18 July 2026

Carroll—A contemporary introduction—Chapter 5—Part III

Noël Carroll
Philosophy of Art: A contemporary introduction
(1999)


[SK's comments]


[249]

...





Part III
Identifying art

Definition and identification

Recent attempts to define art ... have proven thus far to be inconclusive. ...

And yet we are able

to identify art ... with a very

high degree of consensus.


" . . . , presuming of course
that nothing important is riding on the

consensus

itself,
for if there is, it will soon disintegrate. . . . "

Thus the question of how we manage to do it

remains pressing.


Well,
the apparent paradox given above establishes that

the question

is difficult,
not that it is

pressing

.

Those are two different things.

Moreover, this is not

merely an academic question.

Classifying artifacts as artworks is

central to our practice

of art. ... is integral to

determining how we should respond

to it. ... Should we attend to the expressive properties of a amalgam of crushed and mangled automobile chassis or

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consign them to the junkyard?

How about

first the one,

    and then the other

?

If art, these objects bear scrutiny and interpretation. If not, we call the Department of Sanitation.

". . . Quick, what's the number for Critics and Interpreters? . . ."

17 July 2026

Carroll—A contemporary introduction—Chapter 5—Part II (cont.)

Noël Carroll
Philosophy of Art: A contemporary introduction
(1999)


[SK's comments]

[this post picks up where this one left off]


[226]

...


Neo-Wittgensteinianism has an obvious problem dealing with readymades and found objects. If In Advance of a Broken Arm is an artwork, then any snow shovel that is indiscernible from it, including yours and mine, should be an artwork as well. If we simply attend to the

[227]

perceptible features of the shovels in question, they should all count as artworks, since they are perceptually indiscernible. ... But this result is wrongheaded. ... The Institutional Theorist appeals to certain nonmanifest, relational properties that In Advance of a Broken Arm possesses and that my snow shovel does not, ...

The Institutional Theorist calls the relevant social practice "the artworld." The artworld, he claims, is

a social institution, like religion,

insofar as it is

underwritten by rules and procedures.

Candidates are artworks because they abide by the pertinent artworld rules and procedures. In other words, an artwork is

generated by


playing by

the required rules and procedures. These social rules are the underlying factors that

make artworks possible

(they are

analogous to the genetic mechanisms

that account for family resemblances).

The relation of the artwork


to the rules

is

not a manifest property

of the artwork—you cannot eyeball it ... ; it is

a function of


the social context

into which the artwork is inserted.


This seems not quite

genetic

so long as it is
not quite a

mechanism.

.

It approaches a "mechanistic" tractability only as scale and sample approach infinity.

i.e. It is tractable in this way only where it can be formulated as a problem of disorganized complexity and its surface thereby observed.

But
to land on these emergent

rules

you have to ignore all of the "rules"
which prevail at the organized level,

i.e.,
in this case,
at the so-called individual level.

If the discovery that humanity is a culture-bound superorganism merely becomes the latest rationalization for subjugating 'individuals' to 'the system', then it would be better to put this discovery on a rocket and shoot it to the moon.

15 July 2026

Margolis—The Importance of Being Earnest about the Definition and Metaphysics of Art


[215]

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 68, No. 3 (SUMMER 2010), pp. 215-223

JOSEPH MARGOLIS


The Importance of Being Earnest about the Definition and Metaphysics of Art

[SK's comments]

The philosophy of art may be doomed,
again and again
but always once and for all,
to define what it is to be
"a work of art,"
an "artwork,"
"art"
in the sense

best suited to "the fine arts."

Modern efforts seem to end
in exhaustion
or bafflement
or sheer scatter
or

a sort of bad faith

that assures us that it was never worth the bother in the first place.

But many are troubled by the nagging sense of failure that no mere dismissal seems able to dispel.

We are still caught in the puzzles of Morris Weitz's extraordinarily disturbing early essay, ...

published ... only a few years after the appearance of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1953),

on which,

however inaccurately,

it claims to depend.

If Weitz's account is regarded
as
the original gauntlet analytic aesthetics took up so eagerly almost at once ...

it is equally plausible
to credit Arthur Danto's immensely influential essay,
"The Artworld," published in 1964,
with
having confirmed
(by the absence of explicit mention,
so to say)
the single most-discussed version
of
the great complication
that
baffled all efforts
at
defining art
in accord with
the new spirit of rigor
that had just taken hold
in
analytic aesthetics.

I mean,
of course,

the trauma

produced by

Duchamp's devilish jokes

(especially the notorious Fountain)

transfigured,

in Danto's hands,
into

the sober metaphysics

of Warhol's Brillo Box.

11 July 2026

Kristeller—The Modern System of the Arts

Paul Oskar Kristeller
The Modern System of the Arts:
A Study in the History of Aesthetics
Part I
Journal of the History of Ideas,
Vol. 12, No. 4 (Oct., 1951),
pp. 496-527

[SK's comments]

[minimal excisions in main body]

[many Greek terms dashed out]


I read this a while back, once and quickly. It's good to come back to it. But I would not have thought that it would figure in the Definition Wars, and I'm still not sure that it should.

[496]

THE MODERN SYSTEM OF THE ARTS:

A Study in the History of Aesthetics (I)

By Paul Oskar Kristeller

Dedicated to Professor Hans Tietze on his 70th birthday

I

  The fundamental importance of the eighteenth century in the history of aesthetics and of art criticism is generally recognized.

To be sure, there has been a great variety of theories and currents within the last two hundred years that cannot be easily brought under one common denominator.

Yet all the changes and controversies of the more recent past presuppose certain fundamental notions which go back to that classical century of modern aesthetics.

It is known that the very term "Aesthetics" was coined at that time, and, at least in the opinion of some historians, the subject matter itself, the "philosophy of art," was invented in that comparatively recent period

and can be

applied to earlier phases of Western thought

only with reservation. ¹

It is also generally agreed that such dominating concepts of

  ¹ ...

For music: H. Sahlender, Die Bewertung der Musik im System der Kuenste: Eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung (thes. Jena, 1929). ...



[497]

modern aesthetics as taste and sentiment, genius, originality and creative imagination did not assume their definite modern meaning before the eighteenth century.

Some scholars have rightly noticed that only the eighteenth century produced a type of literature in which the various arts were

compared with each other

and discussed

on the basis of common principles,

whereas up to that period treatises on poetics and rhetoric, on painting and architecture, and on music had represented quite distinct branches of writing and were primarily concerned with

technical precepts

rather than with

general ideas.

Finally, at least a few scholars have noticed that the term "Art," with a capital A and in its modern sense, and the related term "Fine Arts" (Beaux Arts) originated in all probability in the eighteenth century.

  In this paper, I shall take all these facts for granted, and shall concentrate instead on a much simpler and in a sense more fundamental point that is closely related to the problems so far mentioned, but does not seem to have received sufficient attention in its own right.

Although the terms " Art," "Fine Arts " or "Beaux Arts" are often identified with the visual arts alone, they are also quite commonly understood in a broader sense.

In this broader meaning, the term "Art" comprises above all the five major arts of

painting,

sculpture,

architecture,

music

and

poetry.

These five constitute the irreducible nucleus of the modern system of the arts, on which all writers and thinkers seem to agree.

On the other hand, certain additional arts are sometimes added to the scheme, but with less regularity, depending on the different views and interests of the authors concerned: gardening, engraving and the decorative arts, the dance and the theatre, sometimes the opera, and finally eloquence and prose literature.

10 July 2026

John Wisdom—Things and Persons

Symposium: Things and Persons
D. M. Mackinnon, H. A. Hodges, John Wisdom
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 22 (1948), pp. 179-215

[SK's comments]

[202]

III.—By JOHN WISDOM.

...

[206]

...

3. To return.
MacKinnon wants ethical problems taken seriously,
and perhaps we ought to say
that

he wants them taken seriously
not merely
by people who have a particular problem to deal with,
but also
by people who are dealing with a problem of some generality
even though,
as in a problem play,
the problem is presented through a particular case.

Connected with this
which is, I believe, his main concern
are two other points :

(1) He thinks that
many ethical problems are
better put

in terms of people

than

in terms of acts.

Thus he says that writers like Kierkegaard, Buber and Marcel raise the problem of the individual.

He also says that Butler,
as opposed to a utilitarian,
argues that
the proper subject of the moralist is the individual or person in his nature and in his relation with his fellows,
and that
he refuses consequently to allow that we can so to speak
"absorb

ethical reflection

in discussion of

the means of promoting good".