Lasch—Confession and Anticonfession

Christopher Lasch
The Culture of Narcissism
(1979)

[Subheading:]
Confession and Anticonfession  The popularity of the confessional mode testifies, of course, to the new narcissism that runs all
[17]
through American culture; but the best work in this vein attempts, precisely through self-disclosure, to achieve a critical distance from the self and to gain insight into the historical forces, reproduced in psychological form, that have made the very concept of selfhood increasingly problematic. The mere act of writing already presupposes a certain detachment from the self; and the objectification of one's own experience, as psychiatric studies of narcissism have shown, makes it possible for "the deep sources of grandiosity and exhibitionism—after being appropriately aim-inhibited, tamed, and neutralized—[to] find access" to reality. [Kohut, The Analysis of the Self] Yet the increasing interpenetration of fiction, journalism, and autobiography undeniably indicated that many writers find it more and more difficult to achieve the detachment indispensible to art.

Well, indispensible might be a bit strong even for my tastes, but the point stands that a detached and...attached (?) standpoint have vastly different implications for artist and audience alike. We would do well to try to understand those implications as best we can.

One reason to beat this particular horse as relentlessly as I now do is that, among said implications, there are many properly epistemological ones which don't get the attention or treatment I would like for them. Also important is that these sorts of implications are not, I don't think, usually having anything at all to do with what motivates or, more sentimentally speaking, what inspires either artists or audiences.

Instead of fictionalizing personal material or otherwise reordering it, they have taken to presenting it undigested, leaving the reader to arrive at his own interpretations. Instead of working through their memories, many writers now rely on mere self-disclosure to keep the reader interested, appealing not to his understanding but to his salacious curiosity about the private lives of famous people. In Mailer's works and those of his many imitators, what begins as a critical reflection on the writer's own ambition, frankly acknowledged as a bid for literary immortality, often ends in a garrulous monologue, with the writer trading on his own celebrity and filling page after page with material having no other claim to attention than its association with a famous name. Once having brought himself to public attention, the writer enjoys a ready-made market for true confessions. Thus Erica Jong, after winning an audience by writing about sex with as little feeling as a man, immediately produced another novel about a young woman who becomes a literary celebrity.

...

[19] The confessional form allows an honest writer like Exley or Zweig to provide a harrowing account of the spiritual desolation of our times, but it also allows lazy writers to indulge in "the kind of immodest self-revelation which ultimately hides more than it admits." The narcissist's pseudo-insight into his own condition, usually expressed in psychiatric clichés, serves as a means of deflecting criticism and disclaiming responsibility for his actions.

...

[20] When T.S. Eliot appended reference notes to The Waste Land, he became one of the first poets to call attention to his own imaginative transformation of reality, but he did so in order to expand the reader's awareness of allusions and to create a deeper imaginative resonance—not, as in these more recent instances, to demolish the reader's confidence in the author.

When T.S. Eliot appended reference notes...
...he was...a century behind Berlioz, who was at least that far ahead of the aforementioned "confessional" writers. Let's not excuse the early adopters just because they have since become classics.

...to expand the reader's awareness of allusions...

...but it doesn't work that way. Just as he who laughs last doesn't get the joke, so he who must read about the allusions in the reference notes has irrecoverably missed the boat. What confidence can one reasonably have in an author who elevates spoiling the punchline from incidental to conventional?

[20, cont.] The unreliable, partially blinded narrator is another literary device of long standing. In the past, however, novelists often used it in order to achieve an ironic juxtaposition of the narrator's flawed perception of events with the author's own more accurate view. Today, the convention of a fictionalized narrator has been abandoned in most experimental writing. The author now speaks in his own voice but warns the reader that his version of the truth is not to be trusted. ... Having called attention to himself as a performer, the writer undermines the reader's ability to suspend disbelief. By fogging over the distinction between truth and illusion, he asks the reader to believe his story not because it rings true or even because he claims it is true, but simply because he claims it conceivably might be true—at least in part—if the reader chose to believe him. The writer waives the right to be taken seriously, at the same time escaping the responsibilities that go with being taken seriously. He asks the reader not for understanding but for indulgence. In accepting the writer's confession that he lied, the reader in turn waives the right to hold the writer accountable for the truth of his report. The writer thus attempts to charm the reader instead of trying to convince him, counting on the titillation provided by pseudo-revelation to hold the reader's interest.

Undertaken in the evasive mood, confessional writing degenerates into anticonfession. The record of the inner life becomes an unintentional parody of inner life. A literary genre that appears to affirm inwardness actually tells us that inner life is precisely what can no longer be taken seriously. This explains why [Woody] Allen, [Donald] Barthelme, and other satirists so often parody, as a deliberate literary strategy, the confessional style of an earlier time, when the artist
[21]
bared his inner struggles in the belief that they represented a microcosm of the larger world. ... The writer no longer sees life reflected in his own mind. Just the opposite: he sees the world, even in its emptiness, as a mirror of himself. In recording his "inner" experiences, he seeks not to provide an objective account of a representative piece of reality but to seduce others into giving him their attention, acclaim, or sympathy and thus to shore up his faltering sense of self.

It occurs here that Lasch is on solider ground in telling us what such work does than where it came from. e.g. Here, whether this is actually a matter of shoring up seems tough to say for sure, although there is no shortage of anecdotal evidence to that effect.

Lasch—Tolerance and Indifference

Christopher Lasch
The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics
(1991)

[122]
Our twentieth-century experience of imperial rivalries, international competition for markets, and global wars makes it hard for us to share the Enlightenment's conviction that capitalism would promote world peace. The comsopolitan ideal articulated by the Enlightenment, although it remains an essential ingredient in modern liberalism, strikes many of us today as at once arrogant, in its contempt for the unenlightened masses, and naive. "Benevolence," moreover—the universal love for humanity assumed to follow emancipation from local prejudice—presents itself to us as a singlularly bloodless form of goodwill, founded more on indifference than on devotion. We can appreciate Rousseau's mockery of "those pretended cosmopolites, who in justifying their love for the human race, boast of loving all the world in order to enjoy the privilege of loving no one." Paine's self-congratulatory humanitarianism, on the other hand—
[123]
"my country is the world, my religion to do good to mankind"—leaves us a little cold.

It is important to remind ourselves, therefore, that cosmopolitanism and "benevolence" commended themselves, in the eighteenth century, as an alternative to the fierce partisanship now blamed for two hundred years of religious warfare. Religious tolerance may have reflected a growing indifference to religion, but at least it held out the hope of peace.




[123—footnote to above]
Burke attacked "these new teachers continually boasting of their spirit of toleration," just as Rousseau attacked those who professed a love for all mankind, on the grounds that such professions really revealed a certain indifference. "That those persons should tolerate all opinions, who think none to be of estimation, is a matter of small merit. Equal neglect is not impartial kindness. The species of benevolence which arises from contempt is no true charity."

...

[148]
ambivalence was a more appropriate response to progress than unyielding opposition or wholehearted approval. Indeed it was the only appropriate response, when progress was identified so closely with fate; and there is a certain heroism in the classical sociologists' determination to face unflinchingly facts that could not be altered, in their view, and to "bear the fate of the times like a man," as Weber put it. Weber's conception of the scientific vocation may have conceded too much to the view that science demands a rigorous abstention from moral judgment, but his warning against "academic prophecy" remains indispensable. "In the lecture rooms of the university," Weber insisted, no other virtue holds but plain intellectual integrity." It is impossible not to acknowledge the force of this, even for those who have seen Weber's ideal of heroic detachment degenerate into the familiar academic accommodation with political power that sides with the status quo, in effect, while disclaiming any intention of taking sides. "Science as a Vocation" and its companion, "Politics as a Vocation," have been put to purposes Weber himself would have disavowed, serving to excuse moral and political complacency, to rid scholarship of "value judgments," to reinforce the notion that ethical judgments are completely subjective and arbitrary, and finally to banish them even from politics itself, leaving politics to the managers and technocrats. Far from encouraging "intellectual integrity" or protecting the university from political interference, a misconceived ideal of scientific objectivity has brought about a rapprochement between the university and the state, in which academic expertise serves to lubricate the machinery of power; and it is important to remind ourselves that Weber, often invoked by those who wish to limit both scholarship and politics to purely technical matters, never endorsed such a trivial conception of either.

Lasch—A Refusal To Find Patterns

Christopher Lasch
The Minimal Self (1984)

In the visual arts at least, the celebration of selfhood, as exemplified by abstract expressionism in the late forties and early fifties—the assertion of the artist as a heroic rebel and witness to contemporary despair—had already come under critical attack by the time Roth published his diagnosis of the literary malaise in 1961.
(p. 132)

Bodies and Artifacts (iii)—Jones' Voice

LeRoi Jones
Blues People (1963)

For a Westerner to say that the Wagnerian tenor's voice is "better" than the African singer's or the blues singer's is analogous to a non-Westerner disparaging Beethoven's Ninth Symphony because it wasn't improvised.
(p. 30)

So what if a Westerner says this about Beethoven? What if a small but vocal subculture emerges within the Western world itself where this disparagement of Beethoven is nothing less than the storefront signage, the secret handshake, and the honor code all rolled into one? What if several such subcultures emerge independently, and what if they have little else in common among them besides this?

What tf then?

Haraway—Situated Knowledges

Donna Haraway
"Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Persepctive"
Feminist Studies 14/3 (1988)

on the "strong" social constructionist theory of scientific (non-)objectivity:

So much for those of us who would still like to talk about reality with more confidence than we allow the Christian right when they discuss the Second Coming... We would like to think our appeals to real worlds are more than a desperate lurch away from cynicism and an act of faith like any other cult's..." (577)

This itself is just rhetoric, but it's refreshing anyway. The more recent Intersectional emphasis on Local Knowledge Claims seems to me, seeing as it is yet more Local than what DH is discussing here, to be a yet more volatile maneuver: some of the most pervasive/insidious prejudices (especially racial ones) are propagated through Local Knowledge Producers, and it remains unclear to me what the epistemological distinction is between these racists and the antiracist Intersectionalists.

the further I get in describing the radicial social constructionist program...the more nervous I get. The imagery of force fields, of moves in a fully textualized and coded world...is, just for starters, an imagery of high-tech military fields, of automated academic battlefields... Technoscience and science fiction collapse into the sun of their radiant (ir)reality—war. It shouldn't take decades of feminist theory to sense the enemy here. (577-578)

This is a brilliant insight, as well as, I would add, a sort of left-becomes-right moment. From "the strong social constructionist perspective," "all drawings of inside-outside boundaries in knowledge are theorized as power moves, not moves toward truth." (576) DH can see that this orientation treats the world as irremediably hostile, confrontational, and subject to (at least potentially) the rule of might-makes-right; and she ever so delicately implies (I am reading between the lines here) that the apparent absence of any genuine reluctance among such theorists could itself suggest motivations/agendas, i.e. a desire to see the world this way whether it is accurate or not.

Feminists have to insist on a better account of the world; it is not enough to show radical historical contingency and modes of construction for everything. ... Feminists have stakes in a successor science project that offers a more adequate, richer, better account of a world, in order to live in it well... In traditional philosophical categories, the issue is ethics and politics perhaps more than epistemology. (579)

Indeed, ethics/politics and epistemology are quite mutually interdependent and dynamically linked, but ultimately it is ethical behavior out-in-the-world which is the goal, the question on which the success or failure of all other epistemological endeavors hinges. Feminists have too often blanched when science turns up knowledge we'd rather not know (B. Thorne and L. Eliot's books on boys/girls spring immediately to mind); but DH leads us out of the dark here, I think, with the insight that bedrock ethical principles enable us to pursue knowledge without any fear of how it might be used.

We are not immediately present to ourselves. Self-knowledge requires a semiotic-material technology to link meanings and bodies. Self-identity is a bad visual system. Fusion is a bad strategy of positioning. The boys in the human sciences have called this doubt about self-presence "the death of the subject" defined as a single ordering point of will and consciousness. That judgment seems bizarre to me. I prefer to call this doubt the opening of nonisomorphic subjects, agents, and territories of stories unimaginable from the vantage point of the cyclopean, self-satiated eye of the master subject. (585-586)

So, the subject has not died; it lives, but it is no longer "isomorphic," which is to say that it no longer resembles its (same)self in all times and places; which is to say that in time and space the subject is not of a fixed/constant nature but rather undergoes changes. I'm inclined to embrace this part (perhaps because I can actually understand it). There are ways in which this is (for the most part unfortunately) revolutionary in its simplicity. Just ask politicians who claim to have learned and evolved since their younger days only to thereby invite epithets like Wishy-Washy or Flip-Flopper. ... On the other hand, it only seems to solve the problem raised by bell hooks of individual subjectivity being questioned just as the subjugated have arrived to claim it. Indeed, "we are not immediately present to ourselves," and "self-identity is a bad visual system." Hence the "subjugated" subject who arrogates to speak as such in fact commits the same commutative/associative fallacy as does the ignorant outsider who asks "What do YOUR people think?"

[from a notebook, probably late 2017]

Parsons on Universalistic and Particularistic Systems

Social systems in which a considerable number of individuals are in a complex and delicate state of mutual interdependence tend greatly to limit the scope of "personal" emotional feeling or, at least, its direct expression in action. Any considerable range of affective spontaneity would tend to impinge on the statuses and interests of too many others, with disequilibriating consequences for the system as a whole. (187-188)

[A footnote to this passage...]

This tendency for multiple-membered social systems to repress spontaneous manifestations of sentiment should not be taken too absolutely. In such phenomena as cliques, there is room for the following of personal inclinations within the framework of institutionalized statuses. It is, however, probable that it is more restrictive in groups where, as in kinship, the institutionalized relationships are particularistic and functionally diffuse than in universalistic and functionally specific systems such as modern occupational organizations. In the latter case personal affective relationships can, within considerable limits, be institutionally ignored as belonging to the sphere of "private affairs." (188)

Talcott Parsons
"The Kinship System of the Contemporary United States" (1943)
in Essays in Sociological Theory (1954)
pp. 177-196

Note (4 June, 2016): It would be interesting and productive to consider the various contemporary trends toward social theories of art in light of this observation. Such theories seem hell-bent on delivering a more particularistic, functionally diffuse relationship between artist and audience in place of the universalistic and functionally specific relationship that persisted in earlier European high culture. Of course, the larger implications of this are never sufficiently considered, either on the side of drawbacks to contemporary social theories of art or of benefits of the supposedly outmoded romantic/modernist theories, and so the various systemic-level drawbacks articulated by TP throughout his later essays could make for potent rebuttals. The notion that particularistic/diffuse/interdependent social structures inherently restrict "spontaneous manifestations of sentiment" certainly would be a damning charge if it could be proven.

Mumford -- Art and Technics (xiv)

"As with printing, photography did not altogether do away with the possibilities of human choice; but to justify their productions as art there was some tendency on the part of the early photographers, once they had overcome the technical difficulties of the process, to attempt to ape, by means of the camera, the special forms and symbols that had been handed down traditionally by painting. Accordingly, in the nineties, American photographs became soft and misty and impressionistic, just when impressionism was attempting to dissolve form into atmosphere and light. But the real triumphs of photography depended upon the photographer's respect for his medium, his interest in the object before him, and his ability to single out of the thousands of images that pass before his eye, affected by the time of day, the quality of light, movement, the sensitivity of his plates or film, the contours of his lens, precisely that moment when these factors were in conjunction with his own purpose. At that final moment of choice--which sometimes occurred at the point when a picture was taken, sometimes only after taking and developing a hundred indifferent prints--the human person again became operative; and at that moment, but only at that moment, the machine product becomes a veritable work of art, because it reflects the human spirit." (93)

Against Parsimony

If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough.

Some things in life, of course, are just plain difficult to understand. Often enough this is their ineluctable nature (and ours); but if a particular subject seems to offer itself up for mastery, try learning as much as you possibly can about it and see if that doesn't thicken the plot just a bit.

The more you know, the more you don't know.

This second piece of popular wisdom carries a very different message from the first: a depth of understanding sufficient to permit the formation of simple explanations is highly destructive of the willingness to accept them; and thus in the ethical sense, I would say, also to dispense them.

Hence there is a third colloquialism which is an essential corollary to the first:

Just because you can doesn't mean you should.

Scrabble, Ethics, and The Meritocracy

Another confession: over the last several years I have allowed myself to get sucked into the strange and beautiful world of more-than-casual Scrabble playing, and I like it a little more than is probably good for me. Yes, I have become "that guy" who thinks nothing of playing words like UVEA, COOEE, and AENEOUS whether he's at a Scrabble club (yes, it has gone that far) or with a bunch of drunk friends, and who, when inevitably accused by said drunk friends of "cheating" in the moral sense (if hardly in the legal sense), thinks nothing of pointing out that (1) these words in fact appear on a widely available list of "vowel dumps" that anyone with an internet connection can easily seek out and learn if they care enough to do so, and (2) though these words seem pretty random, Scrabble vocabulary is hardly an anything-goes proposition, specifically because there is an international organization of people who really care about this stuff and whose administration of the rules and their application reflects said high degree of caringness. In contemporary terms now: don't hate the player, hate the game.

Having thus passed from being someone who only thought he was good at Scrabble to being someone who knows he's nowhere near an "expert" (and there is, as with the words themselves, a finite definition of experthood), I have also made the concurrent transition from being someone who viewed studying such lists of meaningless words as "cheating" to being someone who understands that access to such lists or the willingness to make them oneself represents so much less than half the battle. To compete on the highest levels of this game, you still need a steel trap mind, a killer instinct, and an iron poker face; if you lack any of these, experienced players will summarily devour you. You do, admittedly, also need to know a lot of words that you're highly unlikely to encounter anywhere else. Even so, "knowing" them is one thing, "finding" them in crucial moments of a game is another; and that throws the whole proposition back on to familiar territory: practice.

As professor Jerry Luckhardt at the U of MN would always say, "Practice is not a sign of weakness or insecurity." It certainly is not cheating either. Get a bunch of drunk music majors together some weekend and they will unite behind this battlecry concerning their own metier, then decry it in the next breath once someone grabs the Scrabble board off of a nearby bookshelf and deals them a death by a thousand cuts using some of the over 1,000 permissible 2- and 3-letter words. The truth is that the two pursuits are overwhelmingly similar in their Gladwellian dimensions: the intuitive genius and the hapless grinder are, while not unheard of, exceedingly rare birds both in Scrabble and in music. There is also this: given a modicum of discipline and motivation (the afterburn of having one of those vowel dumps played on you for the first time and then losing your challenge seems to provide an adequate, if temporary, dose of both for most drunk music majors), there's no reason virtually any fully developed adult couldn't grasp the most basic elements of high-level Scrabble in one sitting, thereby becoming nearly unbeatable in occasional drunk living room games against less enterprising friends while expending a disproportionately paltry amount of effort. Similarly, I have often found it both maddening and heartbreaking when my adult students seem unable or unwilling to solidify foundational skills and knowledge that would open up the world for them. Too many hobbyists look at professionals with the same mixture of awe and contempt that my music major friends point in my direction when I take the rack AICNNRT and drop down TYRANNIC through a Y for 80-some points. The truth of the matter, though, is that while I've put in only a fraction of the time the experts have, I have made an investment, I have put some thought into prioritizing certain tasks over others in the limited time I am willing to devote specifically to Scrabble, and it has been sufficient to deliver a much more enjoyable and satisfying Scrabble experience. Some find it off-putting simply that you can be capable of plays like the one described above and not yet be near the experts. They should not feel this way: you get out of it what you put into it, and there is plenty of fulfilling, even exhilarating grey area to be inhabited without jeopardizing prior commitments to other life-dominating pursuits.

If you have an iOS device and a Facebook account, let's play Scrabble over the interwebs sometime. I promise I won't go easy on you.

Exchange with Milo Fine (iv): "if you don't like the world, change yourself"

[Previously: Foreword – (i) – (ii) – (iii)]

[SK] Not that it's of much consequence, but I guess I should clarify what I meant about consistency/reinvention. There is an adage now that in order to get over, you have to be "the guy/gal/group with the _____," the blank being filled in with just about anything, but just one thing (at once) so as to be digestible/memorable in scope and on display at each and every opportunity, i.e. towards the notion that people need to see something advertised x number of times before they will buy it. (Wikipedia tells me this is called Effective Frequency.) I didn't mean to imply that those so inclined never, ever evolve, just that there is an initial marketing phase that has to either succeed (which permits more freedom) or fail (which necessitates trying a new, calculated [blank]) on the basis of a predictable musical outcome. In other words, in terms of a science experiment, the [blank] is the control/constant.

[MF] Ah, I see. In a way, distinction without a difference. What we're talking about here is marketing/packaging, and, of course, advertising. Big tool for the latter is, naturally, repetition, through which people are convinced they "need" something. A couple thoughts concerning "effective frequency". First is the fact that I keep stumbling into more and more rarified concepts and terms. Some, maybe even a good percentage, can be helpful as they identify further subsets in/of a given field. Put another way, they illuminate various "corners" of various theories. On the other hand, they seem to obfuscate more than illuminate when it comes to application. So much more "knowledge" resulting in so much less "wisdom". Putting *that* another way, people coin terms and phrases, research and write about them, but, fundamentally *nothing* changes concerning the so-called human condition. We're much better at identifying things than putting them into meaningful action in our own lives. Pathetic. Concerning "effective frequency", I would debate the issue that the success of an initial marketing phase permits more freedom. Perhaps true enough if that (successful) initial phase is focused on the public image of the "artist". That would give them maneuvering room to take on different forms/styles. But, if a particular style/approach/form is what strikes the (fickle) fancy of the public, then one will be hard-pressed to do anything else if one is to maintain that initial blush. Of course, "art" predicated on the commonly understood definition of success is, for me, always highly suspect.

I guess the funny thing, though, is that should the artist insist on being unpredictable, the "pidgeonholing" impulse in the culture at large will fill in the blank anyway.

Right, right.

I've been "the jazz tuba player" for a while, and I'm sure you've had your go-rounds with that sort of thing as well. It happens by itself, whether you like it or not; truthfully, though, I can't sit here and complain without acknowledging that all of this has probably done more good than harm for me in the long run in terms of opportunities to play with people, even despite getting to hear them say some borderline-insulting things about me in my presence (i.e. a jazz guy once told me, "Once you get your classical chops together, you're set!"). The dynamic I was attempting to describe before was a certain encouragement of/pandering to the pidgeonholing impulse, an impulse which unfortunately I think we all are prone to (see, in your words, "wiring"), which explains its reliability in the eyes of those doing the pandering.

Yeah. Just as our conditioning/wiring filters create a sense of "order" in our perceptions, so we readily gravitate towards pigeonholing. As I've no doubt posited to you before, how amazing it would be to perceive (hear, see, etc.) the world around us closer to what *it really is* without these filters, rather than with the artifice created by them.

There's something in there, of course, about Improvised Music being "different every time," but also about your notions of consistency and resonance. Another fruitful dialectic very much at odds with the status quo, which is more dualistic.

Yes! Particularly if, re: "different" every time" you mean genuinely *improvised* music rather than improvising musicians overly relying on their tried-and-true vocabularies, strategies, etc. That stated, musicians relying on established tools can, and do, obviously, create resonant music. And there, we return once again to the initiative of the individual, which, ultimately, is much more important than the style of music. Putting *that* another way, while improvised music provides, shall we say, more potential for resonant/individual expression, that too has been squandered.

Besides the threat of being personally/artistically pidgeonholed, it was eye-opening for me in my early "professional" career to see friends and acquaintances gradually polarize around styles and venues I had associated myself with. In one sense I actually felt bad about it, thinking again of what it's like to be a follower of a few "inconsistent cats" myself. At that age, though, I was strangely content (and aware of it) to lead a compartmentalized musico-stylistic life without much blending. Needless to say that my first whiffs of the "specious pastiche-stained umbrella" of self-conscious eclecticism actually heightened my resolve, even though I always figured a more thorough integration was inevitable; in so many ways, I've come to be very suspicious of those so bent on precipitating inevitabilities; but, it has started to happen, and I think it has indeed been positive precisely for not being forced in the least.

Your path of discovery; what I like to term "gathering evidence", after Thomas Bernhard's autobiography.

Even so, a degree of compartmentalization is still perceivable and I suspect it always will be with me. I always aspire to play jazz, classical, and improvised music with the best players in those areas, which is to say usually with specialists, problematic, if not outright hypocritical, since I thus refuse to specialize myself, and increasingly a non-starter with my own music, which tends to demand fluency in (not just familiarity with) more than one of those traditions. (An aside: is Improvised Music a tradition or an anti-tradition?) Ethnomusicology has established rather starkly that there are only so many styles/forms/compositions a human musician can truly specialize in, and yet I can pinpoint a number of pretty specific technical features of the music I'm interested in that cut across these three styles: it's mostly polyphonic, contrapuntal, harmonically and timbrally rich/dense, and so on. The question facing musicians like me, then, is whether we can transcend the limitations of generalism by specializing in our own poly-stylistic music (i.e. jack-of-all-trades, master-of-some)?

First, improvised music is now a tradition; absolutely. But, for the most resolute practitioners, it is still and must be, a non-tradition; an "avant grade" in the purest sense of the term.

And, concerning this whole "renaissance man" notion which has taken on a whole new (oxymoron intended) superficial breadth and depth over the last century, I again defer to Musil (THE MAN WITHOUT QUALITIES, same translators). Here, our "protagonist" is contemplating his position compared to the "superman (renaissance man) of letters" character in the book, who is also a cagey opportunist and politician:

"Let us try to imagine the opposite — a writer who did not do all these things. He would have to refuse cordial invitations, rebuff people, assess praise not as though he himself were the object of it, but like a judge, tear the natural state of things to shreds, and treat splendid opportunities with suspicion merely because they were splendid; and he would have nothing to offer in return but processes going on inside his own head, difficult to express and difficult to assess, and the work of a man of letters, something that an epoch already possessing supermen of letters need not set much store by. Would not such a man inevitably remain an outsider and have to withdraw from reality, bearing the consequences of his attitude?"

Let us also take into account another searing observation from Hannah Arendt. To paraphrase, each succeeding generation has "improved" technical wiring; which is why, for instance, contemporary composers are generally one generation ahead of people actually being able to realize what they write. This is much more inevitable than it is admirable; a natural progression of technique, but, of course, not necessarily resonance. And this ties into the above re: no marked "improvement" in the overall human condition. So, it makes biological/physiological sense that more and more musicians are able to produce superficially convincing/compelling eclectic music.

It seems to me there are fewer specialists now; a situation created/driven by careerism. "Oh, I'd better get this other thing together -- at least somewhat -- because it will open more doors." And those who are specialists are just that because they are able to do so, i.e.; the gig pays enough. Naturally, I'm oversimplifying, but the point I keep getting back to is that, sadly, most "art" is done for recognition and money rather than the work itself. Hey, you hipped me to the term "hire education".

That stated, "poly-stylism" is absolutely a viable path. (And I say that unequivocally because, as you point out below, I am a "poly-stylist"; though not quite in the manner you ascribe to yourself.) For example, I find composer Alfred Schnittke's "poly-stylism" very appealing; and resonant. Just as I don't find anything opportunistic about Henry Cowell's adaptation of ethnic music. It all boils down to doing the work you need to do for *yourself*; because it needs to be done. Doing that, you will find listeners. And, among those, some who will truly hear.

You're path was, by choice, very different, one very large degree removed from what I'm describing in that your range of listening is quite broad but your interface with your instruments intuitive (autodidactic? naive?), and from a very early stage. Your groups include people who elsewhere read notation, play changes, recite poetry, do experimentalism, etc., and you occasionally enable/tolerate a certain amount of those things, but your groups play "free" as a rule. It seems to me that your sources, so to speak, are not so different, but your method is. (But then, at a certain point, that kind of music becomes a source?) I had a string of gigs with you a few years ago where a listener dropped a different superficial post-concert reference each night; they were not so much off-base as simply unnecessary. In any case, despite my own compartmentalist tendencies, I would say based on playing in your groups that there certainly is something of a higher order about the way these things emerge from your way of working. It is actually more compelling when not everyone in the group "owns" every style.

Extremely astute observations. And, as I think you know, I never mapped this out; never had a "game plan". This all evolved more or less naturally, as I played, observed, challenged my own personal baggage, and investigated; combining as I do when playing, the intuitive and the intellect. And, I am convinced that this, as you put it, "higher order" (Musil's "andere zustand") comes from a collective consciousness/unconsciousness/energy. I have no idea how it actually functions, but that mystery of that process is vital.

As for resonance, at the risk of now running in circles, the question for me becomes whether this notion that "what he learned from sound he brought to his life, and vice versa" is a description or a prescription? This potential of sound/music is self-evident to many of us, but...well, so many others seem incapable of learning this way. You almost can't give away music right now. So yes, from the department of worrying about the things you can control, the inner struggle becomes paramount. I guess I am trapped, though, because I have always made my inner struggle about how I could do more for other people; and further, a paradox inside a paradox: the closer you get to just about any people, their fallibility and vicissitudes, the less you want to help them! Yet unless you believe in a higher power and/or something like a judgment day, it seems to me that any sense of wholesomeness or morality is at root a matter of your relationships, direct and indirect, to other living things on Planet Earth. So, I guess I'm not sure how the "indirect" route of the inner struggle can claim complete supremacy or dominance over more "direct" paths. Or, is the notion that "direct" here is simply standing in for "contrived?"

Whew.

I would suggest that "direct/indirect" is much like "intuitive/intellect"; a flux. We are diseased, we are flawed, we struggle. In amongst that we find that some people's "fallibility and vicissitudes" cause us to cut them loose. With others, we find ourselves hanging in to varying degrees in different ways. I know I've told you about the surprising relationship arcs I've had with a few people over decades. The "falling outs" have seemed final; irrevocable. And, then, years later, through no forced effort of our own, we find a new footing/common ground. Sometimes this leads to a new "falling out", but, the time reconnected feels utterly worthwhile. When I was younger, things were much more cut-and-dried. But, with age, my self-righteousness has diminished, thanks in good part to an unerring look in the mirror. From another angle, and as the cliche goes, "I love humanity; it's people I can't stand"; and, of course, that *all* starts in the mirror. A major motivation for me to attempt something akin to an ethical (I find that concept much more tolerable than "moral") life is that *so* much of the world is unethical. As with my music, a matter of moving along the path less traveled. (If you don't like the world, change yourself!)