27 June 2025

Carroll—A contemporary introduction—Chapter 2—Part 1


Noël Carroll
Philosophy of Art: A contemporary introduction
(1999)


[59]

2
Art and expression

Part I
Art as expression

The expression theory of art

For centuries, representation was taken to be the central, defining feature of art. ... broadly, the emphasis in imitation theories of art was on

the outward aspects of things
the look of objects and the actions of humans.

In a loose sense ... the objective features of the "external" world— ...

nature and observable behavior.

But, in the West, as

the eighteenth century

dissolved into

the nineteenth,
ambitious artists

... began

to turn inward;

... less preoccupied with ... appearance ... than with ... their own

subjective experiences.

... landscapes [e.g.] were charged with

a significance beyond their physical properties.

... artists ... attempted to

register their reactions
—the way they felt—

about the landscapes. ...

... Romanticism places premier value on

the self and its own individual experiences.

... some outward scene ... is not presented for its own sake, but as a stimulus for the poet to

examine his or her own emotional responses to it.

[60]

...

... We still live in the shadows of Romanticism. ... Many twentieth-century art movements ...

can be seen

as direct descendants of Romanticism.

Should these movements
be seen as such?

Moreover, ... these developments ... employing distortion and abstraction for expressive purposes ... made ever more evident the inadequacies of imitation and representational theories of art.

. . . but presumably this didn't happen right away. I think Danto has a point there. The initial reaction, and the final reaction of many people until their final death-reaction, is simply to resist expansion of the "concept," as we might say in Anal. Phil. terms.

Danto can always be counted on to make many good points, but he usually manages to draw precisely the wrong conclusions from them. If "it was impossible to accept" Postimpressionism, at first, "as art unless inept art," then this does not at all suggest that "terrain is constituted artistic in virtue of artistic theories." What it suggests, in fact, is that theories and concepts are the last to adapt themselves to a new reality.

If so, then Our Man Here has an even bigger problem than Danto: What does this say about any "analysis" of "our" concepts and practices? Are we analyzing yesterday's newspaper hoping to find out what is happening today?

21 June 2025

Carroll—A contemporary introduction—Chapter 1 (Part 2 of 2)


Noël Carroll
Philosophy of Art: A contemporary introduction
(1999)


[33]

Part II
What is representation?

Pictorial representation

...

...

...

[34]

...

Traditional approaches to
pictorial representation

... The resemblance theory of representation states that x represents y just in case x resembles y. ... the illusion theory of pictorial representation maintains that x represents y just in case x causes the illusion of y in spectators. ...

...

... Plato thought painting to be strictly analogous to holding a mirror toward an object. ... [hence] Plato held what we are calling a resemblance theory of representation. ... Note that this theory claims two things. First that resemblance is a necessary condition for representation—that x represents y only if x

[35]

resembles y. But it also claims something else, namely that if x resembles y, then x represents y. ... The first occurrence of "if" here signals that resemblance is a sufficient condition for representation—... The "only if" portion of the formula states that resemblance is a necessary condition for representation. ...

... if x resembles y, does it follow that x represents y? This seems false; ... Imagine two [identical] automobiles... They roll off the assembly line one after the other, ... These two ... will resemble each other maximally, but neither represents the other. ...

... Resemblance is a

reflexive relation.

... But

representation is not reflexive:

I resemble myself in every respect, but I do not represent myself. ...

... resemblance is a

symmetrical relation.

That is, if x is related to y, then y is related to x in the same way (xRy if and only if yRx). If I am Pat's brother, then Pat is my brother. ... But

representation is not a symmetrical relation.

If a picture of Napoleon resembles Napoleon, it follows that Napoleon resembles his picture, but it does not follow that Napoleon represents his picture. ... Thus,

[36]

resemblance cannot serve as a model for representation, ... there will be many cases of resemblance ... that will not warrant attributions of representation. ...

One might try to get around this objection via amending the resemblance theory by stipulating that x must be a visual design. ... Thus, even if Napoleon resembles his portrait, we will not say that he represents it because Napoleon is not a visual design. But this calls attention to a[nother] problem ...

What most visual representations
resemble most
are other visual representations.

A picture of Richard Nixon looks more like a picture of Bill Clinton than it looks like Richard Nixon. ...

...

...

Resemblance, then, does not appear to be a sufficient condition for representation. But is it a necessary condition? ...

... When we say that

one object represents another object,

we mean, at the very least, that

the first object is a symbol for the second object.

... But what is a symbol? ... Peirce

[37]

defined a symbol as

a sign
"whose special significance or fitness
to represent just what it does represent
lies in nothing but the very fact
of there being a habit, disposition or other effective rule
that it will be so interpreted."

...

Consider a military map. A thumbtack can stand for an armored division, but it does not resemble an armored division. ... In a context like this one, what stands for the armored division is arbitrary. ... But

if the symbol relation (denotation) is the core of representation,

and if denotation can obtain without resemblance,

then resemblance is not a necessary condition for representation.

Carroll—A contemporary introduction—Chapter 1 (Part 1 of 2)


Noël Carroll
Philosophy of Art: A contemporary introduction
(1999)


[19]

1
Art and representation

Part 1
Art as representation

Art, imitation and
representation

... In the course of outlining his utopia, [Plato] argued that poets—particularly dramatists—should be outlawed. ... According to Plato, the essence of drama was imitation—the simulation of appearances. ... he believed that appearances appeal to the emotions and that stirring up the emotions is socially dangerous. An emotional citizenry is an unstable citizenry, ready to be swayed by demagogues ...

Arguments like Plato's against poetry are

still heard today

when it comes to discussions of the mass media.

How alike are these arguments, really?

Often we are told that TV with its seductive imagery ... makes for an unthinking electorate.

Because seductive TV imagery makes us ready to be swayed? Because this imagery appeals to the emotions? Who is making that argument quite like Plato?

...

Aristotle, however, believed that Plato's case was overstated. ...

[20]

... Tragedy evokes pity and fear in spectators, but, he said, it does this for the purpose of catharsis—that is, for the purpose of purging the emotions. ...

... Aristotle also thought that Plato was mistaken in presuming that drama did not address the mind ... He maintained that people can learn from imitations, ...

Though Plato and Aristotle disagree in their diagnosis ... Both take poetry to be involved essentially in the imitation of action. ...

What painters try to do, on the Platonic-Aristotelian view, is to reproduce the appearances of things—to copy them— ...

... Plato and Aristotle primarily thought of dance and music as accompaniments ... They were parts of drama, ... Thus, along with drama and painting, Plato and Aristotle thought of music and dance as primarily imitative or representational arts.

[21]

When the Greeks used their word for "art," they had a broader conception in mind than we do today. For them,

an art

was

any practice that required skill.

Medicine and soldiering were arts on this conception. ... [they] would not have defined the arts, in their sense, as solely involved in imitation. However, it is clear that ... [they] thought that these [today's fine arts] shared a common feature: ... imitation.

... the theory of art that we find presupposed [here] ... We may state it thus:

x is an artwork only if it is an imitation.

...

Today, after almost a century of abstract painting, ... the theory that art is imitation appears to us to fail as a general theory of art, ...

...

... in deference to Plato and Aristotle, we should also add that ... When they went in the theater, or when they went to the unveiling of a new sculpture, what they saw were imitations ...

[22]

...

So, in their own time, the imitative (mimetic) theory of art advanced by Plato and Aristotle had some initial plausibility. It coincided with the dominant examples of Greek art and it also

informed readers about
what to look for and to appreciate

in the art of their contemporaries,

Seriously, Boomer?!

20 June 2025

Carroll—A contemporary introduction—Introductory Chapter


Noël Carroll
Philosophy of Art: A contemporary introduction
(1999)


[2]


Introduction


What is philosophy?

The word "philosophy" has many different meanings. ... Herein, "philosophy" will generally refer to a certain academic discipline.

... there are many different schools of philosophy, ... [which] often have different aims and emphases. The type of philosophy that we will we will be exploring in this book is often called analytic philosophy. ...

... it is sometimes called "Anglo-American" philosophy, ... a somewhat misleading label ... it is not ... the only form of academic philosophy in the English-speaking world. ...

... "What exactly does this school of philosophy analyse?" Simplifying drastically, we might say that

what analytic philosophy analyses

[3]

are concepts.

That is why it is sometimes also called

conceptual analysis.

...

Concepts, of course, are fundamental to human life.

Concepts organize our practices.

The concept of a person, for example, ... The concept of a number ... the concept of knowledge ...

Without such concepts, the activities in question would not exist.

Ok,
so politicsmorality,number,
indeed knowledge itself,
these practices (a.k.a. activities)
simply would not exist
without the requisite concepts.

How about without the words?

Must we possess the word
in order to possess the concept?