Noël Carroll
Philosophy of Art: A contemporary introduction
(1999)
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Part II
What is representation?
Pictorial representation
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...
...
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Traditional approaches to
pictorial representation
... The resemblance theory of representation states that x represents y just in case x resembles y. ... the illusion theory of pictorial representation maintains that x represents y just in case x causes the illusion of y in spectators. ...
...
... Plato thought painting to be strictly analogous to holding a mirror toward an object. ... [hence] Plato held what we are calling a resemblance theory of representation. ... Note that this theory claims two things. First that resemblance is a necessary condition for representation—that x represents y only if x
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resembles y. But it also claims something else, namely that if x resembles y, then x represents y. ... The first occurrence of "if" here signals that resemblance is a sufficient condition for representation—... The "only if" portion of the formula states that resemblance is a necessary condition for representation. ...
... if x resembles y, does it follow that x represents y? This seems false; ... Imagine two [identical] automobiles... They roll off the assembly line one after the other, ... These two ... will resemble each other maximally, but neither represents the other. ...
... Resemblance is a
reflexive relation.
... But
representation is not reflexive:
I resemble myself in every respect, but I do not represent myself. ...
... resemblance is a
symmetrical relation.
That is, if x is related to y, then y is related to x in the same way (xRy if and only if yRx). If I am Pat's brother, then Pat is my brother. ... But
representation is not a symmetrical relation.
If a picture of Napoleon resembles Napoleon, it follows that Napoleon resembles his picture, but it does not follow that Napoleon represents his picture. ... Thus,
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resemblance cannot serve as a model for representation, ... there will be many cases of resemblance ... that will not warrant attributions of representation. ...
One might try to get around this objection via amending the resemblance theory by stipulating that x must be a visual design. ... Thus, even if Napoleon resembles his portrait, we will not say that he represents it because Napoleon is not a visual design. But this calls attention to a[nother] problem ...
What most visual representations
resemble most
are other visual representations.
A picture of Richard Nixon looks more like a picture of Bill Clinton than it looks like Richard Nixon. ...
...
...
Resemblance, then, does not appear to be a sufficient condition for representation. But is it a necessary condition? ...
... When we say that
one object represents another object,
we mean, at the very least, that
the first object is a symbol for the second object.
... But what is a symbol? ... Peirce
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defined a symbol as
a sign
"whose special significance or fitness
to represent just what it does represent
lies in nothing but the very fact
of there being a habit, disposition or other effective rule
that it will be so interpreted."
...
Consider a military map. A thumbtack can stand for an armored division, but it does not resemble an armored division. ... In a context like this one, what stands for the armored division is arbitrary. ... But
if the symbol relation (denotation) is the core of representation,
and if denotation can obtain without resemblance,
then resemblance is not a necessary condition for representation.
