24 April 2021

Parsons on Ideological Skewness


The relation of an ideological system to the social system in which it takes root is highly complex, and subject to a great deal of variation in different circumstances. In a well-integrated society the dominant ideology in large measure reflects and interprets a large part of the system of actually institutionalized patterns. But even in the most stable societies the ideological patterns are selective relative to the institutional. Ideological formulation often reflects a need to justify, which may imply a sense of insecurity. Hence, those patterns which are most completely taken for granted are likely to play a small role, if any, in explicit ideology. The system is thus "skewed" in the direction of emphasizing elements which are felt to be "problematical." Consciousness of contrast with other societies is one major factor in this." (267)

Talcott Parsons
"The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change" (1945)
in Essays in Sociological Theory (1954)
pp. 238-274

Note (4 June, 2016): A brilliant analysis. Essentially he's pointing out the same logical conundrum of the notion of something being "extremely average." The ideological average/LCD by definition does not have a strong enough profile in either absolute or relative terms to be consolidated into powerful political statements. Attempts at this fall flat just as sayings like "extremely average" or "intensely mediocre" come off as humorous and/or ironic no matter the affect with which they are uttered. Hence, the harder the political center tries to consolidate its message, the more ridiculous they look. Meanwhile, various extremists gain notoriety all out of proportion to their logical underpinnings and real level of support simply because they appeal to baser lizard-brain impulses and have a very strong/distinctive profile built into them. I have been maintaining this election season that the "center" represented by H. Clinton and other status-quo candidates (or are there any in the repub. party?) is essentially a crudely calculated mirage which simply takes the average of strong-left and strong-right positions and consolidates it in order to appeal to the LCD. I feel that it thus represents very few actual people's views. The increasing struggles of mainstream candidates and the increasing success of relatively extreme insurgents back this up. All indications are that the polity is highly polarized right now, which means that while this fake center tries to stigmatize "extreme" left and right views as if their common extremeness were their defining feature and their many substantive differences irrelevant in light of this, the fact is that these VAST differences are TOTALLY relevant, and hence that one or the other of the "extreme" candidates collectively represent far more people than the centrists ever could hope to. Hence their conundrum, and ours. Here TP sounds a cautionary note from the mainstream, reminding us extremists that our "ideologies" are undoubtedly rooted to some extent in our "insecurity" and in our "us-against-them" mindset (our "consciousness of contrast" with the other), and that just because we can't detect any common sense emanating from the center doesn't mean that it is not there (i.e. things are inherently "skewed" towards extremes). In a vacuum, I'll drink to that. In the actual world I live in, there are all manner of additional factors to consider which lead me to feel comfortable supporting Bernie and less and less comfortable with Hillary on any level. The current mainstream might literally be the worst of all evils. But TP's is a timely note of caution even so.

...the objects of ideological formation are mainly in the "remote" category to most persons–or are high-level abstractions with a similar significance. Hence, they are less fully controlled by realistic considerations and constitute particularly favorable opportunities for the operation of such nonrational and irrational mechanisms as projection, displacement, identification. Where there are severe and definitely structured tensions in a society there are almost certain to be ideological patterns which contain conspicuous elements of unrealism, romantic idealization, and distortion." (268)

Note (4 June, 2016): A partner statement with the previous one, and clearer connection between psychoanalytic theory and real-world political/ideological phenomena than any of the psychoanalysts themselves seemed to be capable of formulating.

2 comments:

Stefan Kac said...

David Riesman
The Lonely Crowd
("Abridged edition with a 1969 preface")
(orig. 1950)

"The reader who recalls our beginnings with the large, blind movements of population growth and economic and technological change may ask whether we seriously expect utopian thinking, no matter how inspired, to counter whatever fate for man these movements have in store. ...

"I think we need to insist today on bringing to consciousness the kind of environments that Marx dismissed as utopian, in contrast to the mechanical and passive approach to the possibilities of man's environment that he helped, in his most influential works, to foster. However, since we live in a time of disenchantment, such thinking, where it is rational in aim and method and not simply escapism, is not easy. It is easier to concentrate on programs for choosing among lesser evils. ... Both rich and poor avoid any goals, personal or social, that seem out of step with peer-group aspirations. The politically operative inside-dopester seldom commits himself to aims beyond those that common sense proposes to him. Actually, however, in a dynamic political context, it is the modest, commonsensical goals of the insiders and the "constructive" critics that are unattainable."

Stefan Kac said...

Christopher Lasch
The Revolt of the Elites (1995)

"There is a good deal of evidence...that Americans agree even about concrete issues, the very issues, prominent in recent years as a source of bitter ideological conflict, on which agreement is allegedly impossible."

(p. 110)