tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post6127247017584233826..comments2024-03-27T18:45:16.950-07:00Comments on Fickle Ears: Against The Literary ImperativeStefan Kachttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comBlogger146125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-1390663110053327502024-03-08T12:46:37.651-08:002024-03-08T12:46:37.651-08:00Mandler and Johnson (cont. #2)
"In attempti...Mandler and Johnson (cont. #2)<br /><br /><br /><i>"In attempting to uncover the details of story schemata, folktales, fables, and myths can be used to great advantage. ... If a story is not written down but is preserved only through retelling, it must respect the limitations on memory. We assume that an orally transmitted story will survive only if it conforms to an ideal schema in the first place or has gradually attained such a structure through repeated retellings. Thus, the structure of a folkstory must be one which has been influenced by what people can remember."</i><br /><br />If I'm following some of the previously-consulted sources here, then it seems later scholars would question one aspect of this: if tellers didn't merely <i>"remember"</i> stories but rather recomposed some/much of the material each time, then this is not so simple. What is remembered is, indeed, a <i>"schema"</i> but not necessarily in and of itself a <i>"story."</i> I suppose that is indeed a happy accident for schema-tizers, but it makes the feat of memory less impressive and, potentially, less relevant, since much of the content in any given telling may not actually reflect <i>"what people can remember."</i> but rather what people can (re)compose out of remembered, misremembered, and suddenly reremembered stuff-of-life ("stuff" which usually ends up being mostly and fundamentally <b>about them</b> themselves, not merely metaphorically but literally).<br /><br />But this is not even the most interesting implication of this paragraph. The most interesting part is that <i>"what people can remember"</i> is a <b>technical</b> question, i.e. as in the "technique" of storytelling. It is not rendered here as a question of cultivated or refined technique, certainly; rather one of what might be called naive technique. Or, perhaps I am in error in applying the t-word here; and, true enough, this does seem in spirit what is better called a <b>material</b> question than a properly technical one. But I want provisionally at least to call it "technical" because I think it is a clear and parsimonious refutation of LeRoi Jones' quip that such considerations are inherently "after the fact."<br /><br /><br /><br />[130]<br /><i>"If we had an independent definition of a well-formed story, the search for transformational rules would be easier. Lacking such a definition, we could proceed as linguists often have and ask people whether a given piece of prose is or is not a story. This technique has problems, even for the definition of a sentence..., and the problem may be even more severe for stories. People are able to categorize prose passages crudely as stories or nonstories, or even as good or bad stories, but the finer details of story structure are too complex to be amenable to such intuitive judgments. Instead, we have proposed to make our initial tests of well-formedness and the transformational rules relating well-formed stories to underlying structures on the basis of what people can and cannot remember and on the nature of the distortions that occur in memory."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-50334349088637784712024-03-08T12:46:01.313-08:002024-03-08T12:46:01.313-08:00Mandler and Johnson (cont. #1)
[113]
"a set...Mandler and Johnson (cont. #1)<br /><br /><br />[113]<br /><i>"a set of sentences, forming a story, which are all equally well comprehended (as tested by probe questions or cloze techniques) will not be equally well recalled a week or a month later. Recall will be, in part, a function of the role the sentences play in the overall structure of the story and the extent to which the story matches an ideal schema. ... Reorganization continues to occur...either over the course of time and/or at the time of later retrieval... Therefore, a theory of story schemata designed to predict recall probably should stress the structural characteristics which are relatively invariant across stories rather than the more flexible structures available for use during the course of and immediately following input."</i><br /><br />Well okay, so if what we're interested in is <b>how reception affects the audience</b>, then we're trying to determine what sticks and what doesn't; and this question in fact (at least for <i>"story"</i>) breaks down along lines of <i>"schema"</i>; and "schema" is a species of naive expectation.<br /><br />But vis-a-vis <i>"recall"</i>, I would think that we also <i>"should stress"</i> the most facile considerations of surface content, i.e. to borrow from music, the "vertical" as opposed to the "horizontal" view. e.g. Gratuitous violence, the perennial bugbear of Media Effects studies; "gratuitous" being, actually, the perfect word here because it denotes precisely the notion that said violence is inessential to the narrative. This inessentiality, THIS of all things, IS certainly noticed BOTH by the LCDs and the PhDs. I would certainly think that sheer visceral impact would have <b>much</b> to do with whether such content is <i>"recall</i>[ed]<i>"</i>; but maybe that is a facile underreading of the mechanism. The above suggests that actually it is the <b>essential</b> violence, sex, curse words, etc., those which DO matter in the grand <i>"schema"</i>, which will stick...at least in terms of <i>"recall"</i>; though of course, to further complicate things, "recall" is a looong way from both observable behavior and tacit ideology.Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-72533870833713949272024-03-08T12:35:53.720-08:002024-03-08T12:35:53.720-08:00JEAN M. MANDLER AND NANCY S.JOHNSON
Remembrance o...JEAN M. MANDLER AND NANCY S.JOHNSON <br /><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242529824_Remembrance_of_things_parsed_Story_structure_and_recall" rel="nofollow">Remembrance of Things Parsed: Story Structure and Recall</a><br />(1977)<br /><br /><br />[112]<br /><i>"We will use the term “story schema” to refer to a set of expectations about the internal structure of stories which serves to facilitate both encoding and retrieval. People construct story schemata from two sources. One source comes from listening to many stories and consists of knowledge about the sequencing of events in stories, including how they typically begin and end. The other source comes from experience and includes knowledge about causal relations and various kinds of action sequences. However, the units which eventually form a story schema either condense or ignore many aspects of logical and experiential knowledge about the world. Only those perceptions, feelings, actions, and events which have to do with the ongoing plot or story line are represented in the schema, even though these may subsume other logical and psychological conditions."</i><br /><br />Well, my hackles still rise at any appeal to audience <i>"expectations"</i>, even a sober academic appeal The sonata-form outreachers have used-and-abused "expectations" to death. "Expectations" broadly seem to me more like the sure death of "art appreciation" than the germ from which it could grow. This comes from noticing, as a much younger person, that bringing "expectations" to the table merely ensures their frustration.<br /><br />All of that said (again), it should be possible both to form and to evince "expectations" unconsciously, so maybe that is the less-literal sense in which the above passage deals; or if not "unconsciously," then let's say "naively." <br /><br /><i>"During encoding, the schema acts as a general framework within which detailed comprehension processes take place. This framework performs several functions. First, it directs attention to certain aspects of the incoming material. ... Second, the framework helps the listener keep track of what has gone before."</i><br /><br />Ok, well, this sounds all too familiar. Sounds like we are reading books and watching movies in the sonata-form outreacher manner. That can't possibly be the case, can it?Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-66408347821366752362024-03-08T12:32:48.638-08:002024-03-08T12:32:48.638-08:00B. Calvo-Merino, D.E. Glaser, J. Grèzes, R.E. Pass...B. Calvo-Merino, D.E. Glaser, J. Grèzes, R.E. Passingham and P. Haggard<br /><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/8114654_Action_Observation_and_Acquired_Motor_Skills_An_fMRI_Study_with_Expert_Dancers" rel="nofollow">Action Observation and Acquired Motor Skills: An fMRI Study with Expert Dancers</a><br />(2005)<br /><br /><br />[<b>Page 3 of 7</b>]<br />...<br /><br /><i>"<b>Discussion</b><br /><br />Our results show that the brain’s response to seeing an action is influenced by the acquired motor skills of the observer. ...<br /></i>[<b>Page 4 of 7</b>]<i><br />"...while all groups </i>saw<i> the same stimuli, the mirror areas of their brains responded to the stimuli in a way that depended on the observer’s specific </i>motor<i> expertise. This suggests that action observation may recruit such mirror areas to the extent that the observed action is represented in the subject’s personal motor repertoire, i.e. if the subject has acquired the motor skills to<br />perform such actions. ...in our normal subjects...who had no motor experience of either ballet or capoeira, no such differences were detected."</i><br /><br /><br />[<b>Page 6 of 7</b>]<br /><br /><i>"Our finding lends support to ‘simulation’ theories, according to which action perception involves covert motor activity."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-89773914331476007192024-03-08T12:29:10.029-08:002024-03-08T12:29:10.029-08:00Deborah Tannen
THE MYTH OF ORALITY AND LITERACY
(...Deborah Tannen<br /><a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5523ffe4e4b012b2c4ebd8fc/t/59271eae6a4963dae8638b81/1495735983156/1982+-+The+myth+of+orality+and+literacy.pdf" rel="nofollow">THE MYTH OF ORALITY AND LITERACY<br /></a><br />(1982)<br /><br /><br />[37]<br /><i>"...I concluded that it is not orality and literacy per se that accounts for the findings of the oral/literate research, but rather that typically oral and typically written discourse reflects relatively more focus on interpersonal involvement and content, respectively. ...it is not orality vs. literacy per se that is the key distinction, but relative focus on involvement vs. content.<br /><br />"...many features that have been associated exclusively with literacy are rhetorical strategies found in spoken discourse.<br />"</i><br /><br /><br />[38]<br /><i>"HOW I DISCOVERED ORALITY AND LITERACY <br /><br />...a project analyzing narratives told by people who had seen a film. ...<br /><br />"...the American women...tended to approach the telling about the film as a memory task, whereas the Greek women tended to approach it as a storytelling task. The Americans seemed to struggle to recall as many details as possible,...<br /><br />"In contrast, the Greeks told better stories. ...the Greek narratives were significantly shorter,...<br /></i>[39]<i><br />Moreover, the Greeks interpreted more; they ascribed social roles and motives to the characters, and they offered explanations, judgments, and even philosophization about their actions."</i><br /><br /><br />[40]<br /><i>"a decontextualization hypothesis: that in literate discourse the accuracy of detail is valued, and that literate discourse is decontextualized or text-focused rather than context-focused.<br /><br />"In a sense, the Americans...were approaching the film narrative as a decontextualized task,... However, there is another sense in which the Americans' narratives were not decontextualized at all...</i>[but]<i> as a task contextualized in school. They were using strategies that seemed appropriate to the context they in fact were in: a university setting.<br /><br />"This perspective reflects a growing dissatisfaction with the notion that any discourse can be decontextualized..., and that what has been thought "literate" is in fact associated with formal schooling."</i><br /><br /><br />[41]<br /><i>"...the </i>[underline]<i>cohesion</i>[/underline]<i> hypothesis: that spoken discourse establishes cohesion through paralinguistic features, whereas written discourse does so through lexicalization.<br /><br /><br />"THE COHESION HYPOTHESIS<br /><br />"In speaking, everything that is said must be said in some way... ...one cannot speak without showing one's attitude toward the message and the speech activity.<br /><br />...<br /><br />"...in writing, the relationships between ideas and the writer's attitude toward them must be lexicalized."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-846072567253780712024-03-08T12:21:34.689-08:002024-03-08T12:21:34.689-08:00Butler, Dennis, and Marsh (cont.)
"LIMITS O...Butler, Dennis, and Marsh (cont.)<br /><br /><br /><i>"<b>LIMITS ON THE GENERATION AND RETENTION OF DEDUCTIVE INFERENCES</b><br /><br />"Although there is some evidence to indicate that people generate and retain deductive inferences while reading fictional stories, it is not a foregone conclusion that both steps in the process will occur. First, most models of text processing agree that readers typically generate inferences that are critical to comprehension of the text, but many studies have found that people do not make elaborative inferences. Other research suggests that prior knowledge plays a large role in text comprehension, especially with respect to making inferences; if readers rely on prior knowledge, they will be less likely to make false inferences based on incorrect information from the text because it may contradict prior knowledge. In addition, even if readers do rely on information from the text, they may fail to connect the new proposition to previously read information under certain conditions, such as when the context of the story has changed. Furthermore, there is also evidence to indicate that readers of fictional stories may not always use information from the text to make deductive inferences, even if that information is retrieved or re-activated. ...<br /></i>[490]<i><br />...<br />"Second, other studies that focus on deductive inferences have found that people do not always retain them in long-term memory. ... In addition, while studies have found that exposure to incorrect information slows down responding on a later task, participants in these experiments rarely made judgement errors,... This finding suggests that the correct information was still accessible in prior knowledge even if incorrect information was also retained. Finally, it is possible that even if people integrate inferences into long-term memory, later they will notice incorrect inferences that conflict with their general knowledge and then reject them... In summary, the literature makes competing predictions..."</i><br /><br /><br /><i>"<b>Experiment 1</b><br />...<br /><br /></i>[494]<br /><i>"<b>Discussion</b><br /><br />"Experiment 1 replicated previous research by showing that participants acquired both correct and incorrect information that was directly stated in the stories and produced that information on the subsequent general knowledge test. However, the results also revealed a novel finding: participants made deductive inferences using both the correct and incorrect information and then produced those inferences on the subsequent general knowledge test."<br /></i><br /><br /><br /><i>"<b>Experiment 2</b><br />...<br /><br /></i>[496]<br /><i>"<b>Discussion</b><br /><br />"Experiment 2 replicated the novel finding in Experiment 1: participants in the near inference condition made deductive inferences using both the correct and incorrect information and then produced those inferences on the subsequent general knowledge test. ...the near and far inference conditions showed roughly the same benefit when the text contained correct information, but the near inference condition produced a much greater cost than the far inference condition when the text contained incorrect information."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-4039842471323442422024-03-08T12:20:27.928-08:002024-03-08T12:20:27.928-08:00Andrew C. Butler, Nancy A. Dennis, and Elizabeth J...Andrew C. Butler, Nancy A. Dennis, and Elizabeth J. Marsh<br /><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225068205_Inferring_Facts_From_Fiction_Reading_Correct_and_Incorrect_Information_Affects_Memory_for_Related_Information" rel="nofollow">Inferring facts from fiction: Reading correct and incorrect information affects memory for related information</a><br />(2012)<br /><br /><br />[487, abstract]<br /><i>"Readers learn more than what is directly stated in stories; they use references to the real world to make both correct and incorrect inferences that are integrated into their knowledge bases."</i><br /><br /><br />[488]<br /><i>"Previous research has shown that reading a fictional story that contains references to facts about the world improves people’s ability to answer questions about those facts on a subsequent general knowledge test; however, if the story contains references to false information, people often acquire this misinformation and then reproduce it on the later test... even when they know the correct information."</i><br /><br /><br /><i>"<b>EVIDENCE FOR THE GENERATION AND RETENTION OF DEDUCTIVE INFERENCES</b><br /><br />Do readers of fictional stories generate deductive inferences from correct and incorrect information in the text and then retain those inferences? The literature offers some support for the two steps that would be necessary for this outcome to occur. First, when readers encounter a new proposition, they must activate or retrieve related information from the text and then combine this information with the new proposition to make a deductive inference. Previous research has shown that readers immersed in<br /></i>[489]<br /><i>fiction are less likely to retrieve related prior knowledge, relying instead on information from the text. ... A few studies also suggest that readers sometimes make deductive inferences even when these inferences are not critical to comprehension. ...<br /><br />"Second, once a deductive inference is made during text processing, the reader must integrate it into the mental model of the text and long-term memory. In the memory literature there is a wealth of evidence to show that people remember the inferences that they make over long periods of time, regardless of whether those inferences are based on correct or incorrect information.<br /><br />"...</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-20755487063955578972024-03-08T12:14:05.821-08:002024-03-08T12:14:05.821-08:00Richter, Schroeder, and Wöhrmann (cont.)
[6]
&qu...Richter, Schroeder, and Wöhrmann (cont.)<br /><br /><br />[6]<br /><i>"...the broad impact of the model notwithstanding, the experimental tests of the core assumptions of Gilbert’s (1991) model were concerned with a rather special case of the relation between comprehension and validation. The studies conducted so far were based on pseudo facts such as word definitions in a non-existent language, assertions about an imaginary animal, </i>[etc.]<i>... As a consequence, the information that participants had to study in the course of the experiments and that they later had to verify was not related to any knowledge or beliefs that they could hold. This restriction seems critical because in most situations where individuals validate information, they compare incoming information with their own beliefs about the particular subject matter. ... Thus, the results leave open the possibility that people might be able to validate and reject false information early in information processing, provided that they possess relevant background knowledge.<br />"</i><br /><br /><br />[14]<br /><i>"Experiment 1<br />...<br /><br /></i>[18]<br /><i>"</i>Results and Discussion<br />...<br /><br />[21]<br /><i>"...cognitive load during learning impaired verification performance only in false assertions associated with weak background beliefs but not in false assertions associated with strong background beliefs. These results suggest that even when individuals are placed under a high cognitive load during comprehension, they are not necessarily forced to accept everything they comprehend as being true. In contrast to the assumption of effortful validation processes, the availability of strong background beliefs seems to enable people to reject invalid information in a fast and efficient manner."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-27947798204366047422024-03-08T12:13:01.582-08:002024-03-08T12:13:01.582-08:00Tobias Richter, Sascha Schroeder, and Britta Wöhrm...Tobias Richter, Sascha Schroeder, and Britta Wöhrmann<br /><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/24170531_You_Don't_Have_to_Believe_Everything_You_Read_Background_Knowledge_Permits_Fast_and_Efficient_Validation_of_Information" rel="nofollow">You Don't Have to Believe Everything You Read: Background Knowledge Permits Fast and Efficient Validation of Information</a><br />(2009)<br /><br /><br />(In a fitting twist of irony, I found this paper exceptionally difficult to read and understand.)<br /><br /><br />[3]<br /><i>"Despite the close connection of the two types of activities in everyday life, there is a widespread consensus in the social and cognitive psychology literature that comprehension and validation of information form subsequent stages of processing with very different characteristics. Theories of language comprehension are primarily concerned with stimulus-driven comprehension processes that proceed in an automatic fashion. Theories of attitude change, in contrast, largely portray knowledge-based validation as relying on thoughtful and slow processes that occur only under specific conditions."</i><br /><br /><br />[4]<br /><i>"we will argue that validation is a routine companion of comprehension. Starting from a discussion of the dual-stage model proposed by Gilbert (1991), we will develop the alternative view that individuals rely on fast and efficient validation processes in order to construct an adequate referential representation of the communicated<br />information. ... One controversial implication of the view advocated here is that individuals are able to reject false information fast and efficiently when they have accessible, certain, and relevant background knowledge. A second implication is that they do so routinely, i.e. without following specific processing goals."</i><br /><br />So, have we de-relativized <i>"knowledge"</i> yet?<br /><br /><br /><i>"Comprehension vs. Validation of Information: Fast and Automatic vs. Slow and Strategic?<br /><br />Gilbert (1991) has proposed a dual-stage model of comprehension and validation that is based on ideas of the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1677/1997). The core assumption of this model is that the comprehension of information invariably entails its initial acceptance. Only at a later stage, resource-demanding validation processes may take effect, allowing individuals to “unbelieve” false information that was initially accepted as true and to re-represent this information as false."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-85408141384955780632024-03-08T11:01:56.535-08:002024-03-08T11:01:56.535-08:00Valkenburg, Peter, and Walther (cont. #4)
[30]
&...Valkenburg, Peter, and Walther (cont. #4)<br /><br /><br />[30]<br /><i>"<b>Conclusion</b><br />...<br /></i>[33]<i><br />...<br />A final unmistakable trend in communication technologies that may enhance the likelihood of media effects is the increasing lifelike visualization in both mass and mass self-communication. Text-only CMC, which was still common around the start of the millennium, has been supplemented or even replaced by visual CMC (e.g. Instagram). Movies increasingly appear in 3D and we will soon be able to experience virtual reality games or worlds by means of head-mounted devices such as Oculus Rift. Such display devices provide users with a strong degree of sensory richness because they make them think and feel that the environment responds to their actions, and that users themselves are the source of changes to their environment."</i><br /><br />Sure, let's have some <i>"future research"</i>. And in this case at least, let's take any robust results seriously vis-a-vis the role of new technologies, since theater and film have already furnished plenty of <i>"lifelike visualization"</i>, and because most all of The Arts have been able to convice plenty of people along the way to <i>"think and feel that the environment responds to their actions."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-68374946476787260852024-03-08T10:58:10.074-08:002024-03-08T10:58:10.074-08:00Valkenburg, Peter, and Walther (cont. #3)
[21]
&...Valkenburg, Peter, and Walther (cont. #3)<br /><br /><br />[21]<br /><i>"<b>Feature 5: Media Effects are Transactional</b><br />... Transactional theories assume reciprocal causal relationships between characteristics of the media users, their selective media use, factors in their environment, and outcomes of media. ...<br /><br />"Transactional media effects theories are usually quite complex and based on at least three assumptions. First, producers and receivers of media content/messages are connected through communication technologies...and engage in transactions, that is, they exchange information and values with each other through communication technologies. ... Second, both producers and receivers of media content/messages influence each other and, hence, both can change as a result of the media<br /></i>[23]<i><br />content/messages they produce or receive:... Third, transactions can be distinguished as </i>inter<i>personal, that is, the transactions between producers and receivers, and </i>intra<i>personal, that is, the transactions within the cognitive and affective systems of the producers or receivers themselves. ..."</i><br /><br /><br />[24]<br /><i>"<b>‘MEDIA EFFECTS’ IN THE NEWER MEDIA ENVIRONMENT</b><br />...<br /><br /></i>[27]<i><br />...<br />"<b>Mass Self-Communication and Expression Effects</b><br />... Given that a considerable proportion of the information distributed via social media is personal and self-related, Castells (2007, p. 248), as discussed earlier, has outlined a “new form of socialized communication” that he calls mass self-communication. ...<br /><br /></i>[28]<i><br /><br />"... Many, especially the older, CMC </i>[Computer-Mediated Communitcation] <i>theories suffer from the same omissions as some older media effects theories. Both types of theories are often rooted in a reception model, that is, in the notion that certain properties of media or technologies...have a unidirectional impact on recipients. ...<br /><br />"The concept of mass self-communication does not deny the processes related to the reception of media content. However, its emphasis on the self-generated, self-directed, and self-focused character of internet-based social communication draws our attention to the possible effects of content produced by the sender on him or herself. Long before the advent of Web 2.0, observers noted that media users had become producers as well as consumers of information and entertainment, a phenomenon for which the now somewhat obsolete term </i>prosumers<i> was coined (Toffler 1980). This implies that, in terms of transactional media effects theories, CMC technology not only provides users a fast and easily accessible vehicle for </i>inter<i>personal transactions, but also an increased opportunity for </i>intra<i>personal transactions, that is, transactions within the senders (and recipients) themselves. In other words, the production and distribution of content by a sender may not only affect its recipient(s), but also the sender him or herself. This phenomenon, that our<br /></i>[29]<i><br />own beliefs and our own behavior exert influence on ourselves, has been recently referred to as an expression effect (Pingree 2007)."</i><br /><br />Less recently, it was <i>"referred to"</i> by Rank as follows: <br /><br /><br />"<br />the artist is under a sort of organic compulsion to transform his art-ideology into experience. In this he makes reality of the unreal to just the extent that it represents the concretization of the soul-concept in the work. In other words, the artist must live his ideology so that he, as well as others, may believe in it as true; on the other hand, this ideological experience acts both as a means to make artistic productivity possible and as a means to live a real life.<br />"<br />(<i>Art and Artist</i>, p. 416)Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-19172005225709095542024-03-08T10:54:07.232-08:002024-03-08T10:54:07.232-08:00Valkenburg, Peter, and Walther (cont. #2)
[16]
&...Valkenburg, Peter, and Walther (cont. #2)<br /><br /><br />[16]<br /><i>"<b>Feature 3: Media Effects are Indirect</b><br />...<br /><br /></i>[17]<i><br />...<br />"Media effects theories have identified three types of indirect effects. In the first type, which we discussed in the section about selectivity (feature 1), media use itself acts as an intervening variable between pre-media use variables (development, dispositions, and social-context factors) and outcome variables. In the second type of indirect effects, the cognitive, emotional, and physiological processes that occur during and shortly after exposure act as mediators. It has often been posited and shown that the way in which individuals process media forms the route to media effects. ...<br /><br />"The third type of indirect effects that has been identified conceptualizes postexposure variables that may themselves be dependent variables (e.g. attitudes and beliefs), as mediators of other post-exposure variables. Especially in political and health communication, it has repeatedly been found that effects of media use on political and health behavior are mediated by certain beliefs and attitudes. ..."</i><br /><br /><br />[18]<br /><i>"<b>Feature 4: Media Effects are Conditional</b><br />...<br /></i>[20]<i><br />"The moderating role of dispositional variables can be explained by the disposition-content congruency hypothesis (Valkenburg & Peter 2013a), which argues that dispositionally congruent media content may be processed faster and more efficiently than incongruent content because it can be assimilated more readily to the media user’s existing cognitive schemata. Because congruent content requires less cognitive effort, it leaves more resources available for the processing of less salient content. Dispositionally congruent content can also affect </i>emotional<i> processing through processing fluency. ... This (illusion of) familiarity may in turn enhance positive affect<br /></i>[21]<i><br />and aesthetic pleasure, a process that has been named the hedonistic fluency hypothesis (Reber et al 2004)."</i><br /><br />Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-75753299059554976622024-03-08T10:30:27.771-08:002024-03-08T10:30:27.771-08:00Valkenburg, Peter, and Walther (cont. #1)
[12]
&...Valkenburg, Peter, and Walther (cont. #1)<br /><br /><br />[12]<br /><i>"<b>Feature 2: Media Properties as Predictors</b><br />...<br /></i>[13]<i><br /></i><b>Modality</b><i> ... Marshall McLuhan (1964) is best known for his theory of the differential impact of modalities. ... Inspired by McLuhan’s theories, a myriad of media comparison studies have tested whether information delivered via auditory or textual modalities encouraged learning, reading skills, or imagination more (or less) than information delivered through audiovisual media. These media comparison studies largely lost their appeal in the new millennium, probably because they often failed to produce convincing results especially when it comes to learning (Clark 2012). Many content and structural properties related to the presentation of information<br />(e.g. difficulty, repetition, prompting) turned out to be more important for learning and information processing than modality (Clark 2012).<br /><br />"... due to advances in technology, research interest in the differential effects of media modalities have shifted to, for example, a comparison of the effects of interfaces... Media comparison studies also started to focus on the differential effects of reading on paper versus screens... This rapidly growing literature has to date yielded small and inconsistent differences in favor of reading on paper.<br /><br />"</i><b>Content Properties</b><i> The contribution of media content to guide selective exposure or to predict media effects has received relatively little attention on both the theoretical and the empirical level. ...<br /></i>[14]<i><br />... Although related fields (e.g. cinematography, advertising) have paid more attention to content properties that may attract attention or enhance effects (e.g. Boerman et al 2011), media effects researchers typically assess the effectiveness of media content/messages from the psychological reactions they elicit. ...<br /><br />"The complexity faced in formulating a comprehensive theory of content properties that guide selective exposure is particularly challenging because the attractiveness and effectiveness of content is strongly contingent upon individual users or, at best, subtypes of users. ... Still, the literature reveals some notions about media content that may guide selective exposure. For example, it has often been found that people pay more attention to negative media content than to positive content, especially when it comes to news."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-19909437890483958992024-03-08T10:27:00.690-08:002024-03-08T10:27:00.690-08:00Patti M. Valkenburg, Jochen Peter, and Joseph B. W...Patti M. Valkenburg, Jochen Peter, and Joseph B. Walther<br /><a href="https://www.pattivalkenburg.nl/images/artikelen_pdf/ARTIKEL_JUIST_2016_Valkenburg_et_al_2016_Media_Effects_Annual_Review.pdf" rel="nofollow">Media Effects: Theory and Research</a><br />(2016)<br /><br /><br />[2]<br /><i>"<b>Abstract</b><br />... On the basis of exemplary meta-analyses of media effects and bibliometric studies of well-cited theories, we identify and discuss five features of media effects theories as well as their empirical support. ...<br />"</i><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />[4]<br /><i>"The concept of mass communication arose during the 1920s as a response to new opportunities to reach large audiences... However, </i>mass<i> refers not only to the size of the audience that mass media reach, but also to uniform consumption, uniform impacts, and anonymity, notions that are progressively incompatible with contemporary media use."</i><br /><br />Hmm. Not even a hat-tip to McLuhan's temporal <i>"uniform</i>[ity]<i>"</i>?<br /><br /><br />[6]<br /><i>"Although small to medium effect sizes are common in many disciplines, several researchers have argued that the small media effects reported defy common sense because everyday experience offers many anecdotal examples of strong media effects. ...<br /><br />"Such discrepancies in results are less contradictory than they seem at first sight. They suggest that there are strong individual differences in susceptibility to media effects."</i><br /><br />Refreshing in its bluntness! Do I still need to read the next 44 pages?<br /><br /><br />[7]<br /><i>"<b>Feature 1: Selectivity of Media Use</b><br />...<br /></i>[8]<i><br />... More than 60 years ago, researchers discovered that people do not randomly attend to media, but rather focus on certain messages as a result of specific social or psychological needs or beliefs (Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955). For example, in their classic study of the 1940 U.S. presidential election, Lazarsfeld et al (1948) suggested that people often seek out political content that reinforces their beliefs while they avoid content that was meant to change their opinions. ...<br /><br />"The selectivity paradigm, so coined in the 1940s, has been further elaborated into two theoretical perspectives: Uses-and-Gratifications and Selective Exposure Theory. ...Uses-and-Gratifications Theory conceptualizes media users as rational and aware of their selection motives, whereas Selective Exposure Theory argues that media users are often not aware, or at least not fully aware, of their selection motives. This difference in conceptualization of the media user has methodological consequences."</i><br /><br /><br />[10]<br /><i>"Since the work of Lazarsfeld et al (1948) and Klapper (1960), the selectivity paradigm has predominantly been inspired by Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory,... However, although there is ample evidence for the mechanism that individuals seek congenial information, cognitive dissonance reduction is not as consistent a cause of selective exposure as it was previously assumed to be. First, it seems to hold more consistently for political than for health messages. Second, subsequent evidence showed that under specific conditions, people are willing or even eager to attend to uncongenial information, for example, when the perceived utility of information is great, when they are uncommitted to an attitude, or when the reliability of the offered information turns out to be poor. "</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-41116590167864646442024-03-08T10:15:11.833-08:002024-03-08T10:15:11.833-08:00Anne Böckler • Lukas Herrmann • Fynn-Mathis Trautw...Anne Böckler • Lukas Herrmann • Fynn-Mathis Trautwein •Tom Holmes • Tania Singer<br /><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317832980" rel="nofollow">Know Thy Selves: Learning to Understand Oneself Increases the Ability to Understand Others</a><br />(2017)<br /><br /><br />[198]<br /><i>"...the Internal Family Systems (IFS) model... The IFS model regards a person’s personality as<br /></i>[199]<i><br />composed of relatively discrete subpersonalities—inner parts—each of which possesses its own characteristic set of cognitions, affects, and behaviors."</i><br /><br /><br />[201]<br /><i>"<b>Inner Parts Work</b> ... Inner parts according to IFS are relatively<br />discrete subpersonalities which are each characterized by specific affective, cognitive, and behavioral patterns. The IFS model loosely classifies inner parts based on their therapeutic relevance into the categories of </i>Managers<i>, </i>Exiles<i>, and </i>Firefighters<i>. </i>Managers<i>, for instance, intend to adapt the person to the demands of the external world and are often reflected in behavioral and cognitive patterns aiming at rationally structuring the persons’ everyday life. </i>Exiles<i> are parts which are burdened with severe, negative affect due to past traumatizing experiences. Both </i>Managers<i> and </i>Firefighters<i> attempt to keep </i>Exiles<i> from entering conscious awareness, e.g., by distracting the person from the negative or threatening content by overeating or excessive overworking. Beyond this psychotherapeutic application, Holmes (2011) suggested various types of inner parts relevant for a non-clinical population, such as </i>Pleasure Parts<i> which are driven by the pleasure principle of immediate satisfaction of physical needs or </i>Caring Parts<i> which exhibit feelings of empathy and closeness and a caring motivation. ..."</i><br /><br /><br />[205]<br /><i>"<b>Discussion</b><br />...<br /><br /></i>[206]<i><br />...<br /><br />"Most importantly, the finding of a significant correlation between the number of participants’ inner parts identified throughout the 3-month training and their improvements in high-level ToM performance clearly suggests that the degree of familiarization with one’s own internal dynamics and affective and cognitive patterns is linked to improvements in understanding the mental states of other people. This interplay between taking one’s own and others’ perspectives is in line with neuroimaging studies reporting a neural overlap between brain regions that are reliably activated during both processes and mimics similar theories in the domain of affective empathic responses that show a relationship between the degree of understanding ones’ own emotions and the degree of empathizing with others’ affective states. Our findings further add to an idea put forward by Dimaggio et al. (2008) that better self-reflection can lead to greater awareness of others. Another important theoretical framework based in philosophy (Goldman 1995a, b) and later developed by neuroscientists (Gallese and Goldman 1998) has been the simulationist account which posits that our capacity to understand another’s mind relies on our privileged access to our own mental states (Goldman 2006). In accordance, becoming aware of a greater variety of our own different inner parts associated to patterns of affective, bodily, and cognitive states may increase our ability to identify similar mental states in other people."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-82223920108389739492024-03-08T09:43:39.026-08:002024-03-08T09:43:39.026-08:00Marsh, Meade, and Roediger (cont. #2)
"Gener...Marsh, Meade, and Roediger (cont. #2)<br /><br /><i>"<b>General Discussion</b><br />...<br /><br />"Overall, the data support the hybrid view of fact representation. That is, facts learned from fiction were linked in memory both to related pre-experimental knowledge and to the story source. ...<br /><br />"The hybrid representation hypothesis helps us to understand why subjects relied on the stories even though they often noticed that the stories contained errors. It was not necessary for subjects to forget the source of their knowledge. Rather, what was critical was that story reading led to an illusion of truth. Misinformation production was very low prior to the experiment and thus should not have been attributed to general knowledge. However, reading misinformation led to its production, and these answers were often attributed to pre-experimental knowledge. This illusion of prior knowledge is similar to the knew-it-all-along bias (Fischoff, 1977; Wood, 1978) exhibited by people who have been told correct answers or otherwise received feedback about judged events. With the answer in front of them, people overestimate how likely they would have been to produce the answer. In this case, once subjects produced the misinformation, they were unable to judge their prior knowledge."</i><br /><br /><br />[535]<br /><i>"We can only speculate about why Gerrig and Prentice (1991) found evidence for monitoring and selective use of story information in their studies while we did not. When reading for pleasure, one may be less likely to engage in the critical processing necessary to notice, respond to, and reject the misinformation (Prentice & Gerrig, 1999). Gilbert has argued that the default mode is to believe information, and that to 'unbelieve' information takes effort (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990). Indeed, readers deeply involved in text are less likely to detect false notes (Green & Brock, 2000). If our subjects did not notice the errors in the stories, these errors would come to mind fluently at test without an accompanying warning of falsehood. However, this line of reasoning suggests our subjects were more involved in our stories than were Gerrig's in his stories, and we have no evidence (or reason) to support that assumption. Figuring out when subjects do vs. do not monitor (and selectively use) fiction remains a question for further research."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-39550046268065870472024-03-08T09:38:34.266-08:002024-03-08T09:38:34.266-08:00Marsh, Meade, and Roediger (cont. #1)
[535]
&quo...Marsh, Meade, and Roediger (cont. #1)<br /><br /><br />[535]<br /><i>"<b>Experiment 2</b><br />...<br /></i><br /><br />[529]<br /><i>"In summary, subjects were aware of their reliance on fictional sources. Critically, however, reading facts in fiction created an illusion of prior knowledge. Subjects thought they had known both correct and target misinformation answers all along."</i><br /><br /><i>"</i>Discussion of Experiment 2<br />...<br /><i>"... While story attributions were always highest for correct and misinformation answers read in the stories, subjects also erroneously claimed to have read non-presented correct answers in the stories. That is, having read a neutral or misleading frame led to the erroneous belief that the </i>correct<i> answer had been read in the story... A similar effect was not observed for </i>misinformation<i><br />answers... Possibly subjects generated the correct answers upon encountering a neutral or misleading frame in the story... The later misattribution of these inferences to the stories would yield the observed pattern of false alarms. The low baserate production of misinformation suggests subjects were unlikely to have spontaneously thought of the target misinformation when reading a correct or neutral frame, and hence misinformation answers were rarely incorrectly attributed to the stories. The results are similar to the false memories observed after reading a list of related words (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) or reading statements that only implied a particular fact (Brewer, 1977)."</i><br /><br /><br /><i>"<b>Experiment 3</b><br />...<br /><br /></i>[534]<br /><i>"After a week's delay, we failed to eliminate the link to the story source. In Experiment 3, subjects still showed some knowledge of the story link, although clearly less than on immediate tests. Prior testing minimized but did not eliminate the effects of delay. Misinformation responses, however, were still misattributed to prior<br />knowledge for items that had also been tested in the first session. Finally, note that the delayed source errors were similar to those observed in Experiment 2; correct answers produced after reading misinformation were misattributed to the stories, but misinformation answers produced after reading correct answers were not misattributed to the stories."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-65766312358855487922024-03-08T09:34:49.410-08:002024-03-08T09:34:49.410-08:00Elizabeth J. Marsh, Michelle L. Meade, and Henry L...Elizabeth J. Marsh, Michelle L. Meade, and Henry L. Roediger III<br /><a href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=ed3f94783354bb27b77cc66b37d5a99b0a981e36" rel="nofollow">Learning facts from fiction</a><br />(2003)<br /><br /><br />[520]<br /><i>"it is important to consider the theoretical distinction in the text processing literature between </i>integration<i> and </i>compartmentalization<i> (e.g., Potts & Peterson, 1985). Integration of facts from fiction would mean that readers link these facts to preexisting world knowledge. ... In contrast, compartmentalization would occur if readers represented these 'fictional' facts in memory as separate from the rest of their general world knowledge. ... More recently, a hybrid position has been suggested,..."</i><br /><br /><br /><i>"Educators' use of fiction in the classroom suggests that they believe students integrate information from fictional sources with the rest of their world knowledge. Several experimental results support this view. For example,...Lewis and Anderson s (1976) classic study,..."</i><br /><br /><br /><i>"</i>Limits on integration of facts from fiction<br />...<br /><i>"Other data suggest that facts learned from fiction retain links to their fictional sources. ...Lewis and Anderson's (1976) subjects were faster to verify true facts when the test did not contain any of the studied fantasy facts (a pure test) than when the test contained a combination of true and fantasy facts (a mixed test). This finding suggests that some form of source information was retained,..."</i><br /><br /><br />[521]<br /><i>"</i>The current research program<br />...<br /><br /><i>"... Previously, links to the story source have been inferred, from data points such as Peterson and Potts' (1982) finding that subjects were slower to verify fantasy facts on a test that contained facts from both fantasy and true facts. In contrast, when Green and Brock (2000) asked subjects to remember whether a narrative had been labeled as fact or fiction, many subjects made errors (e.g., 1/3 of subjects made errors in Experiment 1). Thus, one object of the current research was to directly evaluate people's awareness of their reliance on fictional sources."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-63588330373711125952024-03-08T09:15:09.591-08:002024-03-08T09:15:09.591-08:00Reber (cont. #5)
"...what differentiates th...Reber (cont. #5)<br /><br /><br /><i>"...what differentiates these sophisticated processes from the primitive<br /></i>[232]<i><br />is that all share a basic operating property: They all depend on a rich, abstract knowledge base that asserts itself in a causal manner to control perception, affective choice, and decision making independently of consciousness. This component of the cognitive unconscious depends on previously acquired knowledge, as opposed to the primitive component, which operated to acquire such knowledge. The very epistemic base that makes these sophisticated processes functional can be seen as that derived from the primitive processes.<br /><br />"These sophisticated systems also differ from the primitive in other ways. First, they are components of mind that are generally available to consciousness. In other words, there is awareness of the knowledge base itself;... Second, they are based on knowledge systems that have become highly automatized. They share this automatic quality with the primitive functions in the limit, but there are good reasons for thinking that much of this interpretive and semantic knowledge derived from explicit processes that became automatic only after pained, conscious action. ... Last, these systems all function on a symbolic level. All of the critical components of the sophisticated unconscious involve semantic and affective properties of stimuli. This aspect seems to be largely missing in the primitive domain. ...<br /><br />"</i>The Robustness of Implicit Processes<i><br /><br />"There has been a good deal of work to suggest that implicit systems are robust in the face of disorders that are known to produce serious deficits in conscious, overt processes. ...<br /><br />"... There is a standard heuristic in evolutionary biology that older primitive systems are more robust and resistant to insult than are newer, more complex systems. ...<br /><br />"...a recent study of Abrams and Reber (1989) suggested that even the acquisition of knowledge is undiminished so long as the task is a nonreflective, unconscious one. They used an implicit grammar learning task and an explicit short-term memory task with a mixed population of institutionalized depressives, schizophrenics, and alcoholics with organic brain damage. The patients performed more poorly than a normal control group on the memory task, but the performances of the two groups were statistically indistinguishable on the implicit learning task. This last study is particularly important, for it is one of the few that shows that implicit learning is robust in the face of serious psychological and/or neurological disorders.<br /><br />"</i>On Intuition<i><br /><br />"... There is probably no cognitive process that suffers from such a gap between phenomenological reality and scientific understanding. Introspectively, intuition is one of the most compelling and obvious cognitive processes; empirically and theoretically, it is one of the processes least understood by contemporary cognitive scientists.<br /><br />"The basic argument is simple: The kinds of operations identified under the rubric of implicit learning represent the epistemic core of intuition;... Perhaps the most compelling aspect of intuition, and the one most often cited in the various definitions that have been given....is that the individual has a sense of what is right or wrong, a sense of what is the appropriate or inappropriate response to make in a given set of circumstances, but is largely ignorant of the reasons for that mental state. This, of course, is how the typical subject has been characterized after a standard acquisition session in<br />an implicit learning experiment.<br /><br />"... In other words, intuition ought not to be embedded in personality theory as it was with Jung, and although it is a topic of some philosophical interest, it is probably best not dealt with as an a priori topic as it was by Croce."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-35657902246340411792024-03-08T09:10:51.414-08:002024-03-08T09:10:51.414-08:00Reber (cont. # 4)
"Parsing the Cognitive Un...Reber (cont. # 4)<br /><br /><br />"Parsing the Cognitive Unconscious<i><br /><br />"... As a first approximation, assume a relatively high-level parse that separates unconscious mentation into two classes,...the </i>primitive<i> and...the </i>sophisticated<i>. ...<br /><br /></i>[231]<i><br /><br />...<br /><br />"The operations of this primitive unconscious seem to be about as fundamental for a species' survival as any nonvegetative function could be. Virtually every organism must be able to perform a...counting of the occurrences of ecologically important events. ... The essence of Pavlovian conditioning is the apprehension of a genuine covariation between the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned stimulus (Rescorla, 1967, 1988). The reason that the work of such researchers as Hasher and Zacks, Lewicki, and others is typically<br />regarded as cognitive in nature and somehow different from Rescorla's is that it is typically carried out with mature adult subjects and with materials that have a rich cognitive underpinning, such as words, sentences, and pictures. Yet, there is no a priori reason to regard these high-level cognitive "counts" as different in any fundamental way from the very simple countings of Rescorla's subjects. What is different is the process by which each organism comes to categorize the items whose frequency and covariation patterns are being logged, not the mechanism for representing the raw data.<br /><br />"... Lewicki (1985) showed that in the limiting case, only one exposure to a target person with a salient personality characteristic...and particular physical characteristic...is sufficient to set up a tacit knowledge base... In cases with a richer data base,...the kinds of structural covariations that are apprehended are deeper and more abstract. Yet, they can be viewed as categorical extensions in that the basic process is, in principle, still one of counting, only what is being counted are complex interdependent covariations among events—or, as they are commonly known in the literature, </i>rules<i>.<br /><br />"These various manifestations of the functions of the primitive unconscious have a number of additional factors in common. First, and most basic, the pickup of information takes place independently of consciousness or awareness of what is picked up. ...<br /><br />"Second, although much of what is acquired may eventually be made available to conscious expression, what is held or stored exceeds what can be expressed. ...<br /><br />"Third, the memorial content of the primitive unconscious has a causal role to play in behavior. ...if there were no causal component to unconscious cognition, we might as well simply return to a radical behaviorism. Put simply, the primitive unconscious processes are for learning about the world in very basic ways. They are automatic and ineluctable; they function to pick up critical knowledge about categories and about covariations of aspects of categories. They do not, however, have any functions that involve meaning or affect; these are the province of the </i>sophisticated<i> unconscious.<br /><br />"In this latter class are included such phenomena as unconscious perception of graphic and semantic information (Marcel, 1983), perceptual vigilance and perceptual defense (Erdelyi, 1974), the implicit pickup of affective information that is based on phonological factors,...<br /><br />In some ways the evidence for the unconscious element is stronger here than it is with the primitive unconscious. The use of forced-choice recognition tests as a measure of sensitivity...<br /><br />supports the strong claim that these processes are occurring virtually independently of awareness. Although there may be some problems with methodology (see Holender, 1986), this procedure is, in principle, superior to that used by most researchers, who mainly browbeat their subjects into telling what they know."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-8590635618339769582024-03-08T09:07:46.217-08:002024-03-08T09:07:46.217-08:00Reber (cont. #3)
[229]
"On the Availabilit...Reber (cont. #3)<br /><br /><br />[229]<br /><br />"On the Availability of Tacit Knowledge<i><br /><br />"The conclusion reached in the first studies on implicit learning was that the knowledge acquired was completely unavailable to consciousness. The many experiments carried out since have shown that position to have been an oversimplification. ...knowledge acquired from implicit learning procedures is knowledge that, in some raw fashion, is always ahead of the capability of its possessor to explicate it. Hence although it is misleading to argue that implicitly acquired knowledge is completely unconscious, it is not misleading to argue that the implicitly acquired epistemic contents of mind are always richer and more sophisticated than what can be explicated.<br />"</i><br /><br /><br />[230]<br /><i>"Entailments and Implications<br /><br />"... The following is a small flurry of speculation...<br /><br /></i>On the Origins of Unconscious Cognition<i><br /><br />... Traditionally, the focus has been on consciousness with the implication that defining and characterizing consciousness will solve the problem; unconscious processes will be handled by the invoking of exclusionary clauses. ... Consciousness assumes epistemic priority because it is so introspectively obvious, whereas the unconscious must be struggled with in derivative fashion.<br /><br />"The point to be defended here is that this ordering of priorities has been an error. Consciousness, evolutionarily speaking, is a late arrival on the mental scene. ...surely it postdates a number of fairly rich and elaborative cognitive processes that functioned and still function in our phylogenetic predecessors. ...<br /><br />"... The proper stance is to assume that unconscious mental processes are the foundations upon which emerging conscious operations are laid. The really difficult problem, then, is to discern how these components of mind interact."</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-49847612122145063002024-03-08T09:02:44.873-08:002024-03-08T09:02:44.873-08:00Reber (cont. #2)
"Effects of Providing Spec...Reber (cont. #2)<br /><br /><br />"Effects of Providing Specific Information<i><br />...<br /></i>[225]<i><br />"...although there are not a lot of hard empirical data here, those that are available point toward an interesting conclusion. Specific instruction concerning the materials to be learned in complex situations will be maximally beneficial when it is representationally coordinate with the tacit knowledge derived from experience. ...<br /><br />...<br /><br />"</i>On Deep and Surface Structure<i><br /><br />"The issue here is the degree to which implicit learning can be seen as acquisition of knowledge that is based on the superficial physical form of the stimuli or as knowledge of the deeper, more abstract relations that can, in principle, be said to underlie them.<br /><br />"In an early article, Reber (1969), reported evidence for the proposition that implicit knowledge is abstract and not dependent in any important way on the particular physical manifestations of the stimuli. ... Modification of the rules for letter order produced decrements in performance; modifications of the physical form had virtually no adverse effects. So long as the deep rules that characterized the stimuli were left intact, their instantiations in the form of one or another set of letters was a factor of relatively little importance.<br /><br />...<br /><br />"Reber and Lewis (1977) reported an equally striking example of the abstract nature of tacit knowledge. They assessed knowledge of the grammar by having subjects solve anagram problems. ...<br /></i>[226]<i><br />...suggests that subjects were not solving the anagrams on the basis of superficial knowledge of frequency of bigrams or on the basis of a fixed set of memorized instances. They clearly acquired knowledge that can be characterized as deep, abstract, and representative of the structure inherent in the underlying invariance patterns of the stimulus environment.<br /><br />"This finding is analogous to Posner and Keele's (1968, 1970} oft-cited abstraction of prototype effect. The underlying prototypes that their subjects extracted from the exemplary dot patterns are specifiable only in terms of an averaging of the spatial relations among the various components of the patterns. But, psychologically, such an averaging is not just a simple piling up of the features of the exemplars. If memory behaved like that, the resulting representation would be, not distinct prototypes that Posner and Keele found, but a blob.<br /><br />...<br /><br />"...not that all memorial systems must be viewed as founded on induced abstractions. The evidence...shows that memories are frequently based on instantiations, fairly uninterpreted representations of the stimulus inputs. The point is that when implicit acquisition processes are operating, the resulting memorial system is abstract. ...that old war horse </i>functionalism<i> was shown to provide the best characterization of this issue; that is, the specific functions that need to be carried out invite the learner to assume a cognitive stance that is functional, that will accomplish the task at hand. ...<br /><br />"...<br /></i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-69349433544909123042024-03-08T08:57:32.552-08:002024-03-08T08:57:32.552-08:00Reber (cont. #1)
[223]
...Reber (1976) used the ...Reber (cont. #1)<br /><br /><br />[223]<i><br />...Reber (1976) used the simple device of encouraging one group of subjects to search for the structure in the stimuli while a comparable group was run under a neutral instructional set. ... Informed subjects were told only about the existence of structure; nothing was said about the nature of that structure.<br /><br />"The explicitly instructed subjects in this study performed more poorly in all aspects of the experiment than did those given the neutral instructions. ... The suggestion is that at least under these circumstances, implicit processing of complex materials has an advantage over explicit processing.<br /><br />"However, as gradually became clear, what this study actually showed is that explicit processing of complex materials has a decided disadvantage in relation to implicit processing. This is no mere play on words. The implicit/explicit distinction is rather more complex than it first appeared. ...explicit instructions seemed to be having a particular kind of interference effect. Specifically, subjects were being encouraged to search for rules that, given ...they were not likely to find. Moreover, they tended to make improper inductions that led them to hold rules about the stimuli that were, in fact, wrong. The simplest conclusion seems to be the right one: Looking for rules will not work if you cannot find them.<br /><br />...<br /><br />...several </i>[later]<i> studies showed an advantage for the explicitly instructed subjects. Howard and Ballas (1980) reported that the explicit instructions that debilitated performance when introduced under conditions of semantic uninterpretability could also function to facilitate performance when the stimuli expressed semantically interpretable patterns. Reber et al. (1980) showed that it was possible to shift performance about rather dramatically by intermixing instructional set with the manner of presentation of the stimulus materials and with the time during learning when the explicit instructions were<br />introduced.<br /><br />"There are two factors here that help make these data somewhat less haphazard than they appear to be. The first is psychological salience;...<br /><br />"In two of the instances in which explicit instructions facilitated performance, the manner of presentation of the stimuli was such that the underlying factors that represent the grammar were rendered salient. ... Hence the converse of the earlier conclusion: Looking for rules will work if you can find them.<br /><br />...<br /><br /></i>[224]<i><br />...it seems clear that we are still dealing with a rather limited kind of analysis of complex learning, particularly if one wishes to view this research in its constrained laboratory setting as representing a general metaphor for real-world acquisition processes. In the real world nearly all complex skills are acquired with a blend of the explicit and the implicit, a balance between the conscious/overt and the unconscious/covert."<br /></i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-24513097593647558612024-03-08T08:53:35.206-08:002024-03-08T08:53:35.206-08:00Arthur S. Reber
Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowle...Arthur S. Reber<br /><a href="https://bigfatgenius.com/532%20Summer%202008/Reber-Implicit_Learning_and_Tacit_Knowledge.pdf" rel="nofollow">Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge</a><br />(1989)<br /><br /><br />[219, abstract]<br /><i>"the phenomenon of implicit learning, the process by which knowledge about the rule-governed complexities of the stimulus environment is acquired independently of conscious attempts to do so. ... The conclusions reached are as follows: (a) Implicit learning produces a tacit knowledge base that is abstract and representative of the structure of the environment; (b) such knowledge is optimally acquired independently of conscious efforts to learn; and (c) it can be used implicitly to solve problems and make accurate decisions about novel stimulus circumstances.<br />"</i><br /><br /><br />[220]<br /><i>"</i>Grammar Learning<i><br />...<br /><br />...the basic procedure used in these grammar learning studies is to have an acquisition phase, during which subjects acquire knowledge of the rules of the grammar, and a testing phase,...<br /><br />..these synthetic languages are complex systems, too complex to be learned in an afternoon in the laboratory... Miller saw this as a liability, which it is if one wishes to examine explicit concept learning. This complexity, however, should be regarded as a virtue in the current context, for a rich and complex stimulus domain is a prerequisite for the occurrence of implicit learning. If the system in use is too simple, or if the code can be broken by conscious effort, then one will not see implicit processes."</i><br /><br /><br />[221]<br /><i>"Empirical Studies of Implicit Learning<br /></i>On the Exploitation of Structure<i><br />...<br />Reber and Millward (1971) found evidence that subjects can accurately anticipate the changing probabilities of events even when the anticipatory response requires an integration of information across 50 preceding events. ...rather than shadowing the changing event<br /></i>[222]<i><br />probabilities, subjects ultimately learned to anticipate the shifts in the likelihood of events so that their predictions of events rose and fell coincidentally with the actual event sequences. They had learned the underlying structure of the stimulus environment and were capable of exploiting it to direct their choices.<br /><br />"Millward and Reber (1972), using event sequences with short- and long-range contingencies between events, reported an even more impressive ability of subjects to exploit stochastic structures. ...<br /><br />"...subjects displayed...a sensitivity that reflected an ability to exploit structure that required knowledge of event dependencies as remote as seven trials. What makes this finding interesting is that this capacity appears to be beyond what were found in earlier work to be limits on explicit recall...</i>[wherein]<i> Beyond five trials, they </i>[subjects]<i> were virtually reduced to guessing.<br /><br />...</i>Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32978906.post-15414143965794677282024-03-08T08:48:44.904-08:002024-03-08T08:48:44.904-08:00Pavias et al (cont.)
"Structural Centrality...Pavias et al (cont.)<br /><br /><br /><i>"Structural Centrality<br /><br />...<br /><br />"... Readers recall text elements with a large number of causal connections more often than text elements with few connections. This effect of the number of causal connections on the recall of text elements has been found in 4-year-old children, 6-year-old children, and adults. However, the strength of the effect of the number of causal connections on recall increases with age."</i><br /><br /><br />[492]<br /><i>"... Developmental-cognitive neuroscience work has shown that many of the brain regions implicated in social-cognitive processes show large functional and structural changes throughout adolescence. Interestingly, cognitive neuroscience studies in adults have revealed considerable overlap in the network of brain regions that enables social cognition and the network of brain regions that<br /></i>[493]<i><br />underlies narrative comprehension. Immaturity of the brain regions that underlie social-cognitive processing in children and adolescents is likely to limit their ability to process social-cognitive information in narratives as well.<br />"</i><br /><br /><br />[501]<br /><i>"Final Model<br /><br />...<br /><br /></i>[502]<i><br /><br />"... . For both 8- to 10-year-old children and 13- to 15-year-old adolescents the probability of correctly recalling nonsocial story elements was higher than the probability of correctly recalling social story elements. Story elements that require social-cognitive processing were more difficult to recall than story elements that did not require social-cognitive processing. As for the age-related differences in correctly recalling story elements with different social-cognitive processing demands, the results showed that between 13 – 15 and 19– 21 years the probability of correctly recalling social story elements increased significantly faster than the probability of recalling nonsocial story elements... <br />"</i><br /><br /><br />[504]<br /><i>"Discussion<br /><br />"...The findings suggest that the development of social-cognitive abilities contributes to the ability to construct a rich mental representation of a text that encompasses social-cognitive aspects of the story. In contrast, for sensitivity to structural centrality age-related differences manifested themselves earlier between childhood and adolescence.<br /><br />"The effect of structural importance manifested itself at a younger age than the effect of social-cognitive processing. ...<br /></i>[505]<i><br />...13- to 15-year old adolescents behave like adults with respect to sensitivity to structural centrality but behave more like children with respect to comprehension of social story elements. ..."</i><br /><br /><br />[507]<br /><i>"One factor that deserves attention is that in adolescence motivation for reading and the amount of leisure time reading tend to decline (Clark & Douglas, 2011). For example, 7- to 11-year-old children (U.S. grades 2– 6) report to enjoy reading more than 11- to 16-year-old children (U.S. grades 6 –11). Likewise, 7- to 11-year-old children (U.S. grades 2 –6) state to read more often than 11- to 14-year-old adolescents (U.S. grades 6– 9) who, in turn, report to read more often than 14- to 16-year-old adolescents (U.S. grades 9 –11) (Clark & Douglas, 2011). Similarly, self-reported intrinsic motivation for reading decreases between ages 11 and 13."</i><br /><br />The authors of course find the disinclination to read <i>"worrisome...because of its relation...with academic success"</i>. I want to propose that it's our contemporary notions of <i>"academic success"</i> themselves which are uniquely well-suited to make kids of all ages hate reading.Stefan Kachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103517356905739209noreply@blogger.com