Showing posts with label capitalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label capitalism. Show all posts

10 July 2023

Richard Maltby—The Cinematic Contract



Richard Maltby
Harmless Entertainment:
Hollywood and the Ideology of Consensus

(1983)


PART 1

THE CRAP-GAME




CHAPTER 1

TAKING HOLLYWOOD FOR GRANTED


...

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...

"MOVIES ARE YOUR BEST ENTERTAINMENT"

(Industry promotional slogan of early 1950, hastily with-
drawn when it was pointed out that its initials spelt
M. A. Y. B. E.)

What do you go for, go see a
show for?"--lyrics to Dames

entertainment is a type of
performance produced for pro-
fit, performed before a gener-
alised audience (the "public"),
by a trained, paid group who
do nothing else but produce
performances which have the
sole (conscious) aim of pro-
viding pleasure.

Richard Dyer


The American cinema was a commercial institution, and its films were commercial products. Any assessment of those products must acknowledge this economic fact of

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life, and not merely because Hollywood took an industrial attitude to its own activities. Film, by its very nature, proposes a symbiotic relationship between the commercial and the aesthetic . It exists simultaneously in two states. Materially, it is a roll of celluloid, wound onto a metal spool and stored in a tin can. In use, it is a progressive series of "moving pictures, " evanescent shadow images projected onto a blank white screen. Unlike books or paintings, film undergoes a material transformation when it is viewed or experienced. This transformation is engineered by a combination of mechanical and optical processes needing complex projection equipment as well as a large space across which the magnified image is thrown. The economics of these material prerequisites forcibly encourage film to project itself before as large an audience as possible. The evolution of viewing apparatus, from the Kinetoscope and peepshow to the nickelodeon, picture palace and Cinerama, traces a history and an economic logic of larger pictures projected in front of larger audiences. The institution of the cinema is first of all a physical institution of the buildings in which it takes place.

In its inert, tin-can state, film is purely a trading commodity of no intrinsic value or use. As an economic entity it depends on its potential existence as a spectacle offering its consumers an aesthetic experience. It can only perform both its commercial and aesthetic functions when being exhibited to an audience. While showing a film need not involve a financial exchange between customer and exhibitor, the cost of projection, and for that matter of production, must be borne by someone. In capitalist practice, the consumers have conventionally paid for their experience, binding the material requirements for cinema's existence to a commercial system of exchange.

We might, however, consider what it is the spectator actually buys in the cinema. It is nothing tangible or permanent. Film offers the illusion of motion by projecting an uninterrupted flow of sequential images, and the temporal continuity of their projection is essential if the illusion is to be maintained. Each image has a place in this flow, but is of necessity only on temporary exhibition, replaced in a traction of a second by the image that follows it. The temporary nature of the cinematic experience, which is a material condition of film's existence, again differentiates it from stable aesthetic forms such as books or paintings. The spectator does not actually buy anything in the sense that he

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or she leaves the cinema with a material object at the end of a screening. He or she merely rents a seat in the cinema for the duration of a performance, a process we might call buying time. The aesthetic experience that has been purchased ends with the expiry of the commercial transaction that has predicated it. You leave the cinema behind you when you leave the movie theatre.

This transitoriness is a quality common to aesthetic experiences commonly described as "entertainment" ; for example, the circus, vaudeville, or playing a pinball machine. It is, of course, an inevitable condition of any performing art, since the act of performance itself is impermanent. But it may also be seen as a determining condition of entertainment as a sub-species of leisure. Sociologically, leisure can be approximately defined as a non-work activity that is relatively self-determined; that is to say, leisure time is segregated from time spent at work, and is occupied by activities undertaken voluntarily. Such a concept of leisure is a product of an industrial gociety which segments work as separate from other activities. Within a capitalist economy, leisure time can be regarded as a possession , purchased through the expenditure of time at work. At the same time, however, an industrial society turns the provision of leisure into a commercial activity , and what is categorized as leisure for one section of the population becomes work for another : professional sports or the theatre, for example. Leisure thus becomes an activity of consumption--consumption of time if nothing else--and, in consequence, is attached to production.

Leisure is therefore a type of activity which can be recognised through its dependence on commodities, the audience is entertained through the objects it chooses to possess. In the sense of conspicuous consumption this process is easily recognised, it is less easy to grasp in relation to the complementary sense of "spending time."

[Chaney, Fictions and Ceremonies]

In an economic system which treats time as a commodity (the eight-hour day, leisure-time, etc.), the buying and selling of time are normal activities, constantly expressed in the economic metaphors of "spending time," "time-consuming" and so on. Nineteenth-century industrialits regarded their labor force as simply a necessity for production, but in the early twentieth century it was recognized that capitalism must put labor to work as consumers

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as well. One mechanism of this process was to reduce working hours and increase leisure time. In 1926 Henry Ford argued, "It is the influence of leisure on consumption which makes the short day and the short week so necessary." Terms such as Show Business and "the entertainment industry" make semantic associations between amusement and commercial activity and describe entertainment as a subject of economics. Historically the development of commercial mass entertainment--preeminently the cinema--and consumer capitalism are closely related.

Hollywood's self-description as "the entertainment capital of the world," and its happy acceptance of its goal of producing "escapist entertainment," acknowledged that its function was to amuse and distract. The American cinema was, indeed, legally defined as both a business and entertainment by the Supreme Court in 1915, which declared films not to be vehicles for ideas . For fifty years Hollywood acquiesced in this opinion of itself, and provided the primary example of an industrial system devoted to what Lasch describes as "the organisation of leisure as an extension of commodity production." From its establishment as an industry (at the latest by 1922 with the founding of the MPPDA), the American cinema committed itself absolutely to the business of entertainment. Throughout the Classical Age of Hollywood (which lasted until the 1950s) the industry saw itself as manufacturing and merchandising a non-durable consumer commodity, which was the experience of "going to the movies," rather than the specific articles it produced. The picture palaces of the 1920s, the development during the 1930s of longer programs including newsreels, Screeno and other participant activities, indicate that what was being proffered by the cinema was a way of spending part of the "leisure dollar." Individual films were simply the principal manifestation of the mode in which it provided entertainment, but show business embraced such other forms of leisure as fan magazines, fashion and children's toys, as well as promoting consumerism and offering stars as celebrities for public consumption.

The debates over "Mass Culture' arose from the occupation, by commercial enterprises such as the cinema, of territory previously segregated from economics by its appellation as "Art." The cultural distinction between art and entertainment is far from precise: we may not know what entertainment is, but we recognize it when we see it. Its determining characteristics are negative: that which fails to

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be art is entertainment, as is that which lacks a socially or politically significant meaning. "Mere entertainment" is an idea frequently implicit in the term's use, and its connotations are triviality, ephemerality, and an absence of seriousness. Unlike art, entertainment is not "about" something outside itself, but is self-enclosed. Ernest Lindgren suggests entertainment is

In the form of fiction, at least, ... the use of representation to create make-believe situations which are designed to arouse emotion for its own sake, and for the mere pleasure of having it aroused. It is not intended that the emotion shall be carried forward into the practical affairs of life. The emotion is both aroused (titillated is perhaps a better description) and satisfied within a self-contained framework.

[Lindgren, The Art of the Film]
["summarizing ideas" in Collingwood, The Principles of Art]

This self-contained quality, with its inevitable connotation of a lack of seriousness, is the most frequent charge by which entertainment is indicted. Even though their language and their political precepts are at odds, both the elitist critics of "Mass Culture" and the theorists of the Frankfurt School argue the existence of what Dwight MacDonald termed "Gresham's Law in Culture, " in which mass entertainment drives out Art by mimicking and debasing its forms. Mass culture, it is alleged,

pre-digests art for the spectator and spares him effort, provides him with a short-cut to the pleasures of art that detours what is necessarily difficult in genuine art.

[Greenberg, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch"]

At the same time, it forces Art to compete on its vulgar economic terms, or else encourages its ghettoization into an Avant-Garde protected in one way or another from market forces. For Adorno and Horkheimer, who saw this process not simply as a matter of cultural debasement but as an ideological instrument for repressing the difficult, subversive qualities of art, the shallowness of entertainment reduced it to a commodity of consumption which reinforced the exploitative pattern of bourgeois systems of production. "Amusement under late capitalism is the prolongation of work."

These analyses investigated the function of entertainment and, however they phrased it, generally agreed that entertainment was an ideological commodity. But definitions

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of entertainment have, in the main, tended to be affective rather than formal , and describing entertainment as that which is not art in a society which professes pluralism gets you nowhere . One man's meat is still another man's poison. As a function of leisure, entertainment is "deliverance from boredom." As a particular kind of leisure activity, however, entertainment must be defined by its specific formal features. Kaplan distinguishes between entertainment and Johann Huizinga's view of play by suggesting that play involves the subject actively, while entertainment is passive and controlled by others. Such a definition fails to elucidate distinctions that exist in ordinary usage about the relative cultural value of different forms of leisure.

Among the arts of performance, there is a broad, commonly assumed distinction between the performances of High Culture, consisting in performances of musical or dramatic texts which exist independently of any production of them, and the performances of entertainment, in which the text does not have the status of a fixed referent but may be infinitely revised with cultural impunity. Clearly, this distinction between "official" and "unofficial" cultural forms can only be regarded as a tendency, and not as in any sense absolute. However, the sacredness of a "text" by Shakespeare or Tchaikovsky bears on any particular production of it in a way quite different from the responsiveness a stand-up comic brings to his performance of routines before any particular audience.



Of course the sacredness of a "text" may or may not be worth hanging onto in any given case. But this has nothing necessarily to do with the transient-durable distinction. A highly embellished version of a "sacred" text can, potentially, achieve a new durability as "art" just as well as any other version. The difference, rather, is in who keeps the gate and collects the money.

The funny thing about this "sacredness" on one hand and nothing-being-sacred on the other is that both are properly "collective" aspects of art, and both are indispensible precisely because they are collective and "durable" rather than individual and ephemeral.

Implicit in the contrast are distinctions related to the durability of the "text" and between two understandings of the concept of performance. Theatrical performance, in the Grand Tradition of the English theatre from Kean to Olivier, is essentially a matter of interpretation and convincing imitation. In discussing Olivier's Hamlet, there is an implicit assumption that "Hamlet" is a fixed entity, inscribed in the words on the pages of The Complete Works of William Shakespeare. In this sense, performance is primarily a matter of inflecting a given object. Kaplan illustrates both this point and the absence of a sociological distinction between entertainment and art when he says,

The entertainer does respond to his audience, but fundamentally it is a one-way communication; no serious violinist would cut Bach's "Chaconne" in half because of a restless audience.

[Kaplan, Leisure: Theory and Policy]

The stand-up comic, on the other hand, is obliged to respond to his audience in exactly the way Kaplan suggests

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the violinist does not. To carry on regardless would be, in the vernacular of vaudeville, to "die" before the audience.



Stand-up is a particularly interesting example because comics also workshop their routines intensively. This suggests that "entertainment" can be highly refined on the production end, i.e. in a way that is quite incongruous with reception in the mode of "entertainment." i.e. The disposable, self-contained leisure experience actually requires immense effort to design and execute.

We can, then, distinguish between two types of performance: that of the actor, whose primary relationship is with a pre-existing text , and that of the entertainer, whose primary relationship is with the audience . Where the actor performs the text, what the entertainer does is to perform himself, to enact himself as a fiction constructed in collaboration with his audience. The theatrical actor attempts to disguise his presence in the act of performance, immersing his own existence and the audience's suspended disbelief in the character he portrays rather than his portrayal of that character. The entertainer , by contrast, asserts his presence in the act of performance, constantly reminding his audience of his actuality , whether it be in the spectators' knowledge of the tightrope walker's physical vulnerability (if she falls she will break her neck) or in the comic's asides directly addressed to his audience. It is this latter sense of performance as self-assertion that I shall employ from now on.



Perhaps ironically (paradoxically?), there is honesty in

reminding his audience of his actuality
and deceit in
disguising his presence

.

The cinema might seem to occupy an ambiguous position in this typology of performance. It is in itself a fixed text, which appears to deny it the flexibility of response possessed by audience-related performances, while at the same time it does not provide the opportunity for variable interpretation provided by theatrical performance. To clarify its position, it will be necessary to examine the relationship the cinema posits between a film and its audience. Before doing that, however, it is worth pointing out that two conditions of entertainment are particularly appropriate to the material form of film. First is the idea of transitoriness, which is implicit in the ephemeral nature of the cinematic image. The other is the proposition that entertainment is self-contained: "going to the movies" is an event, marked off from other activities by a sustained set of segregations. It takes place in a separate building, which conventionally has this exclusive function and a unique architecture. Its accommodation and lighting are arranged to reduce extraneous sensory perception to a minimum, while the film itself is formally isolated by the strong caesuras of the house lights going down at the beginning and coming up at the end, and the internal device of its opening and closing credits. This experience was, of course, intensified by the grandiose decor of the picture palaces, which impressed even more forcefully on audiences the sensation of being in another world, but the formal devices that insulate the spectator are the same in any cinema. However well-worn the metaphor of the Dream

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Factory may be, the dreaming state remains the most evocative analogy to the cinematic experience, suggesting as it does the contradictory position of the spectator as participant witness to a fantasy not under his or her control. What is perhaps most important about the familiar cinematic sensation of being awake in the dark is the way that it is separated off from other activities, protecting both itself and its spectators for a while from the world outside. This separation, which V. F. Perkins describes as a "public privacy," constitutes it as a self-contained event, formally immune to and removed from events outside the cinema.

David Chaney suggests that

There is a recurrent paradox that as metropolitan provision swamps regional variation, so that we seem to live more in a world of shared forms, there is an increasing emphasis upon retreating from public civility to private individual experience.

[Fictions and Ceremonies]

The formal arrangements of the cinema serve to insulate the audience from each other at the same time that they expose them to an identical apparition. When compared to the audience's experience of theatre, these arrangements precisely chart Chaney's paradoxical movements towards shared forms and private experience. Television, of course, extends both movements even further.



Well, some of this (much, perhaps) has been attempted by (and even successfully institutionalized) by "art." The recent symphony orchestra has imposed much the same thing upon its audience, against which all kinds of grievances have been levelled. Why no such grievances against the cinema? The consultants, who con-fuse and in-sult their clients, say it's the presentation and not the product that is at fault. But if there is a contemporaneous art form which also uproots the audience from quotidian experience, shrouds them in darkness, enforces certain arbitrary conventions, and presents something highly artificial, and if this contemporaneous art form manages to be wildly and ragingly popular while the symphony orchestra enjoys a mere bitter and protracted "death," then maybe it always has been about the product.



THE CINEMATIC CONTRACT

"The Cinema exists in the
distance between the audience
and the screen."
Jean-Luc Godard

Recent critical theories of film, developed out of the rarified atmosphere of Marxist semiotics and Lacanian psychoanalysis, have proposed a model of the cinema that locates the spectator as an essentially passive figure acted on by the film. The individual subject (the spectator) is deprived of his or her centrality by a theoretical assertion that he or she is constituted in a prior existing system,

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which may be identified as "a linguistic system," "the imaginary," or "ideology." The integration of these theoretical discourses by their originators and disciples suggests that we can take these various terms to apply to different aspects of "the system of ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group." The individual subject, deprived of such false bourgeois attributes as free will by his or her restriction within a system of language which determines his or her consciousness, is seen as a receptacle for the various manifestations of this pre-existent and determinist system. The correlative of such a theoretical construction is that the primary object of study is seen to be the language system rather than any particular language event. Despite its immense complexities as a theoretical and analystical discourse, such an approach to the cinematic experience seems to be somewhat simplistic , reducing the audience to a passive amalgam of individuated but not individual receivers of pre-determined messages.

This approach has two weaknesses, which ultimately derive from its origin as a theoretical systemic model. Firstly, it discards Chaney's paradoxical relationship between shared form and private experience by describing the form as a system and singularizing the audience into separate spectators, to whom the system is applied . This singularization is the exact reverse of the cinema's optical process. The camera records a field of vision from a singular point of view, which is itself spatially contiguous to the space it records. In projection, however, the camera's point of view is abstracted from its original spatial context and universalized for the audience, who, wherever they are sitting in the cinema, see the field of view from the same, by now abstracted, point of view. By this process of spatial abstraction and universalization the camera/projector does not so much constitute the spectator as its subject as indicate the difference between perception inside and outside the camera. The single perspective is pluralized by its presentation to a plural audience.

Unmistakably, reproduction as offered by picture magazines and newsreels differs from the image seen by the unarmed eye. Uniqueness and permanence are as closely linked in the latter as are transitoriness and reproducability in the former.

[Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction"]

In the third quarter of the seventeenth century, Samuel van Hoogstraten, a Dutch painter and theorist of perspec-

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tive, constructed a peepshow in which the spectator, looking through a hole in the side of the box, would see a three-dimensional view of the interior of a room. The painting, on five of the interior surfaces of the box, presents its illusion of monocular perspective only from the point at which the peephole is cut, and the box is designed so that it can be viewed from that point alone. Such an artefact, perhaps the archetypal product of the optics of bourgeois individualism, can precisely be said to constitute the viewer as its subject, since it obliges the spectator to adopt a precise geographical position in relation to the image. The cinema, on the other hand, does the very opposite in the way it establishes the spectator's spatial relationship to the screen. The camera records the scene before it from a unique optical position, which the projector then pluralizes and makes equally available to every spectator in the theatre. This pluralization of the image in part accounts for the experiential differences between cinema and theatre, and also emphasizes the distinction between the spectator's perceptions within the cinema and those he or she experiences outside it. The result is to mark a distinction between the fiction of the image and the corporeal, material reality of the spectator, which, Walter Benjamin suggests, "permits the audience to take the position of the critic, without experiencing any personal contact with the actor."

One example of this distinction is an audience's reaction to point-of-view shots taken through car windshields in chase sequences, or the switchback ride sequence in This Is Cinerama. The audience will react physically to such scenes, jumping up and down in their seats as the car hits bumps. But at the same time that they are most obviously viscerally associating with the image before them, the spectators are most concretely aware that they are watching an illusion . The motion might make them sick, but they do not think themselves in danger of falling off the rollercoaster. Chaney describes this "feature of the spectacle" as fulfilling the audience's "desire for vicarious authenticity," and providing "an opportunity for a member of the audience to participate in and yet be distanced from someone risking his life crossing the Niagara Falls, an organization spending many millions of pounds, and Christians actually being eaten by lions." It is not a matter so much of the camera/projector's imposing a point-of-view on the audience as a question of their adopting the camera's perspective. The distinction is between a diktat and a voluntary agreement, but the distinction is essential. If the individual spectator

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is irredeemably fixed in position by the image, then the possibilities of his or her relation to its signification are at best limited to what Stuart Hall describes as "preferred," "negotiated" or "subversive" decodings or readings. If, on the other hand, the audience's role of participant witness is a voluntary one, then their relationship with the image is open to much wider, polyvalent, interpretations. I am suggesting that such polyvalence is implicit in the pluralized nature of the cinematic image as presented to the audience, and that attempts to describe the cinema as constituting its subject misinterpret the nature of the exchange between the audience and the screen .*

To this description of the audience's relation to the image as polyvalent it might be objected that they in fact have no choice as to what they look at. The film preexists its audience in its selection and ordering of images. But in that selection and ordering, it also offers the audience a multiplicity of fictional perspectives. Within any sequence of the most conventional Hollywood fiction the camera may cut among half a dozen distinct spatial placements and provide as many different viewpoints on the events. The cut, for which there is no literary or linguistic equivalent, is an even more obvious instrument to distinguish between the process of cinematic and non-cinematic perception. Only in the cinema can we move our viewpoint without moving physically. The task of the spectator--which is an active task, and a necessary one for even the most basic comprehension of film--is to correlate the separate visual viewpoints, comprehend their spatial relationship, and construct a fiction out of their juxtaposition. Those who propose that the cinema constitutes its subject are in a sense giving no more credit to the audience's capacity than the producers who objected to the introduction of the close-up because the spectators would be confused as to what had happened to the rest of the character. Rather than convert it into a determinist relationship between film cause and spectator effect, we should try to preserve the paradox that the camera's presentation encourages the view-

__________
*It is worth noting that detailed analyses of the proposition that the film constitutes its audience subject have concentrated almost exclusively on the atypical visual rhetoric of the direct point-of-view shot. Even from its own theoretical position, this approach has a great deal more of the image stream to account for than it has yet done.

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er's participatory identification with the performances it presents at the same time that it demonstrably reveals itself as artificial.*

It might be more useful to offer a model of the film-audience relationship based on a model of contractual relations. There is, of course, a legal contract established between spectator and exhibitor by the sale of an admission ticket; that is why box offices display notices announcing that "the management reserves the right to..." The obligations under this contract are, however, limited: try demanding our money back on the grounds that you didn't like the film! However, the broader notion of a contractual relationship between film and audience serves first of all to make the point that the audience's commitment to the film is a voluntary one, particularly since they have already fulfilled their part of the contract by paying the price of admission before seeing the film.** In one sense, the cinematic contract may be taken to be the arrangement by which the filmmakers consent to provide the sequential materials necessary for the construction of a fiction, and the spectator consents to undertake its construction, remaining free to determine significance wherever he or she may choose to locate it. David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson's distinction between plot and story may make the point clearer:

__________
*Walter Benjamin concisely expresses the paradox of the camera: "In the studio the mechanical equipment has penetrated so deeply into reality that its pure aspect freed from the foreign substance of equipment is the result of a special procedure, namely the shooting by the specially adjusted camera and the mounting of the shot together with other similar ones. The equipment-free aspect of reality here has become the height of artifice; the sight of immediate reality has become an orchid in the land of technology."

**We can distinguish two levels of performance participation (negotiation). The first is those social skills displayed in buying tickets, finding one's seat, observing the conventions of attention and applause and managing exiting. The second level is only analytically distinguishable from the first, but it relates to the development of identity involved in attending performances of a distinct style... By patronizing a certain type of performance an individual is asserting a conception of self with distinctive aesthetic tastes and communal commitments.

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The story, then, is a mental reconstruction we make of the events in their chronological order and in their presumed duration and frequency. The plot is the way in which these events are actually presented in the film.

[Bordwell and Thompson, Film Art]

I will elaborate on this distinction and add other terms to it later, but for the moment it is enough to observe that it is obviously possible to construct a wide variety of stories from one plot, simply by varying the emphasis placed on different plot events . Anyone who has ever tried to tell someone else the story of a film, or, even worse, tried to explain "what's happened so far" to someone who has come in late, will know what I mean. The process of constructing a fiction is formally retrospective : it requires a distance between the fictional events and the spectator who puts them to use. In practice, the audience construct the fiction as they go along, relying on their individual powers of memory and observation to locate the material the film provides them with in the overall pattern of the fiction they construct.

Two things should by now be clear. First, the spectator is not a passive recipient of the film . He or she is assigned a task which must be performed if he or she is to elicit any meaning from it. The audience, then, have to work at their entertainment; they have, in fact, to entertain themselves from the material provided on the screen.*

The work involved may not be very hard, and a knowledgeable spectator performs it as unconsciously as he or she might perform a simple task on a factory production line, but the fact that the cinematic contract does provide the spectator with a task to perform if the fiction of the film is to be brought into being is empirically demonstrated every

__________
*They may, for example, choose to do this in "deviant" ways quite contrary to the filmmakers' expectations: the Camp appreciation of B-movies is one example; the repeated viewings of cult films like The Rocky Horror Picture Show, in which audiences dress up as their favorite characters in the film and recite the dialogue with them, is another; tearing up cinema seats during screenings of Rock Around the Clock is a third; and adolescent sexual experimentation in the back row or the drive-in is obviously an extreme possibility in constructing your own entertainment in the cinema.

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time a cinematic convention is ruptured and the spectator has to negotiate a new spatial or character relationship.*

My second point is that an alternative description of the audience's activity is to call it a process of performance. Entertainment is not a system or a material object, it is an activity. The product the American film industry sold in its movie theatres was entertainment, but that commodity was a process in which the audience was contractually obliged to perform a function. Kaplan's distinction between play and entertainment does not, in this analysis, hold. Applying my earlier definition of performance as an act of self-assertion the audience becomes not simply an active presence in the process of cinematic articulation, but necessarily a self-conscious presence. I shall argue later that the cinema of the consensus (which to some extent coincides with what is now commonly, if vaguely, called "the classical Hollywood narrative") seeks to construct a mode of articulation in which the self-conscious role of the audience is reduced to a minimum so that its cinematic fictions may be consumed with as much ease and as little work as possible. To a degree this makes my empirical interpretations of the effects of the consensual mode on fictional construction similar to the conclusions of the theorists I am criticizing. But there are, or at least there seem to me to be, several crucial points of methodological difference, which reveal themselves in terminology. I shall argue that the cinema of the consensus effectively restricts its products to a unilateral mode of communication, in which the spectator is encouraged to construct the fiction intended by the filmmakers because of the conventional arrangements of the fictional material. But I emphatically do not accept that such a procedure is inherent in the cinematic process, or within the Hollywood cinema. The Interludes on Dissent exist precisely to make this point: that it was and

__________
*Recent developments in the theory of motion perception have invalidated the idea that the cinematic illusion results from persistence of vision, and suggest that the spectator is involved in a much more complex unconscious process. "Just as film theorists have supplanted naive notions of cinema as a simple copy of the world with an attempt to come to grips with the medium as a system of representation and signification, so too must the naive notions of persistence of vision and of direct perception be replaced with an effort to understand visual perception itself as a transformational and representational process."

[Joseph and Barbara Anderson, "Motion Perception in Motion Pictures"]

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is possible to make films that contest the assumptions of the consensus by questioning, breaking or exposing its conventional arrangements--and still remain within the Hollywood system.

My second point of disagreement with the systematizers is a discrepancy in the objects of our inquiry. I am much less concerned with the language system of cinema than I am with the language event; that is, with the film as experienced by its audience and as located in its specific historical and ideological context. I am unconvinced that the cinema is either a language or a language system because its production of meaning is both too mimetic and too connotative to be systematized. A science of connotations strikes me as an inherently contradictory proposition. I do not deny the value of a great deal of recent semiological analysis, and it will, I hope, be clear that my own methodlogical techniques have been influenced by formalist and structuralist approaches to film. But I am inclined to think that the study of the cinema is at the moment more in need of historical and textual research than it is of further theoretical speculation.

Finally, I disagree with the assumptions about ideological intention and effect in much recent theoretical writing. European presumptions about ideology cannot be imported unproblematically into the analysis of a culture which has so steadfastly refused to acknowledge their existence. Of course, American society can be subjected to class-based European modes of analysis, but in the process, some acknowledgment should be made of the fact that American institutions do not recognize themselves in these terms. The concept of a dominant ideology fits more readily into a society that consciously operates class divisions than it does in one which propounds its egalitarianism. America's Great Refusal of Marxism is a curious cultural fact the ramifications of which go far beyond the scope of this book. But while the English or French cinemas can clearly be seen to be operating class-based ideologies, I am less convinced that such assumptions can be readily recognized in Hollywood. Equally, the conventional structures of Hollywood which determine its unilateral mode of communication cannot automatically be regarded as hegemonic in purpose even if they achieve that effect. The evolution of the mechanisms of consensus cinema was not concerned with the establishment of an ideological hegemony or the imposition of a particular, ideologically conditioned perceptual system. It was rather a

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technological evolution geared to the production of more efficient entertainment.* Hollywood sought to minimize its audience's effort both because it was economically more effective for it to do so, and because that was what it presumed its audience wanted. Within the contractual framework I have proposed, there is good reason for thinking that it was correct in its presumption. The development of Hollywood's fictional conventions was a gradual process, conducted progressively in film after film, and took the form of an economic dialogue between filmmakers and audience at the box-office. Innovations in form or content were negotiated by their financial success or lack of it; a crude mechanism of consultation, no doubt, but a mechanism nevertheless.**

My proposition, then, is that while the American cinema of the consensus may have established itself as a hegemonic and unilateral system of communication, it did so not out of a conscious or unconscious desire to impose a dominant ideology on its audience, but with the active participation of that audience, which was also maintained through its products. If Hollywood films governed the perception of their audiences, they did so with "the consent of the governed."

__________
*In contrast to Europe, the private business sector in American history has been a more and more important factor in affecting activities, attitudes, and tastes for leisure... education or quality are not primary goals of business. The leisure dimension of American life, inasmuch as a portion of it is dominated by goods or services provided for financial, profit, is efficiently served instead of purposefully elevated.

[looks like a quotation whose marks and endnote have accidentally been omitted]

**I am, of course, making certain assumptions about the legitimacy of capitalist procedures that many Marxist critics would dispute. This seems to me exactly the problem in much critical analysis of the American cinema. I do not seek to defend monopoly capitalism as an economic or ideological institution. I merely intend to acknowledge that that was the condition within which the American cinema operated. Any analysis of its products must place it within that condition rather than insisting against history that it ought to have operated under different conditions.

01 January 2023

Riesman—Abundance For What?


David Riesman
Abundance For What? and Other Essays
(1964)


"Work and Leisure: Fusion or Polarity"
(with Warner Bloomberg, Jr., 1957)
(pp. 147-161)

[149] Some workers responded to the exhausting demands of the workplace by a heroic effort to build up a counterlife outside the plant... Some retired into a close-knit family life and to home-improvement rather than self-improvement...

Where no other escape existed, the factory workers tended, like sailors, to fall back on the common denominator of the male sex as defining their leisure: gambling, fighting, whoring. ... Men became habituated to the factory, as children to school, but this "second nature" never overtook them completely nor turned them into enthusiastic addicts of monotony.

No wonder that a counterattack soon began against the central place of work on the simplest level of demanding shorter hours, with men choosing to take part of their increasing productivity in the form of time off rather than of an increase in real income. ...

[150] At a certain point, however, workers seem to want to buy leisure inside rather than outside the plant. No doubt this in part reflects still operative conventions as to a proper working day... And in part men may fear to have too much time outside—time perhaps on which their wives could make demands.


...

[155] ...the worker, as a parvenu, tends to have a more unequivocal relation to consumer goods than do people who have had a longer exposure to them. One of us supervised a study which illustrates this point. Working-class and middle-class parents were interviewed concerning their attitudes toward TV: for the former, this was an extrapolation of radio and the movies, and indubitably and good thing in a world of things, whereas for many middle-class parents TV presented a problem in self-definition, as well as in its possibly harmful effects on children.

This adherence to the tangible, then, characterizes working-class leisure activities in a wide gamut: the garden harvest which, like the fishing catch, can be counted and weighed; the travel mileages and car horsepowers which can be compared; and sex (whether marital or not), drinking, sports, and betting, which are all felt as essentially palpable. To be sure, we do not want to exaggerate...the lack of abstraction, nuance, and shadings of taste among factory workers. We know that even where the objects are the same, the meanings we assume to be attached to them

[156]

are of course attached only to their human possessors and that there is great variety here. ..

Beyond that, it is our impression that the simplicities of working-class leisure are under pressure not only from the tastes of the better educated strata as class consciousness and cultural encapsulation decline, but also from what we might term the feminizing of leisure. ...




"Leisure and Work in Postindustrial Society"
(1958)
(pp. 162-183)

[169] An informal poll a union local...found that the leaders did want a shorter work week whereas the rank and file did not. This was interpreted as suggesting that the leaders, better educated and more enterprising, feel cramped for time to do everything they want to do... Such men already had many hobbies... But the less active members...had no similar feeling of wanting the days to be longer. Such men, asked what they would do with an extra day, sometimes say, "sleep"; others could use it in hunting season—and already did so, to the dismay of the foreman. . . .

[In another study] some 80 per cent of industrial workers stated that they, in effect, kept on working for lack of alternatives, not for positive satisfactions. ... This clinging to the job is not simply a legacy of the Puritan ethic: it is rather a legacy of industrialism itself, of the old structures it has destroyed and the new structures it has created. Nor is it merely the feeling of shame in not having a job that is involved (although this is certainly an element). Work may not be an active presence in the life of American workers, but its absence would be an active absence. Or, more accurately, it is not so much work that would be missed as having a job...[as in] the self-definition (these data refer only to male workers) that comes from holding a job and the punctuations of life provided by regular employment.


...

[175] I have the impression that a general decline is occurring in the zest for work, a decline which is affecting even [certain] professional and intellectual groups... ...there is some slight evidence that application lists to medical school are no

[176]

longer so full, a decline which is attributed to the belief among young people that medical education is too arduous and takes too long before one is stabilized on a plateau of suburban life and domesticity. ... [In one study of medical students] three quarters of them are married, and, instead of sitting around waiting for night duty or talking about their work, they are eager to go home, help the wife get dinner, and relax with television.

Indeed, when I was an undergrad at The U, many of the grad students were both married and quite eager to go home. This meant, among other things, that you couldn't expect to get a practice room before 5pm, and that scheduling rehearsals was always difficult. It also was, already to me at that age, just really annoying to find music being treated like just another job. (I hadn't seen nothin' yet.)

[178] I have largely been discussing the uneven distribution of leisure in terms of differential attitudes toward work in different occupational groups. In comparison with the achievements of our occupational sociology, however, we have little comparable information concerning the sociology of leisure. ... A more systematic study than most...found that radio and TV listening were the top two activities for both upper and lower prestige groups, followed by studying in the upper group

[179]

and do-it-yourself activities in the lower. The latter spend much more time just driving around, as well as polishing the car; they also spend much more time in taverns. Only in the upper group do people go out to parties, as against simply dropping in on a neighbor... In both groups, commercial recreation outside the home, such as going to the movies, plays little part. This and other, more impressionistic studies point to the conclusion that the busier people, the professionals and executives and better-educated groups generally, also lead a more active life in their time away from work; as the saying goes, they work hard and play hard. ... Contrastingly, at the other end of the social scale, the unemployed as we know from several studies have in a psychological sense no leisure time at all...




"Some Issues in the Future of Leisure"
(with Robert S. Weiss, 1961)
(pp. 184-195)

[188] While for a few [industrial workers] this [response that given an extra hour in the day they would "sleep"] may bespeak an overfull life, and for others a general irritation with a nettling or silly question, the answer seems to us to symbolize the lack of interests and resources that could give point to the leisure time that is now available. ...

[189]

... This relative indifference has not always been the case: in the period before the Civil War, energetic workmen, in a burst of enthusiasm for science and literacy, created and attended the Mechanics Institutes. Presently our education system tends to siphon off from the working class the more literate and ambitious...

It is discomfitting to reflect on the complexity and scope of the programs that would be required to overcome this legacy of passivity and aimlessness. ...

At the level of the society the problems are no less grave. Where

[190]

the recreationist works for the public rather than the private sector, he has as little leverage at his disposal as the city planner has. One of us has recently had the chance to observe the enormous resistance that developed in a small Vermont community to a recreation leader's idea that the town should build a swimming pool, rather than some monument, as a war memorial: the project was fought by the town's elders as frivolous and a waste of money, in spite of the fact that the nearby rivers had become too polluted for swimming. Only great civic effort finally carried the project through, and now "everyone" can see what a boon it is to children and their parents, to farmers and workers after a hot day, and to otherwise idle teenagers, who can display themselves on the high dives, or, if they swim well enough, make a little money and gain some sense of responsibility from helping act as lifeguards around the pool. One consequence of the political weakness of public recreation is a tendency to overideologize particular leisure-time activities, exaggerating their importance and their potential contribution to individual character and the fabric of society. The President's campaign for physical fitness as a way of beating the Russians is an illustration. College sports may have suffered in the same way; it has repeatedly been shown, in novels and in the newspapers, that football or basketball do not inevitably build character. Yet it is hard to see how social forms adequate to the new leisure can be developed without an ideology that will mobilize people and strengthen the power of the few groups who are now concerned with the preservation of wilderness areas, the setting aside of land in our sprawling metropolitan belts for the play of adults and children, and the general release of resources other than commercial ones for experimentation and research in the field of leisure.

In comparison with the organizational forms developed for the integration of effort at work, there barely exist the social forms within which the energies of leisure might be developed or even illustatrated. Yet such comments evoke the whole paradox of planning for the use of what is an uncommitted part of one's life. Leisure is supposed to be informal, spontaneous, and unplanned, and is often defined as unobligated time, not only free of the job but free of social or civic obligations, moolighting, or more or less requisite do-it-yourself activities. One re-

[191]

sult of this outlook, however, is to discourage whatever planning is possible (except, perhaps, in terms of the family, not always the optimal unit for leisure when one thinks of the development of its individual members). When we confront such problems, we are inclined to think that significant changes in the organization of leisure are not likely to come in the absence of changes in the whole society: in its work, its political forms, and its cultural style.



Franco Moretti—Planet Hollywood


Franco Moretti
Planet Hollywood

in the 1920s American films were already enjoying a worldwide hegemony: what brought it to a halt was the invention of sound, which elevated language into a powerful barrier, supporting the quick take-off of the various national film industries. The abrogation of language in action films is a powerful factor in turning the tide around.

...

relatively speaking, comedies do not travel well. ...since jokes and many other ingredients of comedy rely heavily on short circuits between signifier and signified, they are weakened by translation—and indeed comic films reached the apex of their world diffusion long ago, before the age of sound.

...

we usually associate the national spirit with the sublime (et pour cause: unknown soldiers, torn flags, battlefields, martyrs . . .) yet, what makes a nation laugh turns out to be just as distinctive as what makes it cry. If not more distinctive, in fact: the same sublime objects reappear relentlessly from one culture to another, whereas the targets of comic aggression seem to be much more idiosyncratic, more variable.

...

In the mid-fifties, not a single film for children made Variety’s top twenty for the year, with the only possible exceptions of 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea and Around the World in 80 Days: both children’s films in a very dubious sense (and both drawn from nineteenth-century French novels...

Today, the top twenty routinely includes four or five children’s films, and the reason, I suspect, is quite simple: money. These films are more successful because much more money is spent on children’s entertainment. But this extra income is not available everywhere, and the result is the skewed distribution of Figure 4, where the (relative) absence of the genre tends to overlap with the poverty of each given country. ...

‘Children’s films’ is a sloppy definition, of course: it points to the audience, not the film—and to an audience which is moreover quite problematic. Children, after all, don’t usually go to the movies by themselves and, as adults must take them, a little generic paradox ensues: whom should the film be for—the adult, or the child? Faced with this problem, the fifties offered either straightforward fairy tales...or those Jules Verne novels I mentioned earlier (which were much more successful than the fairy tales: another sign of a market directed at the adult). But today the two forms have converged, blending into a hybrid which appeals to children and adults alike...—these are stories designed for a new human species of savvy children and silly grown-ups (Homo puerilis). Their god is Steven Spielberg...

In one film after another...Spielberg has not only chosen stories in which children and adults are somehow involved together, but where the ambiguities so typical of (adult) life are defused by the (child’s) desire for polarization so well described by Bruno Bettelheim.



20 June 2022

Salganik, Dodds, and Watts—Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market


Salganik, Dodds, and Watts
"Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market"
(2006)

The abstract:
Hit songs, books, and movies are many times more successful than average, suggesting that ‘‘the best’’ alternatives are qualitatively different from ‘‘the rest’’; yet experts routinely fail to predict which products will succeed. We investigated this paradox experimentally, by creating an artificial ‘‘music market’’ in which 14,341 participants downloaded previously unknown songs either with or without knowledge of previous participants’ choices. Increasing the strength of social influence increased both inequality and unpredictability of success. Success was also only partly determined by quality: The best songs rarely did poorly, and the worst rarely did well, but any other result was possible.


The gist:
our results suggest not only that social influence contributes to inequality of outcomes in cultural markets, but that as individuals are subject to stronger forms of social influence, the collective outcomes will become increasingly unequal.

[emailed to self, 6 April 2021]

Hanson and Kysar—Market Manipulation


Hanson and Kysar
"Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of the Problem of Market Manipulation"
(1999)
[1426] Rather than simply
[1427]
asking how a particular anomaly will influence the typical consumer, the more probative question is how the presence of cognitive anomalies will influence all actors in the market. With that distinction in mind, we explained that manufacturers have every incentive to utilize cognitive biases to lower consumer appreciation of product risks. Such manipulation, we argued, is simply another form of cost externalization, a practice that manufacturers naturally pursue in an effort to avoid costs and increase profit margins. We noted also that this manipulation of consumer perceptions should occur whether or not manufacturers are cognizant of it. That is, the competitive forces of the market should drive manufacturers to act as if they are utilizing behavioral findings to exploit consumer perceptions, regardless of manufacturers’ awareness of the processes. Thus, we argued that the relative indeterminacy of the behavioral research is irrelevant to products liability theory because manufacturers operating under the evolutionary influence of the market will untangle the various cognitive forces at play in the consumer’s mind even if behavioral researchers and legal scholars cannot.

[emphasis in original]
...
[1434] After a cleaner, more efficient alternative to cockroach spray sold well below expectations in rural areas of the Southern United States, researchers assigned to the problem asked a focus group of representative women to draw pictures of cockroaches and describe their feelings about them. To the researchers’ surprise, all the insects were drawn as males and the stories accompanying the drawings clearly revealed feelings about the men in the subject women’s lives. Researchers learned that for these women, “killing the roaches with a bug spray and watching them squirm and die allowed [them] to express their hostility toward men.
....
[1481] There is growing evidence that cigarette warnings may actually give the product an enhanced gloss in the eyes of young consumers. Several studies have demonstrated a forbidden fruit appeal from television parental advisory warnings for violent shows. Similar studies on the labeling effects of alcoholic versus nonalcoholic drinks also suggest
[1482]
that the warning itself may enhance the attractiveness of the product. Tobacco industry executives seem to have been well aware of that possibility. As early as 1973, Dr. Claude Teague of RJR noted that a new brand aimed at the young group “should not in any way be promoted as a ‘health’ brand” and perhaps should carry some implied risk. To the contrary, “the warning label on the package may be a plus.” Thus, just as tobacco manufacturers were able to devise seemingly safer cigarettes to appease risk-conscious adult smokers, they also seem able to take advantage of government-mandated product warnings as an appeal to children in their constant efforts to recruit new smokers.

[emailed to self, 16 March 2021]

14 June 2022

Lasch—The Decadence of Enterprise


Christopher Lasch
The Culture of Narcissism
(1979)
[xv] ...a way of life that is dying—the culture of competitive individualism, which in its decadence has carried the logic of individualism to the extreme of a war of all against all, the pursuit of happiness to the dead end of a narcissistic preoccupation of the self.
My note says:
So, "decadence" arises not only from the Culture Vulture but also from the Marketeer, whose "self" is ultimately the thing being marketed. Almost totally overlooked today.

Now:
Obviously there is at least a conceit to marketeerism which is at root altruistic or at least communitarian rather than self-centered or "narcissistic." Whether this is ever anything more than a conceit is another question.
[xvi] Many radicals still direct their indignation against the authoritarian family, [etc., etc., ...] and other foundations of bourgeois order that have been weakened or destroyed by advanced capitalism itself. These radicals do not see that the "authoritarian personality" no longer represents the prototype of the economic man. Economic man himself has given way to the psychological man of our times—the final product of bourgeois individualism.
...
[43] The narcissist comes to the attention of psychiatrists for some of the same reasons that he rises to positions of prominence not only in awareness movements and other cults but in business corporations, political organizations, and government bureaucracies. For all his inner suffering, the narcissist has many traits that make for success in
[44]
bureaucratic institutions, which put a premium on the manipulation of interpersonal relations, discourage the formation of deep personal attachments, and at the same time provide the narcissist with the approval he needs in order to validate his self-esteem. ... The management of personal impressions comes naturally to him, and his mastery of intricacies serves him well in political and business organizations where performance now counts for less than "visibility," "momentum," and a winning record. As the "organization man" gives way to the bureaucratic "gamesman"—the "loyalty era" of American business to the age of the "executive success game"—the narcissist comes into its own.
...
[49] Our overorganized society, in which large-scale organizations predominate but have lost the capacity to command allegiance, in some respects more nearly approximates a condition of universal animosity than did the primitive capitalism on which Hobbes modeled his state of nature.
...
[66] The Apotheosis of Individualism The fear that haunted the social critics and theorists of the fifties—that rugged individualism had succumbed to conformity and "low-pressure socialibility"—appears in retrospect to have been premature. ... It is true that "a present-oriented hedonism" [Riesman]...has replaced the work ethic... But this hedonism is a fraud; the pursuit of pleasure disguises a struggle for power. Americans have not really become more sociable and cooperative...; they have merely become more adept at exploiting the conventions of interpersonal relations for their own benefit. ... It is symptomatic of the underlying tenor of American life that vulgar terms for sexual intercourse also convey the sense of getting the better of someone.

08 May 2021

Len Bracken—Debord, Adorno, Time

Len Bracken
Guy Debord—Revolutionary (1997)
...the difference between Adorno's ideas and Debord's relates less to the question of what would be desirable in itself than to the question of what is actually possible at the present moment in history. (117)

For Debord, as for Lukács, alienation arises from the predominance of the commodity system in social life; it is thus associated with industrial capitalism, and has not existed for more than about two hundred years. Within such a relatively brief period of time, changes occurring in the space of a decade may naturally assume great importance.

By contrast, the changes of a whole century can carry little weight for Adorno, whose yardsticks for measuring events are "the priority of the object" and "identity." By "exchange" he does not in the first instance mean the exchange of commodities embodying abstract labor...but rather a suprahistorical "exchange in general" that coincides with the entire ratio of the West. The antecedent here was the kind of sacrifice that sought to win the favor of the gods by means of an offering that soon become purely symbolic; this fraudulent aspect of sacrifice foreshadowed the fraud inherent to exchange. (119)
Generally I am strongly inclined towards the Long View, which Adorno represents here as against Debord's Shorter one, even if it would be easy to quibble with a few of the specifics here. The adolescent petulance and self-importance in Situationist writing can be overwhelming, and it seems that even two hundred years is quite a bit vaster than many of those young people's frame of reference. On Adorno's scale of time, rather, Capitalism cannot possibly be a new or unique problem but rather an instantiation of so many ancient problems given modern form. [Name of former roommate redacted] once attempted to stake out just such a position, which was not at all consistent with many of his other opinions, but which in and of itself was not too far off from what is being laid out here, and which I find compelling, at least as far as it goes. It is less clear to me that it is possible or profitable to, as [roommate] was implying, somehow oppose these endemic human problems while simply leaving Capitalism alone to continue to do God's work. "Exchange" is not new, but Capitalism IS built on exchange. Would a better -ism not necessarily be built on something else?

More of the same, but worth including:
One gets the general impression that for Adorno the particularity of different historical periods fades in the face of the working of certain unchanging principles that have obtained since the beginning of history, such as domination and exchange. ...the division between the thing and its concept had already begun in the animistic period with the distinction between the tree in its physical presence and the spirit that dwells within it. Logic arose from the earliest relationships of hierarchical subordination, and the identification of things by means of their ordering by kind begins with the "I" that remains identical through time. ...the same "reason" applied in the pre-Socratic period as applies today. For Adorno, therefore, it ought to be well-nigh impossible to surmount reification, for he sees it as rooted in society's very deepest structures. (119-120)

[from a notebook, 2017]

10 January 2015

Reports of My Demise (interlude)

I just saw a Craigslist post for a $9/hour security job that lists "critical thinking" as one of the required skills. Evidently it is not a required skill in the HR department.

30 November 2014

Reports of My Demise (xii)

The outer layer of the masculinity crisis, men's loss of economic authority, was most evident in the recessionary winds of the early nineties, as the devastation of male unemployment grew ever fiercer. The role of family breadwinner was plainly being undermined by economic forces that spat many men back into a treacherous job market during corporate "consolidations" and downsizings. Even the many men who were never laid off were often gripped with the fear that they could be next – that their footholds as providers were frighteningly unsteady.

As the economy recovered, the male crisis did not, and it became apparent that whatever men's afflictions were, they could not be gauged solely through graphs from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Underlying their economic well-being was another layer of social and symbolic understanding between men, a tacit compact undergirding not only male employment but the whole connection between men and the public domain. That pact was forged through loyalty, through a conviction that a man's "word" meant something in the larger society, through a belief that faithfulness, dedication, and duty would be rewarded in kind, or at least appreciated in some meaningful way – some way that "made you a man." Realizing that loyalty, whether to a corporation, an army, or a football team, no longer allowed a man to lay claim to male virtue – that it was as likely, in fact, to make him a pitiable sap – could be devastating to any man, but especially to those postwar men raised on home-team spirit, John Wayne westerns, and tributes to the selfless service of the American GI.


Susan Faludi, Stiffed: The Betrayal of the American Man, p. 595

Slogging through Faludi's 600-plus page epic, one often suspects she has slipped in every precious writerly turn of phrase that editors have trimmed from her newspaper articles over the years. Nevertheless, in just over 14 pages, she pulls together a cogent and incisive concluding chapter that's worth more by itself than Hanna Rosin's entire book.

Rosin asks why men can't or won't participate in the New Economy, but she is too polite to seek substantive answers, and her fieldwork is far too shallow to offer them up on a platter. It is ultimately conjectural but by no means without some merit to conclude, as I have devoted much of the month to articulating, that digging deeper in fact threatens to challenge too many of her own basic assumptions about the world and about what people do and ought to want from it.

Faludi on the other hand has the distinct advantage of depth, if not breadth, of engagement, having followed her stories for years on end simply as part of her day job, and thus having developed long-term personal relationships with many of the men she chronicles. And what she found, overwhelmingly, were distant fathers and the gaping chasms they left unfilled in their sons' lives:

For centuries, of course, fathers have disappointed, neglected, abused, abandoned their sons. But there was something particularly unexpected, and so particularly disturbing, about the nature of paternal desertion that unfolded in the years after World War II, precisely because it coincided with a period of unprecedented abundance. In the generation before the war, millions of fathers failed to support their families, and hordes of them abandoned their households, became itinerant laborers, hoboes, winos. But that was the fault of the Great Depression, not of its men. By contrast, the post-World War II era was the moment of America's great bounty and ascendance, when the nation and thus its fathers were said to own the world. Never, or so their sons were told, did fathers have so much to pass on as at the peak of the American century. And conversely, never was there such a burden on the sons to learn how to run a world they would inherit. Yet the fathers, with all the force of fresh victory and moral virtue behind them, seemingly unfettered in their paternal power and authority, failed to pass the mantle, the knowledge, all that power and authority, on to their sons. (596-7)

For all of her insight, Faludi too suffers from a certain reluctance to go all the way on questions such as this, though the word "burden" above is a subtly dropped hint that she does, in fact, have the understanding and wherewithal to do so. I very much doubt she believes single mothers and gay couples to be inherently unfit to raise boys; why, then, should the mere presence of a distant father throw such a wet blanket on the whole enterprise when he is not the only parent present? Rosin's addition-by-subtraction, "just another mouth to feed" analysis certainly comes to mind, but she consistently frames this as a purely economic/financial decision, and one made disproportionately by working-class women; we have reached awfully dark times indeed if it is demonstrably better for children of all classes on grounds of social adjustment as well. That possibility notwithstanding, Faludi never quite so explicitly asks if perhaps the culture at large was responsible for creating in these boys inflated, ultimately regressive expectations of what a father might do for a son. In fairness, she can't really ask this since it violates the trust these men (i.e. the grownup sons) have shown in her in confessing their inner pain for a mass audience. I am asking it here, then, and at the risk of going all Men's Movement on everything, I have another question as well: how many of these distant fathers do you think may once have expressed what was, for them, the responsible intention not to have children only to be, let's say, fooled into impregnating their partner against their wishes? Everyone knows someone.

Another nugget, apropos of nothing in particular: I lost track of how many stories Faludi tells of husbands being laid off and wives more or less immediately moving out and "getting involved" with co-workers. You would think it was a stealth attack on these women's character and motives...that is until she inevitably induces the deserted husband to admit that yeah, he might have hit her this one time, and actually, yeah, he did hit her this one time. Suddenly the sticking around part makes less sense and the leaving part more. So, there certainly is some oblique storytelling here, but I suspect it's intentional, and it's definitely effective as long as the reader is paying close enough attention. It also, however, leaves one wondering if there aren't some simpler big-picture issues for these men to deal with before the intricacies of essentialism-versus-constructionism, inner psyches, and advanced capitalist exploitation can be fruitfully unpacked and offered up for their self-improving consumption.

The last item on that list, however, is one on which Faludi crafts some exceptionally insightful prose, and so in gratitude (is it showing gratitude to plop large sections of someone's book on the internet?), she gets the final word in this year's installment of Reports:

...just because men have wound up in a beauty-contest world doesn't mean women have put them there. The gaze that plagues them doesn't actually spring from a feminine eye. The ever-prying, ever-invasive beam reducing men to objects comes not from women's inspection but from the larger culture. Cast into the gladiatorial arena of ornament, men sense their own diminishment in women's strength. But the "feminine" power whose rise most genuinely threatens men is not the female shoulder hoisting girders at a construction site, not the female foot in the boardroom door of a corporation, not the female vote in the ballot box. The "femininity" that has hurt men the most is an artificial femininity manufactured and marketed by commercial interests. What demeans men is a force ever more powerful in the world, one that has long demeaned women. The gaze that hounds men is the very gaze that women have been trying to escape. (599)

And again:

At century's end, feminists can no longer say of consumer culture with such ringing confidence that "what it does to everyone, it does to women even more." The commercialized, ornamental "femininity" that the women's movement diagnosed now has men by the throat. Men and women both feel cheated of lives in which they might have contributed to a social world; men and women both feel pushed into roles that are about little more than displaying prettiness or prowess in the marketplace. Women were pushed first, but now their brothers have joined that same forced march." (602)

Don't push me, Hanna Rosin. Don't push me.

11 November 2014

Reports of My Demise (ix)

I recall countless high school classes where I sketched compositions during time allotted for a head start on that evening's devoirs. After noting their reticence to intervene, I began silently daring my teachers to reprimand their best student for being off task. I am convinced, however, that status had far less to do with their complicity than did my choice of something as intellectual, esoteric, and over-romanticized as handmade lines-and-dots music. Perhaps on a more practical level my demonstrated ability to lap the field academically without being given extra time to finish my homework had something to do with it too. In any case, by the time it wasn't cute anymore, I was an adult and a college graduate. And man, was it ever not cute anymore. Plastic turns to Cardboard in a hurry for those of us given to intellectual, esoteric, over-romanticized pursuits.

There is a similar reticence that prevails out in the liberal bourgie world, where relativism-as-social-grace acts as a filter and no one wants to be the first to tell you quite so baldly that "Improvising Tuba Player" is not a real job. There is in addition, as I touched upon early on in this series, the lovingly crafted, overdetermined, eminently socially and academically respectable path of university music study. And indeed, not only was I myself almost impossibly meritorious in this academic arena, but my particular mancessory, the tuba, is typically so difficult to recruit that my undergrad school picked up virtually the entire tab for my studies there. And so I left behind high-powered academics in one fell swoop to become a student-athlete of sorts, privy to none of the social perks while suffering from many of the same drawbacks, namely an intellectually stilted curriculum and profoundly limited employment prospects post-graduation. Had I not concurrently taken a student job with the campus security department at a time of rapid post-9/11 growth in both the public and private security sectors, who knows how I would have supported myself in the interim. Indeed, this led me to make yet another statistical contribution to Hanna Rosin's work: I am a college graduate, and now a graduate degree holder, who has never held a job that requires a post-secondary education.

Even having excelled at my course of study and having managed to remain blissfully free from the crushing debt faced by most of my peers, I less launched myself into the real world than did an epic faceplant in its lap. Certainly my timing could not have been worse: an historical recession was on the horizon and, in related news, Western art music had never been less marketable. I don't deny, however, that my distinctively male unwillingness to "adapt" has profoundly shaped this leg of my journey as well. This series of posts has been devoted largely to defending that posture and to enumerating its potentially broader, gender-neutral social utility.

Most of the people I have known who are making a real living as musicians are not the best musicians. Some of them are quite far from it. What distinguishes them, in my experience, is their willingness to do just about anything to achieve this. They will play, teach, and quite frankly, say anything they have to, walking right up to the line between ethical and unethical behavior, and in occasional cases crossing ever so slightly over to the other side. There is, meanwhile, a small collection of people I can count on one hand who are even more uncompromising and sensitive to issues of honesty than I am, who have strongly influenced the way I go about my own business, whose work I find unusually compelling, and who, like me, have generally had a much tougher time of it.

I know, I know, you've heard the art-versus-commerce whine-fest before and you're not too keen on rehashing it through the eyes of a latent mancessionist. If you insist on more excitement, I defy you once again to ponder the deep, dark questions lurking all around this old trope as the (un)willingness to compromise enters popular discourse as a decidedly gendered concern.

The gendering of compromise is a central theme of Rosin's The End of Men. It is a maneuver which holds up quite nicely in the polite company she evidently keeps. The Arts are in this way, though, a far less polite domain, which is why there's no trace of a Maria Schneider, Ingrid Jensen, or Nicole Mitchell anywhere to be found here. How naively parochial and presumptuous such a list is when we're talking about mainstream journalism for mainstream readers; but for me, working in a field where such remarkable women are still breaking ground, it's hard to ignore their being ignored.

In the place they might have occupied, we are of course left with that fleeting, threadbare caricature of a hyper-bourgeois "creative class" of mercenary consultants and entertainment industry frill-mongers, proxies for more substantive notions of creativity and insults to the aesthetic risk-takers who anonymously feed the machine from below. Rosin must understand that creativity and compromise are, if not truly anathema, then at least strange bedfellows, which is why she forgoes meaningful engagement with the kind of art and artists that, wittingly or otherwise, challenge bourgeois values. She sticks instead to an investigation of the new "Plastic Woman" (7) who is "nurturing" (124), "approachable and consumer responsive" (135), "more nimble and responsive to trends." (248) These are above all women who "tend to respond to social cues and bend their personalities to fit in what the times allow," (191) all while demonstrating "the willingness to adapt and bend to a fast-changing economic landscape." (270)

As I encountered each of these turns of phrase for the first time, I was constantly reminded of a paper by Gordon Downie which I had dug up for a prior research project:

With the expansion of free-market neo-liberalization in the form of Thatcherite and Reaganite economics...those performance measures associated with commodity form and behavior have spread to encompass not only public sector services such as health care, utilities, infrastructure, and education, but also cultural provision and production...

...any organization or individual seeking to maximize their strategic advantage in society will be required to adopt those behaviors that are congruent with those metrics of performance associated with marketization and commodity form. Phrases such as "selling yourself" and "making the right impression" point to a process that seeks the extension of the commodity form away from material artifacts and goods to soft services and interpersonal behavior profiling. (197)

'Cultural Production as Self-Surveillance: Making the Right Impression.' Perspectives of New Music 46. 1 (Winter 2008)

At some point in the not-so-distant past, the phrase "Well-behaved women rarely make history" achieved that certain critical mass required to find its way onto a popular bumper sticker. In those terms, the most disturbing aspect of Rosin's Plastic Woman is what a well-behaved capitalist she is. Of course, the key takeaway from The End of Men is that the world we now live in seems keen on rewarding these characteristics to a greater degree than ever before, rendering that bumper sticker a tad bit miscalibrated and odiously vengeful. And yet, anyone who has been shopping for something other than groceries has seen what "the extension of the commodity form away from material artifacts and goods to soft services and interpersonal behavior profiling" looks and feels like. I for one certainly have seen it. Perhaps I have a tad bit more empathy for these workers than the average Cardboard Man, or perhaps I have a raging case of corrugation myself since I just don't like to shop all that much, but generally this is a condition that breaks my heart and my spirit in equal measure. These are the ultimate mediated men and women, and they do not seem to be the least bit happy having been tasked with concealing their employers' criminality beneath parade smiles and complimentary bottles of spring water.

08 December 2011

Doublethink Invades The West

Does Capitalism (or what goes for it here in the USA) not demand/engender/impose much the same psychological condition as archetypal Orwellian totalitarianism does? So few of the people I meet who play our Capitalist economic game, musically or otherwise, seem the least bit sincere in either words or actions, and I think this goes beyond the simple fact that convincing someone to purchase something they previously did not intend to purchase requires...well, some convincing. More to the point: no child grows up dreaming of selling jewelry or vetting credit histories, nor do the ones who grow up dreaming to be musicians typically find fulfillment of those dreams playing wedding receptions or church services. It is on that most basic level that sincerity is rendered more or less untenable in our culture, including for those "doing what they love" in service of something or someone that they don't.

This is merely our minimum common inheritance; the insincerity can, of course, be much deeper as well. My time at the airport permanently changed my perspective on this: here you have two groups of citizens ("business travelers" and "security professionals") more or less involuntarily thrust into an acrimonious "us versus them" relationship by economic and social realities (not to mention some questionable reactions to them by our elected officials). No one at these checkpoints wants to be there: Traveling Salesman and Security Guard are not dream jobs. Their unique relationship, of course, is that this is primarily due to the specter of having to deal with the other group! Such it is that the airport security checkpoint became the "divide and conquer" mechanism par excellence as the Bushes simultaneously crashed the economy and began erecting a police state from scratch: throw the middle class out of work and let them choose between selling useless shit and enforcing useless rules, and not just to anyone, but to each other. No wonder sincerity is in such short supply.

The dynamic in the musical world is not quite so sinister, but nor should we simply accept it on account of music being, as I of course have argued with apologies to most of my dearest colleagues, a very sophisticated but ultimately trivial recreational activity. Issues of sincerity are never trivial, and the recreational value of music, if that is in fact its greatest value, suffers tremendously at the hands of the entrepreneurial spirit, dismembered as these hands too often are from their thinking, feeling body.