21 June 2025

Carroll—A contemporary introduction—Chapter 1 (Part 2 of 2)


Noël Carroll
Philosophy of Art: A contemporary introduction
(1999)


[33]

Part II
What is representation?

Pictorial representation

...

...

...

[34]

...

Traditional approaches to
pictorial representation

... The resemblance theory of representation states that x represents y just in case x resembles y. ... the illusion theory of pictorial representation maintains that x represents y just in case x causes the illusion of y in spectators. ...

...

... Plato thought painting to be strictly analogous to holding a mirror toward an object. ... [hence] Plato held what we are calling a resemblance theory of representation. ... Note that this theory claims two things. First that resemblance is a necessary condition for representation—that x represents y only if x

[35]

resembles y. But it also claims something else, namely that if x resembles y, then x represents y. ... The first occurrence of "if" here signals that resemblance is a sufficient condition for representation—... The "only if" portion of the formula states that resemblance is a necessary condition for representation. ...

... if x resembles y, does it follow that x represents y? This seems false; ... Imagine two [identical] automobiles... They roll off the assembly line one after the other, ... These two ... will resemble each other maximally, but neither represents the other. ...

... Resemblance is a

reflexive relation.

... But

representation is not reflexive:

I resemble myself in every respect, but I do not represent myself. ...

... resemblance is a

symmetrical relation.

That is, if x is related to y, then y is related to x in the same way (xRy if and only if yRx). If I am Pat's brother, then Pat is my brother. ... But

representation is not a symmetrical relation.

If a picture of Napoleon resembles Napoleon, it follows that Napoleon resembles his picture, but it does not follow that Napoleon represents his picture. ... Thus,

[36]

resemblance cannot serve as a model for representation, ... there will be many cases of resemblance ... that will not warrant attributions of representation. ...

One might try to get around this objection via amending the resemblance theory by stipulating that x must be a visual design. ... Thus, even if Napoleon resembles his portrait, we will not say that he represents it because Napoleon is not a visual design. But this calls attention to a[nother] problem ...

What most visual representations
resemble most
are other visual representations.

A picture of Richard Nixon looks more like a picture of Bill Clinton than it looks like Richard Nixon. ...

...

...

Resemblance, then, does not appear to be a sufficient condition for representation. But is it a necessary condition? ...

... When we say that

one object represents another object,

we mean, at the very least, that

the first object is a symbol for the second object.

... But what is a symbol? ... Peirce

[37]

defined a symbol as

a sign
"whose special significance or fitness
to represent just what it does represent
lies in nothing but the very fact
of there being a habit, disposition or other effective rule
that it will be so interpreted."

...

Consider a military map. A thumbtack can stand for an armored division, but it does not resemble an armored division. ... In a context like this one, what stands for the armored division is arbitrary. ... But

if the symbol relation (denotation) is the core of representation,

and if denotation can obtain without resemblance,

then resemblance is not a necessary condition for representation.

Carroll—A contemporary introduction—Chapter 1 (Part 1 of 2)


Noël Carroll
Philosophy of Art: A contemporary introduction
(1999)


[19]

1
Art and representation

Part 1
Art as representation

Art, imitation and
representation

... In the course of outlining his utopia, [Plato] argued that poets—particularly dramatists—should be outlawed. ... According to Plato, the essence of drama was imitation—the simulation of appearances. ... he believed that appearances appeal to the emotions and that stirring up the emotions is socially dangerous. An emotional citizenry is an unstable citizenry, ready to be swayed by demagogues ...

Arguments like Plato's against poetry are

still heard today

when it comes to discussions of the mass media.

How alike are these arguments, really?

Often we are told that TV with its seductive imagery ... makes for an unthinking electorate.

Because seductive TV imagery makes us ready to be swayed? Because this imagery appeals to the emotions? Who is making that argument quite like Plato?

...

Aristotle, however, believed that Plato's case was overstated. ...

[20]

... Tragedy evokes pity and fear in spectators, but, he said, it does this for the purpose of catharsis—that is, for the purpose of purging the emotions. ...

... Aristotle also thought that Plato was mistaken in presuming that drama did not address the mind ... He maintained that people can learn from imitations, ...

Though Plato and Aristotle disagree in their diagnosis ... Both take poetry to be involved essentially in the imitation of action. ...

What painters try to do, on the Platonic-Aristotelian view, is to reproduce the appearances of things—to copy them— ...

... Plato and Aristotle primarily thought of dance and music as accompaniments ... They were parts of drama, ... Thus, along with drama and painting, Plato and Aristotle thought of music and dance as primarily imitative or representational arts.

[21]

When the Greeks used their word for "art," they had a broader conception in mind than we do today. For them,

an art

was

any practice that required skill.

Medicine and soldiering were arts on this conception. ... [they] would not have defined the arts, in their sense, as solely involved in imitation. However, it is clear that ... [they] thought that these [today's fine arts] shared a common feature: ... imitation.

... the theory of art that we find presupposed [here] ... We may state it thus:

x is an artwork only if it is an imitation.

...

Today, after almost a century of abstract painting, ... the theory that art is imitation appears to us to fail as a general theory of art, ...

...

... in deference to Plato and Aristotle, we should also add that ... When they went in the theater, or when they went to the unveiling of a new sculpture, what they saw were imitations ...

[22]

...

So, in their own time, the imitative (mimetic) theory of art advanced by Plato and Aristotle had some initial plausibility. It coincided with the dominant examples of Greek art and it also

informed readers about
what to look for and to appreciate

in the art of their contemporaries,

Seriously, Boomer?!

20 June 2025

Carroll—A contemporary introduction—Introductory Chapter


Noël Carroll
Philosophy of Art: A contemporary introduction
(1999)


[2]


Introduction


What is philosophy?

The word "philosophy" has many different meanings. ... Herein, "philosophy" will generally refer to a certain academic discipline.

... there are many different schools of philosophy, ... [which] often have different aims and emphases. The type of philosophy that we will we will be exploring in this book is often called analytic philosophy. ...

... it is sometimes called "Anglo-American" philosophy, ... a somewhat misleading label ... it is not ... the only form of academic philosophy in the English-speaking world. ...

... "What exactly does this school of philosophy analyse?" Simplifying drastically, we might say that

what analytic philosophy analyses

[3]

are concepts.

That is why it is sometimes also called

conceptual analysis.

...

Concepts, of course, are fundamental to human life.

Concepts organize our practices.

The concept of a person, for example, ... The concept of a number ... the concept of knowledge ...

Without such concepts, the activities in question would not exist.

Ok,
so politicsmorality,number,
indeed knowledge itself,
these practices (a.k.a. activities)
simply would not exist
without the requisite concepts.

How about without the words?

Must we possess the word
in order to possess the concept?

16 May 2025

Ted Cohen—The Possibility of Art


Philosophy Looks at the Arts
ed. Joseph Margolis
(Third Edition, 1987)


[186]

10. The Possibility of Art:
Remarks on a Proposal by Dickie

TED COHEN
[orig. 1973]



... Like much of Dickie's best work, this essay ["Defining Art"] is brief, direct, and convincing ... This time, however, I think he has tried to make things more simple and ingenuous than they can be.

The definition Dickie presents ...

A work of art in the descriptive sense is (1) an artifact (2) upon which some society or some sub-group of a society has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation .

... it may be helpful to note three special features of Dickie's thesis.


03 May 2025

JACK GLICKMAN—Creativity in the Arts


Philosophy Looks at the Arts
ed. Joseph Margolis
(Third Edition, 1987)




[168]

9. Creativity in the Arts

JACK GLICKMAN
[orig. 1976]

I

What is it to be creative?

The answer usually given
is that there is a "creative process,"
and most writers on creativity have taken their task
to be a description of ... activity ...

... I will argue that that is the wrong way to go about characterizing creativity,
that one must attend to the artistic product rather than to the process.

Well . . . speaking again as a twice-over Music Major, immediately I see one obvious candidate explanation for why most writers on creativity would emphasize the process rather than the product: because they are teachers of prospective practitioners, not of prospective scholars; their prospective-practitioner students cannot learn the process directly from inspection of the product.

27 March 2025

The Dixieland Nightmare

"Keep it simple."

But there isn't a simple solution to the VI7(♭13 ) chord, i.e. in Bourbon Street Parade, Sheik of Araby, Whispering, Rock-a-Bye Your Baby, Wait 'Till the Sun Shines Nellie, and who knows how many other tradjazz warhorses.

This chord has been the bane of my existence for as long as my ears have been awake to it. In my nightmares and often in real life too, it goes down something like this:

If the melody player knows one note of the actual melody, it's probably the ♭13, because that's the highest, tensest note in the chart. So the cherry is always on top, no matter what kind of sundae is on the menu that day.

The bass player has been scolded to "keep it simple," and so given any G chord, the options are G and D. That's it. The language used to describe bass players who play notes other than G and D is even less flattering than the old joke about players who can do only this. So, "simply" put, this is a dominant chord, shit runs downhill, and payday is on Friday.

The chord player, meanwhile, has been playing these songs for decades and hasn't looked at a chart in years, but they know that G-B-Eb forms an augmented triad, hence that we are dealing here with a Black Sheep offshoot of the Augmented family, and that the remaining members of this clan are A-C#-F. And although the chord player is too tasteful to overdo it, planing is definitely a thing, and so planing there will be.

In other words, if everyone narrowly assimilates to their role, eventually there will be at least one C#-D-Eb pile-up, and probably more than one. This is especially likely in Sheik where the chord just sits there for two whole bars at medium tempo. If there are more than a couple of solos then there almost certainly will be a D-Eb-E pile-up too. This is the tradjazz version of thematic development.

I'm being extremely pedantic and a bit viscious here, but I promise there is a point to it.

The point is: the bass and chord players can't treat this chord as either a straight dominant OR augmented chord, because IT IS NEITHER of those things. By the most obvious analysis it is only one note away, but that analysis is so misleading as to deserve to be labeled actually "wrong." The functional diatonic weighting and countour of this chord are unique in tonal music. Hence there also is no point in everyone simply agreeing to treat it as straight dominant or augmented. That doesn't fit any of these melodies anyway, as parties to any such agreement will be quickly and viscerally reminded; but even if it did there would be much lost and nothing gained this way.

Technically, in the case of the above-named tunes, I believe this chordscale is best analyzed as "fifth mode of harmonic (or melodic) minor";

i.e. G7(♭13 ) = C harmonic (or melodic) minor starting on G;

but that is far too verbose to be useful, especially for tradjazzers who would rather live with the clams than bring this kind of talk into the band. So, I propose we label it the "Dixieland Nightmare" chord, in honor of an offhand remark that was once made to me by a bandleader.

In high school and college this chord used to drive me nuts as a listener, but now it drives me nuts as a bass (function) player. 

Staying with G7 as the working example:

If the melody shuttles between E-flat and D, then both of those notes are out; C is outest-of-out, as always; and there is an unresolved ambiguity even in what I consider to be the "correct" reference analysis of the chord, namely: are we using harmonic or melodic minor? i.e. Is it A or A-flat? So even there, one of the most obvious "simple"-but-hip solutions, the G-A-B walkup, comes with the same risk of a pile-up.

And so . . . buckle up, hornheads! The F is a really attractive option. The F is both minimally consonant AND minimally risky. So, we can walk DOWN, G to F; we can even do one full bar of each if we must; and this is a very elegant solution! Most days it seems to me like the ONLY elegant solution. The problem (for others, not for me) is that this lands us on the third of the impending C7 chord. Unless you're dealing with exceptionally hardheaded necrophile purists, this is also quite elegant against the resolution to D in the melody. There are two problems, though. (1) Those necrophiles ARE out there; and (2) generally putting the third on the bottom in this style IS actually pretty destabilizing, and people get annoyed with it when it happens all the time; that is why bass players are so often admonished to "keep it simple" even where doing so creates clams rather than preventing them.

So, as nice as this line is, you can't play it every time. Probably you can only play it once per song, and there are likely to be more choruses than there are unique workable solutions. You can probably get away with the G-A-B walkup, one way or another. I often find myself ghosting the dangerous note in those once-bitten-twice-shy moments. And again, "keeping it moving" IS a viable alternative to "keeping it simple": you can fill-ghost with G-A-B♭-B such that the NCTs really are placed and articulated like NCTs and the anchors like anchors; and this (I really REALLY mean this) usually leads to better results and happier sidespersons as compared with letting some necrophile talk you into "keeping it simple."

"You played a Bb under a G7 chord!" Sure did. If you want to fight about it, fight with Messrs. J.S. Bach and P. Chambers, for starters. Just realize that you're fighting the music that came BEFORE tradjazz at least as much as the music that came after it; you're not just damming the backwash, you're damming the headwaters too. That is really Somethin' Else!

22 March 2025

ARTHUR DANTO—The Artworld


Philosophy Looks at the Arts
ed. Joseph Margolis
(Third Edition, 1987)




[153]

The Artworld

ARTHUR DANTO

[orig. 1964]



Hamlet:
Do you see nothing there?
The Queen:
Nothing at all; yet all that is I see.
Shakespeare: Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 4


Hamlet and Socrates,
though in praise and depreciation respectively,
spoke of art
as a mirror held up to nature.

As with many disagreements in attitude,
this one has a factual basis.

Socrates saw mirrors as but reflecting what we can already see; ...
idle accurate duplications ...
of no cognitive benefit whatever.

Hamlet,
more acutely,
recognized a remarkable feature of reflecting surfaces,
namely that
they show us what we could not otherwise perceive—
our own face and form—

and so art,
insofar as it is mirrorlike,
reveals us to ourselves,
and is, even by Socratic criteria,
of some cognitive utility
after all.

Sure, why not?

Just make doubly sure you are actually looking at a reflection and not a projection.

21 March 2025

[sc]airquotes (ix)—in praise of dick-thinking


Herb Goldberg
The Hazards of Being Male
(1976)


[22]

3. The Wisdom
Of The Penis

...

The essence and ultimate joy of male sexuality lies in the experience of total arousal, the moment when nothing in the world exists except the woman beside him, ... —desire at such a peak that no fantasies could possibly intrude ...

... it is a state most men have experienced at some time in their lives before they allowed their sexual spontaneity to be mired in the intellectualizations about "sexuality," derailed by abstractions about "meaningful relationships" and "sharing," alienated from their own experience by a destructive emphasis on techniques, and numbed by scientific teachings about the physiology of the woman and himself. That, to my mind, is the essence of much of the so-called new sexual enlightenment—the "progress" and the problem.

While women's sexuality has been misunderstood and they've been confused and degrated [sic] by psychoanalytic interpretations ... men, I believe, have been seriously and negatively affected by such labels as "latent homosexuality," "fear of intimacy," "mother fixation," "repressed hostility toward

[23]

women," "fear of failure," ...

Undoubtedly these all contain a basis in truth, but instead of facilitating his growth, the major impact of these concepts and terms have been to propel the male into greater self-consciousness, guilt, and self-accusatory reactions. Belief in these ideas often causes him to distrust his own unique sexual responses.

The beginning of a new male consciousness in the area of sexuality will first require, along with being fully aware of his feelings, a different way of interpreting his responses. ...

... It is true that a boy is given more exploratory privileges and has traditionally been allowed a wider latitude in terms of sexual indulgence. However, cultural evaluations of his sexual behavior have been far more harsh.

Impotence

... In our culture the subject has become an almost maniacal preoccupation.

[24]

... While lip-service is paid to the fact that impotence is a two-way problem, it is the male who is in the majority at the sex therapy clinics. The image of the female's role in male impotence is still largely one of helper—a sometimes supportive, sometimes resentful spectator waiting for him to overcome his problem.

...



The psychoanalytic and psychiatric approach to impotence, which involves tracing back and exploring early experiences and traumas, has a basis in reality but is a little like treating

[25]

food poisoning by exploring early eating habits. It neglects the fact that the real cause may be in the present, with the body appropriately responding to something that is seeks to avoid.

... The vast majority of men are of course capable of becoming erect under certain conditions and with certain women. So-called impotence is almost always a pair-specific phenomenon, that may be making a powerful statement about the man's feelings about the relationship toward the particular woman he is in bed with. Ironic as it may seem, most men, would rather feel they have a medical problem than say very simply to their intimate, "I don't want to make love to you." In other words, acknowledging impotence and claiming, "I've got a problem," is easier than expressing the feeling, "I'm not turned on by you." Therefore, instead of seeing himself as impotent, I would encourage him to say "I don't want to have sex with you." I would have him translate "premature ejaculation" into, "I want to get this over with as fast as possible." I would encourage him to explore and understand his negative responses to the particular woman or situation rather than assume the burden and then try to overcome the "symptom."

My clinical experience indicates that the man who diagnoses himself as impotent is often experiencing something within his relationship or about his partner that is killing his desire. However, the feeling message is only being telegraphed by his body response and is not being recognized in his conscious brain.

A colleague of mine is treating a forty-one-year-old man who became impotent after he lost his job. The patient previously was informed by one well-meaning doctor and had also read in several magazine articles that his inability to achieve erection had something to do with the fact that he associated his job with his masculinity ... An in-depth interview with his wife revealed that she was secretly deeply resentful about his unemployment and blamed

[26]

him for his lack of foresight. Out of guilt, however, she never told him, but she did say to the therapist, "He knew it was bound to happen and he could have done something about it in time, if he had really wanted to." The man's penis was perceiving her unspoken anger and her attitude of rejection toward him and was refusing to "make love" in the face of her anger and rage.

...

A different form of the wisdom of the penis is illustrated by the responses of a twenty-six-year-old recently married engineer. ... The twenty-nine-year-old wife had had two years of psychology courses and had convinced him that he was really angry toward women because of the way his mother had treated him. ... That sounded plausible to him and he came to therapy wanting to be "cured." Several private sessions with his wife, however, brought to light the fact that she had married him primarily because she was approaching thirty and was concerned that she'd never get married. She revealed that she had never been attracted to him physically and had been faking her sexual excitement right from the beginning. ... His penis was aware of her basic lack of true involvement with him. ...

[27]

...

An associate of mine told me of a patient who had recently gone to bed with the wife of a friend of his and found himself impotent. As he explored his reaction he realized that she probably was only using him to precipitate an end to her own faltering marriage. His body sensed this and wisely kept him out of a potentially explosive and dangerous relationship.

In another instance, a forty-two-year-old man became completely impotent with his wife of seventeen years. However, he was extremely potent during occasional visits to prostitutes. When I first spoke to him he was in an extreme anxiety state regarding his inability to perform sexually. He wanted to be "cured" as quickly as possible. ...

As we spoke at greater length however, it readily became apparent that internally he had been experiencing rage toward his wife for many years. ...

He acknowledged that he felt smothered and engulfed by his wife whom he felt resented him and tried to block his every autonomous move. He had been unable to assert himself with her. Instead he had given up his own activities— ... He simply went to work and came home.

While consciously he rationalized his wife's demands and stated that he felt she was justified in her expectations and requests to have him at home with the children, his penis registered his innermost feelings. It was protesting the annihilation of his real self. It was his "truth teller" and it said that he did not really want closeness and physical intimacy with a woman he felt was destroying him.

There are other examples, some so transparent that they are amusing. For example, an obviously hostile woman who was always putting down men, recently asked me if I could confirm her experience that "just about all men today have impotency problems." Clearly, she was not aware of the impact her

[28]

hostility toward men had on her lovers. She apparently believed that erections automatically appear under all conditions. Her underlying assumption was that men have no emotional reactions when it comes to sex, and that a "normal" man will automatically have an erection when there is a naked, willing woman.

Men are not impotent today. They only are impotent with some women under some conditions and their non-responsive reactions reflect important truths that they must learn to trust and understand.

... Certain kinds of contemporary conditioning techniques and "helpful" and "supportive" advice ... would have done these men great disservice. Their basic distrust of the wisdom of their body responses would only have been reinforced.

... I don't believe that an erection, no matter how achieved, is a good thing simply because it reduces a man's anxiety for the moment. I feel that this attitude robs him of the necessity of owning up to his real feelings about his partner or the relationship in which he's involved. The man who gets his erections by cheating on himself through fantasizing sex with other women, arousing himself with pornography, or using various and sundry mechanical devices is demonstrating disrespect for himself and rejection of his real emotions.

... The penis is not a piece of plumbing that functions capriciously. It is an expression of the total self. In these days of over-intellectualization it is perhaps the only remaining sensitive and revealing barometer of the male's true sexual feelings.




Arthur Danto
Analytical Philosophy of Action
(1973)


[116]

5

GIFTS

i

'We are not able to move all the organs of the body with like authority',
Hume observes,
'though we cannot assign any reason besides experience, for so remarkable a difference between one and the other.'

'As we are now',
wrote St Augustine,
'not only do our articulate members obey the will — our hands or feet or fingers — but even those that are moved only by small sinews and tendons we contract and turn as we list, as you may see in the voluntary motions of the mouth and face . . . and the lungs do serve a man's will entirely, like a pair of smith's or organist's bellows.'

Like Hume,
Augustine supposed it merely contingent that our 'authority' should be circumscribed as we find it to be,
for there are men capable of doing odd things: 'We see some men's natures far different from others, acting those things strangely in their bodies which others neither do nor hardly will believe.'

So
we could have been framed
with our authority differently seated:
'God could easily have made us with all our members subjected to the will',
he writes,

adding the possibility
which obviously haunted him as a man,
as we might recall from the Confessions,

'even those which now are moved by lust'.

I italicize the word 'now', which occurs twice in this passage. For it was Augustine's curious view that Adam, in paradise, indeed was so framed that he could perform what I have termed basic actions with his sexual organ, and hence achieve the sexual act immune from the contaminations of sin.

It is thus not sex but lust which is the root of sin, and hence the domination by the flesh of us rather than the domination by us over our bodies, which is the fallen state. Paradise accordingly is a condition we may get some glimpses of from our present powers of direct action, executing intentions without the concomitant torment of desire.



I am not at all certain that
it is a merely contingent matter
that voluntary erection
lies outside the boundaries of direct action.

For curiously enough,
a man who were able to erect at will
might in fact be impotent in the received sense,
which is an incapacity for genuine

[117]

sexual response;

where response implies
precisely the absence of
that order of control
Augustine supposes our first parent
to have exemplified.

A man who had direct control, or who was obliged to exercise direct control, would be a man without feeling, erection being the common expression of male sexual feeling.

And it is in some measure a logical truth that if erection were an action it would not be an expression, and the entire meaning of sexuality would be altered were tumescence something over which we had 'authority'.

Hence feeling,
or lust, if you will,
is not so contingently related to erection
as Augustine's argument implies.

But
perhaps it is his claim that there would in fact have been no sexuality in paradise:
a wry conjecture in the light of post-Freudian sexual romanticism.



09 March 2025

MORRIS WEITZ—The Role of Theory in Aesthetics


Philosophy Looks at the Arts
ed. Joseph Margolis
(Third Edition, 1987)




[143]

The Role of Theory in Aesthetics

MORRIS WEITZ

[Pub. 1956, tho' a prizewinner in '55]


Theory
has been central
in aesthetics and
is still the preoccupation
of
the philosophy of art.

Its main avowed concern remains the determination of the nature of art which can be formulated into a definition of it.

It construes definition as the statement of the necessary and sufficient properties of what is being defined, where the statement purports to be a true or false claim about the essence of art, what characterizes and distinguishes it from everything else.

Each of the great theories of art—Formalism, Voluntarism, Emotionalism, Intellectualism, Intuitionism, Organicism—converges on the attempt to state the defining properties of art.

Each claims
that it is
the true theory
because
it has formulated correctly
into a real definition
the nature of art;

and that the others
are false
because
they have left out
some necessary or sufficient property.

"This looks reads like a setup, Jim Morris."

By now, with several decades of shockingly robust pluralism in the rear view mirror, those -isms look more like affirmative declarations of intent, whether before or after the fact, than they do like negative boundary-drawing maneuvers. We've moved on to using art, and we dare any purported definitions to try to catch up to us and our using; we use art in whatever way feels correct to us in a given moment, this rather than casting about for some necessary or sufficient property that has been left out.

It turns out that art, seemingly, has infinite uses. It has too many uses to be amenable to a real definition. But that doesn't matter, because the outcomes of the uses are clear as day, and because we human beings are, for better and worse, moral creatures. That's why we actually do need to hear everyone's opinion, and it's alright if some of those opinions seem too moralistic and not sufficiently aesthetic. Here, for once, bad opinions are more valuable than good definitions!

No one would/could expect philosophers of art to be any but the last to notice. Our Man here is among the more acute. First, though, he has to set us up.

22 February 2025

MARGOLIS—The Definition of Art


Philosophy Looks at the Arts
ed. Joseph Margolis
(Third Edition, 1987)




[137]


Part Two

The Definition of Art





...


The trouble with any effort to fix the basic category-term, "work of art," is that it will depend on what counts as an aesthetic point of view.

But
what counts as an aesthetic point of view cannot itself be decided by some simple inspection of actual usage.

Philosophers seem to decide,
more than to find,
what the boundaries of aesthetic interest are
...

25 January 2025

Fingerprints or Mushroom Stamps?



This is my Goodreads review of Johanna Drucker's Sweet Dreams: Contemporary Art and Complicity.


Feeling horny? Grab this book and flip to page 153. You'll find a photo of Family Romance, a "mixed media" piece comprised of four half-realistic, fully naked mannequins representing mom, dad, bro and sis.

Really need your hands free while you ogle? Break the spine of the book along this page; that way it'll lay flat on the table all by itself. Or, if you live in Southern California, you can head to the Central Library in LA and grab their copy, which has already had its spine broken in precisely this spot and is prone to fall open to precisely this page and this image.

I hesitate to add, " . . . for precisely this purpose," because there is no way I could know for sure what the "purpose" of the spine-breaker was, no way to know if this purpose was shared or how widely, no way to know if there was in fact any purpose at all. Among hundreds of LAPL books I've checked out, dozens have had broken spines. I can't remember another one that had an image of nude children anywhere in it, let alone precisely where the spine was broken; but let's imagine, in a mashup of the Infinite Monkey Theorem with Lacan's Missing Signifier, that there is at least one other book in these particular stacks that would seem, to me, to depict nude children in a semi-realistic manner, and that there is at least one other person in Southern California who would agree with me that this is what it depicts. Were this all to be true, the book I happened to check out wouldn't be special even in this regard. All that would be special about it from my standpoint, perhaps, is that I happened to read some other inscrutable, overlong art-crit book which mentioned this one favorably, my interest was piqued, I swapped one for the other at the circulation desk, and I was unlucky (lucky?) enough to find my latest heist literally falling open to an unusally pungent image before I was able to read a single word. This is all that I ought to be certain of. Nothing I can observe about the book proves anything further.

This has been my inner rationalist speaking. My inner empiricist is not as sanguine.

17 January 2025

GEORGE DICKIE—The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude


Philosophy Looks at the Arts
ed. Joseph Margolis
(Third Edition, 1987)




What to do with this, knowing that it comes not at the end but at the beginning of a long series of refinements, abandonments and reformulations?

I only know how to do one thing, so that's what I'll be doing here.


[100]


The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude

GEORGE DICKIE

[orig. 1964]


Some recent articles1 have suggested the unsatisfactoriness of the notion of the aesthetic attitude and it is now time for a fresh look at that encrusted article of faith.

Note 1 lists two articles:

Marshall Cohen, "Appearance and the Aesthetic Attitude" (1959)

Joseph Margolis, "Aesthetic Perception" (1960)

This conception has been valuable to aesthetics and criticism in helping wean them from a sole concern with beauty and related notions. However, I shall argue that the aesthetic attitude is a myth...

03 January 2025

TIMOTHY BINKLEY—Contra Aesthetics


Philosophy Looks at the Arts
ed. Joseph Margolis
(Third Edition, 1987)




[80]


Piece: Contra Aesthetics

TIMOTHY BINKLEY

[orig. 1977]


I. What Is This Piece?

1.
The term "aesthetics" has a general meaning in which it refers to the philosophy of art. In this sense, any theoretical writing about art falls within the realm of aesthetics.
    There is also a more specific and more important sense of the term in which it refers to a particular type of theoretical inquiry which emerged in the eighteenth century when the "Faculty of Taste" was invented.
In this latter sense, "aesthetics" is the study of a specific human activity involving the perception of aesthetic qualities such as beauty, repose, expressiveness, unity, liveliness.

I think I prefer the first sense to the second, even though it often appears semantically imprecise or even outright deceptive.

Later in the Anthology we encounter some powerful arguments against conflating "aesthetics" with "philosophy of art"!

Although frequently purporting to be a (or even the) philosophy of art
,
    aesthetics so understood is not exclusively about art
:

This is exactly what I don't like about the second sense.