent morality through their plot development and dialogue, it is no less rooted in nineteenth-century precepts than Ford's or Chaplin's. More importantly, earnest discussions of the high moral tone of Rio Bravo, dotted with caveats about the film's unpretentious and relaxed good humor, miss the point. The self-evident fact that Hawks' films whole-heartedly accept that their goal is to entertain is the first observation that must be made about them. For

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Hawks, working within the limitations of that perspective--acknowledging the film as product and accepting the status quo of the production system--is not a necessary evil but a positive virtue. It is his very recognition of these limited objectives which gives his practice of cinematic entertainment an emphasis so significantly different from that of his more orthodox contemporaries.

As practiced by Hollywood, entertainment relied on a balance between the familiar and the novel, the familiar being provided by the audience's recognition of conventional characters, situations, and so on. The idea of genre, as providing a stock of this familiar material, is thus central to an understanding of how the American cinema worked. It may be more useful to consider Hawks as a genre rather than an auteur, even if only briefly; the Hawksian hero and Hawksian woman have distinctive qualities that set them apart from other, conventional figures in much the same way that the generic archetypes of the Western are set apart from those of the crime film. Rio Bravo is more a re-make of Only Angels Have Wings than it is a Western. The Bogart-Bacall relationship in The Big Sleep presumes on their previous relationship in To Have and Have Not. Hawks' films repeat themselves, both inside and outside the single narrative, and this repetition provides a sense of enclosure within conventional modes of expression that informs the reactions of characters and audience alike. Looking at the dead Thomas Mitchell's meager possessions in Only Angels Have Wings, Cary Grant says: "Not much to show for twenty-two years." It is the second time he has said it in the film, and it is a line already familiar from Ceiling Zero which will be used again in Air Force. Hawks knows it, and Grant knows it, and he says it as if he knows it, so the audience know it, too. The scene, which makes a point about the necessary limitations of expressing emotion, is--like a generic configuration--transposable from film to film as a substantially intact block.

In keeping with this pattern of construction, the pleasures for the audience in a Hawks film are all incidental ones: whether they be the delights of unlikely engineering achievements (Pocket's rocket in Hatari!), the game-playing of characters within a scene (Bogart and Bacall all the time, Wayne and Clift in Red River, Martin and Brennan in Rio Bravo), or the enforced realization of the irrelevance of the linear plot (the song sequence in Rio Bravo). They are incidental in several senses. They are tangential to the plot.

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They are separate incidents in themselves, whose entertainment value derives from their performance-- how they happen, not why they happen . They are, like the cinema itself, transitory: they give immediate pleasure, and then they're over . In Hawks' narratives, the scene itself, and what happens within it, are more important than the scene's contribution to a developing plot. As a result, there is no imperative for his plots either to make sense or to progress.

If it mattered who killed Owen Taylor, The Big Sleep would collapse. The implausibilities of the story are accepted because attention is diverted elsewhere. The situation simply exists. The town in Rio Bravo is completely cut off. Statement. Narrative fact. This is the point from which the film tees off. The coincidence of Richard Barthelmess' arrival at Barranca in Only Angels Have Wings is not up for examination, it is simply the means of engineering the situations Hawks wants to make his film about. There is no need to explain why Carmen Sternwood walks into Joe Brody's apartment pointing a gun at him when Marlowe and Vivian are already there. Her entry is justified by the new elements she brings to the scene and by what happens after she arrives. Hawks plays on the immediacy of the audience's experience of film in his narrative construction, replacing plot logic with the pressure generated by one piece of film coming after another. The Big Sleep is sustained only by the passage from incident to incident, a completely internal narrative pressure which has no point of reference outside the film itself. The spatial tension of his framing or the a-temporal pacing of his scene transitions substitutes for exegesis. Because each scene works independently as a dramatic set-piece, we always seem to be where we ought to be, and never mind how we got here or where we're going next. With Hawks, you do not suspend your disbelief, you entirely disengage the faculty, because plausibility is not a requirement or an ingredient in his narratives. The plot is the final construct, built from the characters and situations that inhabit it. It comes last, not first , and its development is determined by the situations Hawks wishes to explore, not by a continual narrative pressure towards resolution. It may be more (Rio Bravo) or less (The Big Sleep) coherent, but the plot is never of primary importance. We are never in doubt of its outcome, only of the route.

Hawks' films are not progressive. They are self-contained exercises, and Hawks is a volunteer inside his

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own limitations. As a result, his aims are always limited and tactical. Scenes are frequently about the tactics of the situation they describe (Martin's entry into the Burdett saloon in Rio Bravo. It is not just that Hawks shoots in a deceptively simple visual style in which the camera rarely deviates from the eye-level shot of several characters forced into narrative relationship by their spatial proximity. Nor that this style of shooting emphasizes the claustrophobia of his interiors, establishing a pattern of tension and release between them and his fluid exteriors, where the capacity for expansive movement becomes a celebration of action and performance as their own rewards. Nor is it merely a matter of the way characters relate to each other, relying on conventions of cinematic narrative that allow their relationships to be presented in a form of shorthand, an indexical system of gesture and monosyllabic dialogue that permits the complicit audience to flesh out these skeletal figures.

Within any given scene, Hawks makes his audience work harder than any of his contemporaries . Whether it is a question of keeping pace with the machine-gun dialogue of His Girl Friday, or picking up on the sexual innuendo of Bogart and Bacall, or following the dual illogic of a Grant-Hepburn conversation in Bringing Up Baby, or interpreting a sentimental motive into the rigidly unsentimental action of Only Angels Have Wings, the spectator has to work to keep up and must participate in the scene if it is to function. It is one half of Hawks' dual approach to the question of his audience's passivity. He makes them work to read a second, unstated, layer of meaning within each of his scenes, and achieves their complicity by never making this process of participation explicit through explanation. Either you get the joke or you don't.

This, I take it, is what Hawks meant when he suggested that the director's primary skill was the ability to tell a story. But telling a story (narrative) is not the same as the story itself (plot). One of the things that makes Hawks such a supreme manipulator of narrative is his fluency in persuading the audience to ignore plot incongruities. It is by the very artificiality of his plots and settings that he operates the second, suitably contradictory half of his narrative equation, which emphasizes the passivity of the audience. Their inability to affect the passage of the film is stressed by the illogic of the plot development , by the refusal of Hawks' stories to make sense, to explain them selves, or even to progress.

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Hawks endorses the limited aim of entertainment, but by his practice of it he not only provides a different basis for entertainment and a different narrative model, he also negotiates a different relationship between film and audience. Like the most thoughtful of genre directors, he substitutes economy for realism--a point which should be obvious from the first five minutes of any of his films. The real world outside the cinema does not intrude into the artificiality of his entertainments. Hawks accepts the idea of the film as product, and the status quo of the production system, but he does so overtly, never purporting to present his films as anything other than a diverting illusion. This acknowledgment of limitation makes both the balance and the effect of his narratives differ from those of consensual directors who seek to offer their audiences an illusion of reality.

Instead, Hawks presents us with a fixed artifact, held together by the arbitrary juxtaposition of pieces of film of the same set of characters in different situations, and allows us to engage it at whatever level we choose. The option of presuming that the plot makes sense, even the option of presuming that His Girl Friday is about The Lure of Irresponsibility, is left open to us. By himself acknowledging the arbitrary nature of the film as closed text, and by permeating his films with that acknowledgment (embarrassing his characters by abandoning them in the middle of a two-shot for longer than they can comfortably find a reason to be there), he provides a text which thereby becomes open for the audience to manipulate for themselves. That acknowledgment comes through Hawks' acceptance of the status quo as the initial fact; he accepts the conventions of the cinema because that is a requirement of his industrial position. As he is interested in professionals because he regards competence as more interesting than incompetence, he sees his competent acceptance of convention as no more than the required professionalism of his job. But as a professional, he doesn't make films for amateurs. He does not disguise those conventions or seek to beguile his audience into believing in his films and characters as anything but fictions whose existence is limited to the spectator's experience of the film. Hawks dissents from the consensus by embracing the artificiality of the American cinema, and thus permitting his audience to acknowledge this artificiality at the same time that they acquiesce in the arbitrary nature of his narrative.

With Hawks as a starting-point, it is possible to propose a distinction between two strands of the American

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cinema: the Cinema of the Consensus, and the Cinema of Dissent. That dissent is sometimes, but by no means invariably, overtly political, but that is never its defining quality. What categorizes the Cinema of Dissent is its renegotiation of the relationship between film and audience, as the Consensus is categorized by its failure to do so. That process of renegotiation must always begin with the director's acceptance of the limitations of his position, both in relation to the system of production and in the nature of the unilateral communication he practices with his audience. That is why these Interludes on Dissent will consistently deal with directors who exploit the conventions of Hollywood cinema as a starting-point for their subversion.






Richard Maltby—The Cinematic Contract



Richard Maltby
Harmless Entertainment:
Hollywood and the Ideology of Consensus

(1983)


PART 1

THE CRAP-GAME




CHAPTER 1

TAKING HOLLYWOOD FOR GRANTED


...

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...

"MOVIES ARE YOUR BEST ENTERTAINMENT"

(Industry promotional slogan of early 1950, hastily with-
drawn when it was pointed out that its initials spelt
M. A. Y. B. E.)

What do you go for, go see a
show for?"--lyrics to Dames

entertainment is a type of
performance produced for pro-
fit, performed before a gener-
alised audience (the "public"),
by a trained, paid group who
do nothing else but produce
performances which have the
sole (conscious) aim of pro-
viding pleasure.

Richard Dyer


The American cinema was a commercial institution, and its films were commercial products. Any assessment of those products must acknowledge this economic fact of

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life, and not merely because Hollywood took an industrial attitude to its own activities. Film, by its very nature, proposes a symbiotic relationship between the commercial and the aesthetic . It exists simultaneously in two states. Materially, it is a roll of celluloid, wound onto a metal spool and stored in a tin can. In use, it is a progressive series of "moving pictures, " evanescent shadow images projected onto a blank white screen. Unlike books or paintings, film undergoes a material transformation when it is viewed or experienced. This transformation is engineered by a combination of mechanical and optical processes needing complex projection equipment as well as a large space across which the magnified image is thrown. The economics of these material prerequisites forcibly encourage film to project itself before as large an audience as possible. The evolution of viewing apparatus, from the Kinetoscope and peepshow to the nickelodeon, picture palace and Cinerama, traces a history and an economic logic of larger pictures projected in front of larger audiences. The institution of the cinema is first of all a physical institution of the buildings in which it takes place.

In its inert, tin-can state, film is purely a trading commodity of no intrinsic value or use. As an economic entity it depends on its potential existence as a spectacle offering its consumers an aesthetic experience. It can only perform both its commercial and aesthetic functions when being exhibited to an audience. While showing a film need not involve a financial exchange between customer and exhibitor, the cost of projection, and for that matter of production, must be borne by someone. In capitalist practice, the consumers have conventionally paid for their experience, binding the material requirements for cinema's existence to a commercial system of exchange.

We might, however, consider what it is the spectator actually buys in the cinema. It is nothing tangible or permanent. Film offers the illusion of motion by projecting an uninterrupted flow of sequential images, and the temporal continuity of their projection is essential if the illusion is to be maintained. Each image has a place in this flow, but is of necessity only on temporary exhibition, replaced in a traction of a second by the image that follows it. The temporary nature of the cinematic experience, which is a material condition of film's existence, again differentiates it from stable aesthetic forms such as books or paintings. The spectator does not actually buy anything in the sense that he

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or she leaves the cinema with a material object at the end of a screening. He or she merely rents a seat in the cinema for the duration of a performance, a process we might call buying time. The aesthetic experience that has been purchased ends with the expiry of the commercial transaction that has predicated it. You leave the cinema behind you when you leave the movie theatre.

This transitoriness is a quality common to aesthetic experiences commonly described as "entertainment" ; for example, the circus, vaudeville, or playing a pinball machine. It is, of course, an inevitable condition of any performing art, since the act of performance itself is impermanent. But it may also be seen as a determining condition of entertainment as a sub-species of leisure. Sociologically, leisure can be approximately defined as a non-work activity that is relatively self-determined; that is to say, leisure time is segregated from time spent at work, and is occupied by activities undertaken voluntarily. Such a concept of leisure is a product of an industrial gociety which segments work as separate from other activities. Within a capitalist economy, leisure time can be regarded as a possession , purchased through the expenditure of time at work. At the same time, however, an industrial society turns the provision of leisure into a commercial activity , and what is categorized as leisure for one section of the population becomes work for another : professional sports or the theatre, for example. Leisure thus becomes an activity of consumption--consumption of time if nothing else--and, in consequence, is attached to production.

Leisure is therefore a type of activity which can be recognised through its dependence on commodities, the audience is entertained through the objects it chooses to possess. In the sense of conspicuous consumption this process is easily recognised, it is less easy to grasp in relation to the complementary sense of "spending time."

[Chaney, Fictions and Ceremonies]

In an economic system which treats time as a commodity (the eight-hour day, leisure-time, etc.), the buying and selling of time are normal activities, constantly expressed in the economic metaphors of "spending time," "time-consuming" and so on. Nineteenth-century industrialits regarded their labor force as simply a necessity for production, but in the early twentieth century it was recognized that capitalism must put labor to work as consumers

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as well. One mechanism of this process was to reduce working hours and increase leisure time. In 1926 Henry Ford argued, "It is the influence of leisure on consumption which makes the short day and the short week so necessary." Terms such as Show Business and "the entertainment industry" make semantic associations between amusement and commercial activity and describe entertainment as a subject of economics. Historically the development of commercial mass entertainment--preeminently the cinema--and consumer capitalism are closely related.

Hollywood's self-description as "the entertainment capital of the world," and its happy acceptance of its goal of producing "escapist entertainment," acknowledged that its function was to amuse and distract. The American cinema was, indeed, legally defined as both a business and entertainment by the Supreme Court in 1915, which declared films not to be vehicles for ideas . For fifty years Hollywood acquiesced in this opinion of itself, and provided the primary example of an industrial system devoted to what Lasch describes as "the organisation of leisure as an extension of commodity production." From its establishment as an industry (at the latest by 1922 with the founding of the MPPDA), the American cinema committed itself absolutely to the business of entertainment. Throughout the Classical Age of Hollywood (which lasted until the 1950s) the industry saw itself as manufacturing and merchandising a non-durable consumer commodity, which was the experience of "going to the movies," rather than the specific articles it produced. The picture palaces of the 1920s, the development during the 1930s of longer programs including newsreels, Screeno and other participant activities, indicate that what was being proffered by the cinema was a way of spending part of the "leisure dollar." Individual films were simply the principal manifestation of the mode in which it provided entertainment, but show business embraced such other forms of leisure as fan magazines, fashion and children's toys, as well as promoting consumerism and offering stars as celebrities for public consumption.

The debates over "Mass Culture' arose from the occupation, by commercial enterprises such as the cinema, of territory previously segregated from economics by its appellation as "Art." The cultural distinction between art and entertainment is far from precise: we may not know what entertainment is, but we recognize it when we see it. Its determining characteristics are negative: that which fails to

[14]

be art is entertainment, as is that which lacks a socially or politically significant meaning. "Mere entertainment" is an idea frequently implicit in the term's use, and its connotations are triviality, ephemerality, and an absence of seriousness. Unlike art, entertainment is not "about" something outside itself, but is self-enclosed. Ernest Lindgren suggests entertainment is

In the form of fiction, at least, ... the use of representation to create make-believe situations which are designed to arouse emotion for its own sake, and for the mere pleasure of having it aroused. It is not intended that the emotion shall be carried forward into the practical affairs of life. The emotion is both aroused (titillated is perhaps a better description) and satisfied within a self-contained framework.

[Lindgren, The Art of the Film]
["summarizing ideas" in Collingwood, The Principles of Art]

This self-contained quality, with its inevitable connotation of a lack of seriousness, is the most frequent charge by which entertainment is indicted. Even though their language and their political precepts are at odds, both the elitist critics of "Mass Culture" and the theorists of the Frankfurt School argue the existence of what Dwight MacDonald termed "Gresham's Law in Culture, " in which mass entertainment drives out Art by mimicking and debasing its forms. Mass culture, it is alleged,

pre-digests art for the spectator and spares him effort, provides him with a short-cut to the pleasures of art that detours what is necessarily difficult in genuine art.

[Greenberg, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch"]

At the same time, it forces Art to compete on its vulgar economic terms, or else encourages its ghettoization into an Avant-Garde protected in one way or another from market forces. For Adorno and Horkheimer, who saw this process not simply as a matter of cultural debasement but as an ideological instrument for repressing the difficult, subversive qualities of art, the shallowness of entertainment reduced it to a commodity of consumption which reinforced the exploitative pattern of bourgeois systems of production. "Amusement under late capitalism is the prolongation of work."

These analyses investigated the function of entertainment and, however they phrased it, generally agreed that entertainment was an ideological commodity. But definitions

[15]

of entertainment have, in the main, tended to be affective rather than formal , and describing entertainment as that which is not art in a society which professes pluralism gets you nowhere . One man's meat is still another man's poison. As a function of leisure, entertainment is "deliverance from boredom." As a particular kind of leisure activity, however, entertainment must be defined by its specific formal features. Kaplan distinguishes between entertainment and Johann Huizinga's view of play by suggesting that play involves the subject actively, while entertainment is passive and controlled by others. Such a definition fails to elucidate distinctions that exist in ordinary usage about the relative cultural value of different forms of leisure.

Among the arts of performance, there is a broad, commonly assumed distinction between the performances of High Culture, consisting in performances of musical or dramatic texts which exist independently of any production of them, and the performances of entertainment, in which the text does not have the status of a fixed referent but may be infinitely revised with cultural impunity. Clearly, this distinction between "official" and "unofficial" cultural forms can only be regarded as a tendency, and not as in any sense absolute. However, the sacredness of a "text" by Shakespeare or Tchaikovsky bears on any particular production of it in a way quite different from the responsiveness a stand-up comic brings to his performance of routines before any particular audience.



Of course the sacredness of a "text" may or may not be worth hanging onto in any given case. But this has nothing necessarily to do with the transient-durable distinction. A highly embellished version of a "sacred" text can, potentially, achieve a new durability as "art" just as well as any other version. The difference, rather, is in who keeps the gate and collects the money.

The funny thing about this "sacredness" on one hand and nothing-being-sacred on the other is that both are properly "collective" aspects of art, and both are indispensible precisely because they are collective and "durable" rather than individual and ephemeral.

Implicit in the contrast are distinctions related to the durability of the "text" and between two understandings of the concept of performance. Theatrical performance, in the Grand Tradition of the English theatre from Kean to Olivier, is essentially a matter of interpretation and convincing imitation. In discussing Olivier's Hamlet, there is an implicit assumption that "Hamlet" is a fixed entity, inscribed in the words on the pages of The Complete Works of William Shakespeare. In this sense, performance is primarily a matter of inflecting a given object. Kaplan illustrates both this point and the absence of a sociological distinction between entertainment and art when he says,

The entertainer does respond to his audience, but fundamentally it is a one-way communication; no serious violinist would cut Bach's "Chaconne" in half because of a restless audience.

[Kaplan, Leisure: Theory and Policy]

The stand-up comic, on the other hand, is obliged to respond to his audience in exactly the way Kaplan suggests

[16]

the violinist does not. To carry on regardless would be, in the vernacular of vaudeville, to "die" before the audience.



Stand-up is a particularly interesting example because comics also workshop their routines intensively. This suggests that "entertainment" can be highly refined on the production end, i.e. in a way that is quite incongruous with reception in the mode of "entertainment." i.e. The disposable, self-contained leisure experience actually requires immense effort to design and execute.

We can, then, distinguish between two types of performance: that of the actor, whose primary relationship is with a pre-existing text , and that of the entertainer, whose primary relationship is with the audience . Where the actor performs the text, what the entertainer does is to perform himself, to enact himself as a fiction constructed in collaboration with his audience. The theatrical actor attempts to disguise his presence in the act of performance, immersing his own existence and the audience's suspended disbelief in the character he portrays rather than his portrayal of that character. The entertainer , by contrast, asserts his presence in the act of performance, constantly reminding his audience of his actuality , whether it be in the spectators' knowledge of the tightrope walker's physical vulnerability (if she falls she will break her neck) or in the comic's asides directly addressed to his audience. It is this latter sense of performance as self-assertion that I shall employ from now on.



Perhaps ironically (paradoxically?), there is honesty in

reminding his audience of his actuality
and deceit in
disguising his presence

.

The cinema might seem to occupy an ambiguous position in this typology of performance. It is in itself a fixed text, which appears to deny it the flexibility of response possessed by audience-related performances, while at the same time it does not provide the opportunity for variable interpretation provided by theatrical performance. To clarify its position, it will be necessary to examine the relationship the cinema posits between a film and its audience. Before doing that, however, it is worth pointing out that two conditions of entertainment are particularly appropriate to the material form of film. First is the idea of transitoriness, which is implicit in the ephemeral nature of the cinematic image. The other is the proposition that entertainment is self-contained: "going to the movies" is an event, marked off from other activities by a sustained set of segregations. It takes place in a separate building, which conventionally has this exclusive function and a unique architecture. Its accommodation and lighting are arranged to reduce extraneous sensory perception to a minimum, while the film itself is formally isolated by the strong caesuras of the house lights going down at the beginning and coming up at the end, and the internal device of its opening and closing credits. This experience was, of course, intensified by the grandiose decor of the picture palaces, which impressed even more forcefully on audiences the sensation of being in another world, but the formal devices that insulate the spectator are the same in any cinema. However well-worn the metaphor of the Dream

[17]

Factory may be, the dreaming state remains the most evocative analogy to the cinematic experience, suggesting as it does the contradictory position of the spectator as participant witness to a fantasy not under his or her control. What is perhaps most important about the familiar cinematic sensation of being awake in the dark is the way that it is separated off from other activities, protecting both itself and its spectators for a while from the world outside. This separation, which V. F. Perkins describes as a "public privacy," constitutes it as a self-contained event, formally immune to and removed from events outside the cinema.

David Chaney suggests that

There is a recurrent paradox that as metropolitan provision swamps regional variation, so that we seem to live more in a world of shared forms, there is an increasing emphasis upon retreating from public civility to private individual experience.

[Fictions and Ceremonies]

The formal arrangements of the cinema serve to insulate the audience from each other at the same time that they expose them to an identical apparition. When compared to the audience's experience of theatre, these arrangements precisely chart Chaney's paradoxical movements towards shared forms and private experience. Television, of course, extends both movements even further.



Well, some of this (much, perhaps) has been attempted by (and even successfully institutionalized) by "art." The recent symphony orchestra has imposed much the same thing upon its audience, against which all kinds of grievances have been levelled. Why no such grievances against the cinema? The consultants, who con-fuse and in-sult their clients, say it's the presentation and not the product that is at fault. But if there is a contemporaneous art form which also uproots the audience from quotidian experience, shrouds them in darkness, enforces certain arbitrary conventions, and presents something highly artificial, and if this contemporaneous art form manages to be wildly and ragingly popular while the symphony orchestra enjoys a mere bitter and protracted "death," then maybe it always has been about the product.



THE CINEMATIC CONTRACT

"The Cinema exists in the
distance between the audience
and the screen."
Jean-Luc Godard

Recent critical theories of film, developed out of the rarified atmosphere of Marxist semiotics and Lacanian psychoanalysis, have proposed a model of the cinema that locates the spectator as an essentially passive figure acted on by the film. The individual subject (the spectator) is deprived of his or her centrality by a theoretical assertion that he or she is constituted in a prior existing system,

[18]

which may be identified as "a linguistic system," "the imaginary," or "ideology." The integration of these theoretical discourses by their originators and disciples suggests that we can take these various terms to apply to different aspects of "the system of ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group." The individual subject, deprived of such false bourgeois attributes as free will by his or her restriction within a system of language which determines his or her consciousness, is seen as a receptacle for the various manifestations of this pre-existent and determinist system. The correlative of such a theoretical construction is that the primary object of study is seen to be the language system rather than any particular language event. Despite its immense complexities as a theoretical and analystical discourse, such an approach to the cinematic experience seems to be somewhat simplistic , reducing the audience to a passive amalgam of individuated but not individual receivers of pre-determined messages.

This approach has two weaknesses, which ultimately derive from its origin as a theoretical systemic model. Firstly, it discards Chaney's paradoxical relationship between shared form and private experience by describing the form as a system and singularizing the audience into separate spectators, to whom the system is applied . This singularization is the exact reverse of the cinema's optical process. The camera records a field of vision from a singular point of view, which is itself spatially contiguous to the space it records. In projection, however, the camera's point of view is abstracted from its original spatial context and universalized for the audience, who, wherever they are sitting in the cinema, see the field of view from the same, by now abstracted, point of view. By this process of spatial abstraction and universalization the camera/projector does not so much constitute the spectator as its subject as indicate the difference between perception inside and outside the camera. The single perspective is pluralized by its presentation to a plural audience.

Unmistakably, reproduction as offered by picture magazines and newsreels differs from the image seen by the unarmed eye. Uniqueness and permanence are as closely linked in the latter as are transitoriness and reproducability in the former.

[Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction"]

In the third quarter of the seventeenth century, Samuel van Hoogstraten, a Dutch painter and theorist of perspec-

[19]

tive, constructed a peepshow in which the spectator, looking through a hole in the side of the box, would see a three-dimensional view of the interior of a room. The painting, on five of the interior surfaces of the box, presents its illusion of monocular perspective only from the point at which the peephole is cut, and the box is designed so that it can be viewed from that point alone. Such an artefact, perhaps the archetypal product of the optics of bourgeois individualism, can precisely be said to constitute the viewer as its subject, since it obliges the spectator to adopt a precise geographical position in relation to the image. The cinema, on the other hand, does the very opposite in the way it establishes the spectator's spatial relationship to the screen. The camera records the scene before it from a unique optical position, which the projector then pluralizes and makes equally available to every spectator in the theatre. This pluralization of the image in part accounts for the experiential differences between cinema and theatre, and also emphasizes the distinction between the spectator's perceptions within the cinema and those he or she experiences outside it. The result is to mark a distinction between the fiction of the image and the corporeal, material reality of the spectator, which, Walter Benjamin suggests, "permits the audience to take the position of the critic, without experiencing any personal contact with the actor."

One example of this distinction is an audience's reaction to point-of-view shots taken through car windshields in chase sequences, or the switchback ride sequence in This Is Cinerama. The audience will react physically to such scenes, jumping up and down in their seats as the car hits bumps. But at the same time that they are most obviously viscerally associating with the image before them, the spectators are most concretely aware that they are watching an illusion . The motion might make them sick, but they do not think themselves in danger of falling off the rollercoaster. Chaney describes this "feature of the spectacle" as fulfilling the audience's "desire for vicarious authenticity," and providing "an opportunity for a member of the audience to participate in and yet be distanced from someone risking his life crossing the Niagara Falls, an organization spending many millions of pounds, and Christians actually being eaten by lions." It is not a matter so much of the camera/projector's imposing a point-of-view on the audience as a question of their adopting the camera's perspective. The distinction is between a diktat and a voluntary agreement, but the distinction is essential. If the individual spectator

[20]

is irredeemably fixed in position by the image, then the possibilities of his or her relation to its signification are at best limited to what Stuart Hall describes as "preferred," "negotiated" or "subversive" decodings or readings. If, on the other hand, the audience's role of participant witness is a voluntary one, then their relationship with the image is open to much wider, polyvalent, interpretations. I am suggesting that such polyvalence is implicit in the pluralized nature of the cinematic image as presented to the audience, and that attempts to describe the cinema as constituting its subject misinterpret the nature of the exchange between the audience and the screen .*

To this description of the audience's relation to the image as polyvalent it might be objected that they in fact have no choice as to what they look at. The film preexists its audience in its selection and ordering of images. But in that selection and ordering, it also offers the audience a multiplicity of fictional perspectives. Within any sequence of the most conventional Hollywood fiction the camera may cut among half a dozen distinct spatial placements and provide as many different viewpoints on the events. The cut, for which there is no literary or linguistic equivalent, is an even more obvious instrument to distinguish between the process of cinematic and non-cinematic perception. Only in the cinema can we move our viewpoint without moving physically. The task of the spectator--which is an active task, and a necessary one for even the most basic comprehension of film--is to correlate the separate visual viewpoints, comprehend their spatial relationship, and construct a fiction out of their juxtaposition. Those who propose that the cinema constitutes its subject are in a sense giving no more credit to the audience's capacity than the producers who objected to the introduction of the close-up because the spectators would be confused as to what had happened to the rest of the character. Rather than convert it into a determinist relationship between film cause and spectator effect, we should try to preserve the paradox that the camera's presentation encourages the view-

__________
*It is worth noting that detailed analyses of the proposition that the film constitutes its audience subject have concentrated almost exclusively on the atypical visual rhetoric of the direct point-of-view shot. Even from its own theoretical position, this approach has a great deal more of the image stream to account for than it has yet done.

[21]

er's participatory identification with the performances it presents at the same time that it demonstrably reveals itself as artificial.*

It might be more useful to offer a model of the film-audience relationship based on a model of contractual relations. There is, of course, a legal contract established between spectator and exhibitor by the sale of an admission ticket; that is why box offices display notices announcing that "the management reserves the right to..." The obligations under this contract are, however, limited: try demanding our money back on the grounds that you didn't like the film! However, the broader notion of a contractual relationship between film and audience serves first of all to make the point that the audience's commitment to the film is a voluntary one, particularly since they have already fulfilled their part of the contract by paying the price of admission before seeing the film.** In one sense, the cinematic contract may be taken to be the arrangement by which the filmmakers consent to provide the sequential materials necessary for the construction of a fiction, and the spectator consents to undertake its construction, remaining free to determine significance wherever he or she may choose to locate it. David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson's distinction between plot and story may make the point clearer:

__________
*Walter Benjamin concisely expresses the paradox of the camera: "In the studio the mechanical equipment has penetrated so deeply into reality that its pure aspect freed from the foreign substance of equipment is the result of a special procedure, namely the shooting by the specially adjusted camera and the mounting of the shot together with other similar ones. The equipment-free aspect of reality here has become the height of artifice; the sight of immediate reality has become an orchid in the land of technology."

**We can distinguish two levels of performance participation (negotiation). The first is those social skills displayed in buying tickets, finding one's seat, observing the conventions of attention and applause and managing exiting. The second level is only analytically distinguishable from the first, but it relates to the development of identity involved in attending performances of a distinct style... By patronizing a certain type of performance an individual is asserting a conception of self with distinctive aesthetic tastes and communal commitments.

[22]

The story, then, is a mental reconstruction we make of the events in their chronological order and in their presumed duration and frequency. The plot is the way in which these events are actually presented in the film.

[Bordwell and Thompson, Film Art]

I will elaborate on this distinction and add other terms to it later, but for the moment it is enough to observe that it is obviously possible to construct a wide variety of stories from one plot, simply by varying the emphasis placed on different plot events . Anyone who has ever tried to tell someone else the story of a film, or, even worse, tried to explain "what's happened so far" to someone who has come in late, will know what I mean. The process of constructing a fiction is formally retrospective : it requires a distance between the fictional events and the spectator who puts them to use. In practice, the audience construct the fiction as they go along, relying on their individual powers of memory and observation to locate the material the film provides them with in the overall pattern of the fiction they construct.

Two things should by now be clear. First, the spectator is not a passive recipient of the film . He or she is assigned a task which must be performed if he or she is to elicit any meaning from it. The audience, then, have to work at their entertainment; they have, in fact, to entertain themselves from the material provided on the screen.*

The work involved may not be very hard, and a knowledgeable spectator performs it as unconsciously as he or she might perform a simple task on a factory production line, but the fact that the cinematic contract does provide the spectator with a task to perform if the fiction of the film is to be brought into being is empirically demonstrated every

__________
*They may, for example, choose to do this in "deviant" ways quite contrary to the filmmakers' expectations: the Camp appreciation of B-movies is one example; the repeated viewings of cult films like The Rocky Horror Picture Show, in which audiences dress up as their favorite characters in the film and recite the dialogue with them, is another; tearing up cinema seats during screenings of Rock Around the Clock is a third; and adolescent sexual experimentation in the back row or the drive-in is obviously an extreme possibility in constructing your own entertainment in the cinema.

[23]

time a cinematic convention is ruptured and the spectator has to negotiate a new spatial or character relationship.*

My second point is that an alternative description of the audience's activity is to call it a process of performance. Entertainment is not a system or a material object, it is an activity. The product the American film industry sold in its movie theatres was entertainment, but that commodity was a process in which the audience was contractually obliged to perform a function. Kaplan's distinction between play and entertainment does not, in this analysis, hold. Applying my earlier definition of performance as an act of self-assertion the audience becomes not simply an active presence in the process of cinematic articulation, but necessarily a self-conscious presence. I shall argue later that the cinema of the consensus (which to some extent coincides with what is now commonly, if vaguely, called "the classical Hollywood narrative") seeks to construct a mode of articulation in which the self-conscious role of the audience is reduced to a minimum so that its cinematic fictions may be consumed with as much ease and as little work as possible. To a degree this makes my empirical interpretations of the effects of the consensual mode on fictional construction similar to the conclusions of the theorists I am criticizing. But there are, or at least there seem to me to be, several crucial points of methodological difference, which reveal themselves in terminology. I shall argue that the cinema of the consensus effectively restricts its products to a unilateral mode of communication, in which the spectator is encouraged to construct the fiction intended by the filmmakers because of the conventional arrangements of the fictional material. But I emphatically do not accept that such a procedure is inherent in the cinematic process, or within the Hollywood cinema. The Interludes on Dissent exist precisely to make this point: that it was and

__________
*Recent developments in the theory of motion perception have invalidated the idea that the cinematic illusion results from persistence of vision, and suggest that the spectator is involved in a much more complex unconscious process. "Just as film theorists have supplanted naive notions of cinema as a simple copy of the world with an attempt to come to grips with the medium as a system of representation and signification, so too must the naive notions of persistence of vision and of direct perception be replaced with an effort to understand visual perception itself as a transformational and representational process."

[Joseph and Barbara Anderson, "Motion Perception in Motion Pictures"]

[24]

is possible to make films that contest the assumptions of the consensus by questioning, breaking or exposing its conventional arrangements--and still remain within the Hollywood system.

My second point of disagreement with the systematizers is a discrepancy in the objects of our inquiry. I am much less concerned with the language system of cinema than I am with the language event; that is, with the film as experienced by its audience and as located in its specific historical and ideological context. I am unconvinced that the cinema is either a language or a language system because its production of meaning is both too mimetic and too connotative to be systematized. A science of connotations strikes me as an inherently contradictory proposition. I do not deny the value of a great deal of recent semiological analysis, and it will, I hope, be clear that my own methodlogical techniques have been influenced by formalist and structuralist approaches to film. But I am inclined to think that the study of the cinema is at the moment more in need of historical and textual research than it is of further theoretical speculation.

Finally, I disagree with the assumptions about ideological intention and effect in much recent theoretical writing. European presumptions about ideology cannot be imported unproblematically into the analysis of a culture which has so steadfastly refused to acknowledge their existence. Of course, American society can be subjected to class-based European modes of analysis, but in the process, some acknowledgment should be made of the fact that American institutions do not recognize themselves in these terms. The concept of a dominant ideology fits more readily into a society that consciously operates class divisions than it does in one which propounds its egalitarianism. America's Great Refusal of Marxism is a curious cultural fact the ramifications of which go far beyond the scope of this book. But while the English or French cinemas can clearly be seen to be operating class-based ideologies, I am less convinced that such assumptions can be readily recognized in Hollywood. Equally, the conventional structures of Hollywood which determine its unilateral mode of communication cannot automatically be regarded as hegemonic in purpose even if they achieve that effect. The evolution of the mechanisms of consensus cinema was not concerned with the establishment of an ideological hegemony or the imposition of a particular, ideologically conditioned perceptual system. It was rather a

[25]

technological evolution geared to the production of more efficient entertainment.* Hollywood sought to minimize its audience's effort both because it was economically more effective for it to do so, and because that was what it presumed its audience wanted. Within the contractual framework I have proposed, there is good reason for thinking that it was correct in its presumption. The development of Hollywood's fictional conventions was a gradual process, conducted progressively in film after film, and took the form of an economic dialogue between filmmakers and audience at the box-office. Innovations in form or content were negotiated by their financial success or lack of it; a crude mechanism of consultation, no doubt, but a mechanism nevertheless.**

My proposition, then, is that while the American cinema of the consensus may have established itself as a hegemonic and unilateral system of communication, it did so not out of a conscious or unconscious desire to impose a dominant ideology on its audience, but with the active participation of that audience, which was also maintained through its products. If Hollywood films governed the perception of their audiences, they did so with "the consent of the governed."

__________
*In contrast to Europe, the private business sector in American history has been a more and more important factor in affecting activities, attitudes, and tastes for leisure... education or quality are not primary goals of business. The leisure dimension of American life, inasmuch as a portion of it is dominated by goods or services provided for financial, profit, is efficiently served instead of purposefully elevated.

[looks like a quotation whose marks and endnote have accidentally been omitted]

**I am, of course, making certain assumptions about the legitimacy of capitalist procedures that many Marxist critics would dispute. This seems to me exactly the problem in much critical analysis of the American cinema. I do not seek to defend monopoly capitalism as an economic or ideological institution. I merely intend to acknowledge that that was the condition within which the American cinema operated. Any analysis of its products must place it within that condition rather than insisting against history that it ought to have operated under different conditions.

01 June 2022

McLuhan—The Ground Rules


Marshall McLuhan
Understanding Media (1964)
MIT Press edition (1994)

Stereo sound...is "all-around" or "wrap-around" sound. Previously sound had emanated from a single point in accordance with the bias of visual culture with its fixed point of view. The hi-fi changeover was really for music what cubism had been for printing, and what symbolism had been for literature; namely, the acceptance of multiple facets and planes in a single experience. Another way to put it is to say that stereo is sound in depth, as TV is the visual in depth.

(p. 282)

15 December 2021

Tensions, Releases, Unities


Christopher Lasch
The Minimal Self (1984)
The fundamental importance of the distinction between self and not-self—the source of all other distinctions, it has rightly been said—might suggest that it serves as the first principle of mental life, the axiomatic premise without which mental life cannot even begin. In fact, however, it is a distinction that is accepted, in the infancy of life, only with the greatest reluctance, after fierce inner struggles to deny it; and it remains the source of our existential uneasiness, as well as the source of our intellectual mastery of the world around us.
(p. 163)


[it] presents itself, at first, as a painful separation from the surrounding environment, and this original experience of overwhelming loss becomes the basis of all subsequent experiences of alienation, of historical myths of a lost golden age, and of the myth of the primary fall from grace, which finds its way into so many religions. Religion, like art at its best, seeks precisely to restore the original sense of union with the world, but only after first acknowleding the fact of alienation, conceived as original sin, as hubris followed by divine retribution, as existential loneliness and separation, or in the arts (especially in music, which conveys these experiences at their deepest level), as the rhythm of tension and release followed by inner peace.
(p. 164)

12 December 2021

Lasch—A Refusal To Find Patterns


Christopher Lasch
The Minimal Self (1984)
In the visual arts at least, the celebration of selfhood, as exemplified by abstract expressionism in the late forties and early fifties—the assertion of the artist as a heroic rebel and witness to contemporary despair—had already come under critical attack by the time Roth published his diagnosis of the literary malaise in 1961.
(p. 132)

11 December 2021

The Radical Restriction of Perspective?

Christopher Lasch
The Minimal Self (1984)
Philip Roth once observed, before this kind of observation became a cliché, that the writer's imagination falters in the face of contemporary "actuality," which "is continually outdoing our talents." ... Our culture "tosses up figures almost daily that are the envy of any novelist.". ... In their bafflement and disgust, many writers turn away from the "grander social and political phenomena of our times"...and "take the self as their subject": the "sheer fact of self, the vision of the self as inviolate, powerful, and nervy, self as the only real thing in an unreal environment.
(p. 130)


When social reality becomes imaginatively unmanageable, the imagination takes refuge, as we have seen, in self-defensive survival strategies: exactly the kind of strategies also adopted by the contemporary writer and artist, according to Roth, in their attempt to keep the artistic enterprise alive in an age of extremity. Overwhelmed by the cruelty, disorder, and sheer complexity of modern history, the artist retreats into a solipsistic mode of discourse that represents "not so much an attempt to understand the self," in Roth's words, as an attempt "to assert it." He conducts his own struggle for survival as an artist, under conditions that have made it more and more difficult to transcribe any shared experience or common perceptions of the world, undermined the conventions of artistic realism, and given rise to a type of art that no longer seems to refer to anything outside itself.
(p. 131)

07 November 2021

Bodies and Artifacts (iv-a)—A Story of Jean and LeRoi

Jean Cassou
"The Nostalgia for a Métier"
in
Art History: An Anthology of Modern Criticism (1963)
ed. Wylie Sypher
pp. 399-409

Think of the tragedy of modern artistic consciousness. Try to discern first of all what it really is. We are led back to the inception of the creative act, where the artist can do only what springs from himself alone; and without knowing what his work will be or how it will be received (save that he is utterly sure it will be refused) he appears as a nearly unknown, useless, nameless creature...

It is the grandeur and honor of modern art to have put the accent on this first step in the artistic process, that of conceiving, to have reduced the definition of art itself to conceiving, it being clearly understood that each conception is not an a priori abstraction, that it comes into being only by manifesting itself as a form. But in that form what [it?] signifies is its problematic character: it is a proposal, a hypothesis, an abnormal and subversive venture. And its inventor can only doubt its viability. For in its behalf he has no guarantee, no guarantor. No teaching has guided him in developing it, and since he is alone in his corner and it in no way resembles things produced by certain, sanctioned, and regular methods, it seems to him that the world will not know what to make of it.

16 May 2021

Consensual Art—Interlude

Peter Laugesen: And I also think that, you know, connected with potlatch and art and all this stuff: Art is simply a gift. Art should be a gift. Art should be given freely to everyone. Not because they maybe want it, but maybe because they don't want it. That's potlatch. I think we should change the slogan we have here to exactly the opposite: "Fear Everything Expect Nothing".

"Fear Everything Expect Nothing"
in Expect Anything Fear Nothing (2011)
ed. Rasmussen and Jakobsen
p. 281
Living in Los Angeles has convinced me that this only works if people have a reasonable means of escape/abstention. Trapping those who "don't want it" in subway cars or in their own neighborhoods seems to me quite contrary to much Situationist thought. We become the bureaucrats this way, no matter our intentions or class position. The saying "captive audience" comes from a bourgeois idiom; radicals nonetheless ignore at their own peril.

Perhaps if people can escape then it's no longer a potlatch. Fine. Sending them running is warlike enough for me! But they don't all run, not even when you most expect them to, not even in San Diego, Bismarck, or Pocatello, and that is the wisdom of sentiments such as the above.