the intentional fallacy (wimsatt and beardsley, orig. 1946)

Wimsatt and Beardsley
"The Intentional Fallacy"
(orig. 1946)
in
Margolis,
Philosophy Looks at the Arts
(Third ed., 1987)

[SK's comments]
[minimal proofreading]
[many italics omitted]

[367]

19. The Intentional Fallacy
W. K. WIMSATT, JR. AND
MONROE C. BEARDSLEY

[...] [epigraph] [...]

I

The claim of the author's "intention" upon the critic's judgment has been challenged in a number of recent discussions,

notably in the debate entitled The Personal Heresy, between Professors Lewis and Tillyard.

But it seems doubtful if this claim and most of its romantic corollaries are as yet subject to any widespread questioning.

The present writers, in a short article entitled "Intention" for a Dictionary¹ of literary criticism, raised the issue but were unable to pursue its implications at any length. We argued that the design or intention of the author is

neither available nor desirable

as standard for judging the success of a work of literary art,

and it seems to us that this is a principle which goes deep into some differences in the history of critical attitudes.

It is a principle which

accepted

or

rejected

points to the polar opposites of

classical "imitation"

and

romantic expression.

It entails many specific truths about inspiration, authenticity, biography, literary history, and scholarship, and about some trends of contemporary poetry, especially its allusiveness.

There is hardly a problem of a

[368]

literary criticism in which the critic's approach will not be qualified by his view of "intention."

Beardsley, Morgan, and Mothersill—On Art and The Definitions of the Arts

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,
Vol. 20, No. 2 (Winter, 1961),
pp. 175-187

ON ART AND THE DEFINITIONS OF ARTS: A SYMPOSIUM

[SK's comments]

THE DEFINITIONS OF THE ARTS

Monroe C. Beardsley

THERE IS ONE VALUABLE—but inadequately appreciated—contribution that aesthetics has made to the growth of 20th-century philosophy in general.

Its generic concepts,
art and work of art,
have served as

paradigm cases

of most of the forms of

waywardness

to which

concepts

are subject:

they have worked overtime as Horrible Examples.

When philosophers were making much of the point
that
some important terms have

variable meaning,

and in some contexts are

ambiguous,

the term "art" provided a fine example,
especially of

the process-product type

of ambiguity.

In some contexts it certainly entails conscious skill,
but
we recall also Shelley's skylark pouring forth its soul
"in profuse strains of unpremeditated art."

When "emotive meaning" came into view,
with all its devious consequences,
the term "work of art" seemed to provide a fine example of "persuasive definition,"
however defined—

for it has widely been assumed to be

classifiable among

the normative or "emotive" terms.

Finally,

through the influence

(at first clandestine,
but after 1953 public)

of Wittgenstein, and others,

many philosophers gave up
the traditional idea
that
general terms are, or ought to be,
definable by necessary and sufficient conditions—

and then these aesthetic terms became

prime examples

of "family-resemblance" and "open-texture" terms.

MONROE C. BEARDSLEY—The Aesthetic Point of View

Philosophy Looks at the Arts
ed. Joseph Margolis
(Third Edition, 1987)

---

[10]

The Aesthetic Point of View

MONROE C. BEARDSLEY
[orig. 1970]

There has been a persistent effort to discover the uniquely aesthetic component, aspect, or ingredient in whatever is or is experienced. Unlike some other philosophical quarries, the object of this chase has not proved as elusive as the snark, the Holy Grail, or Judge Crater—the hunters have returned not empty-handed, but overburdened. For they have found a rich array of candidates for the basically and essentially aesthetic:

aesthetic experience	aesthetic objects
aesthetic value	aesthetic concepts
aesthetic enjoyment	aesthetic situations
aesthetic satisfaction

Confronted with such trophies, we cannot easily doubt that there is something peculiarly aesthetic to be found in our world or our experience; yet its exact location and its categorial status remain in question. ...