Symposium: Things and Persons
D. M. Mackinnon, H. A. Hodges, John Wisdom
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 22 (1948), pp. 179-215
[SK's comments]
[202]
III.—By JOHN WISDOM.
...
[206]
...
3. To return.
MacKinnon wants ethical problems taken seriously,
and perhaps we ought to say
that
he wants them taken seriously
not merely
by people who have a particular problem to deal with,
but also
by people who are dealing with a problem of some generality
even though,
as in a problem play,
the problem is presented through a particular case.
Connected with this
which is, I believe, his main concern
are two other points :
(1) He thinks that
many ethical problems are
better put
in terms of people
than
in terms of acts.
Thus he says that writers like Kierkegaard, Buber and Marcel raise the problem of the individual.
He also says that Butler,
as opposed to a utilitarian,
argues that
the proper subject of the moralist is the individual or person in his nature and in his relation with his fellows,
and that
he refuses consequently to allow that we can so to speak
"absorb
ethical reflection
in discussion of
the means of promoting good".
